Abadi v. Marina Dist. Dev. Co.
| Decision Date | 05 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-00314 |
| Parties | AARON ABADI, pro se, Plaintiff, v. MARINA DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a BORGATA HOTEL CASINO & SPA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Aaron Abadi's (“Plaintiff”) Amended Complaint, received by the Court on July 11, 2022, asserting claims against Defendants Marina District Development Company, LLC (“Borgata”)-which does business as the Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa-and Michael Schultz (“Schultz” and with Borgata “Defendants”), Borgata's Chief of Security. In an Order dated July 1, 2022, this Court granted Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, but simultaneously dismissed his original Complaint for lack of constitutional standing pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)'s mandatory screening process and granted him leave to amend. (ECF No 4). The Court now turns to that same screening process for Plaintiff's amended pleading, and finds that it too must be dismissed.
Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), courts must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, brought by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis that is (i) frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the asserted claims. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
When evaluating a claim under § 1915(e)(2), the Court applies the same standard that governs a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). E.g., Schreane v. Seana, 506 Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Courts construe pro se plaintiffs' submissions liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard that those filed by attorneys, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), but “pro se litigants must allege sufficient facts in their complaint to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint generally asserts that Defendants unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by denying him access to their hotel and casino facilities based on his refusal to wear a face mask as required by certain Executive Orders issued by the Governor of New Jersey to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he intended to travel to Atlantic City, gamble in Borgata's casino, and stay in its hotel in a complimentary room from May 15, 2021, through May 18, 2021. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5, ¶ 16). In advance of his trip, Plaintiff corresponded with Schultz via email to explain that he has a sensory processing disorder-confirmed by a doctor's note-that prevented him from wearing a face mask and to ask for an accommodation regarding Borgata's policies requiring masking pursuant to then-operative[1] Executive Orders in the State. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5, ¶¶ 10, 17; Exhs. A, C-D, ECF No. 5-1). Schultz responded that the Borgata could not accommodate Plaintiff's request. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5, ¶¶ 18-19).
In response to Schultz's communication, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights (“DCR”). (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5, ¶ 31). DCR informed Plaintiff that it declined to pursue any further investigation of the issue by letter dated December 21, 2021. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5, ¶¶ 31-32; Exh. I, ECF No. 5-1). Plaintiff's original Complaint and subsequent amendment in this Court followed. (Compl., ECF No. 1; Am. Compl., ECF No. 5).
The Amended Complaint contains six counts, alleging Defendants' violation of (i) Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.; (ii) the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); (iii) 28 U.S.C. § 1985; (iv) 28 U.S.C. § 1986; (v) 28 U.S.C. § 1983; and (vi) the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 et seq. Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot proceed under any of these stated causes of action, and therefore the Amended Complaint must be dismissed.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' failure to allow him to make use of their facilities without a face mask amounts to a discriminatory denial of access to public accommodations in violation of Title III of the ADA. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5, ¶¶ 52-67). Title III protects individuals from discrimination on the basis of disability “in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Critically, however, “[u]nder Title III of the ADA, private plaintiffs may not obtain monetary damages and therefore only prospective injunctive relief is available.” Anderson v. Macy's, Inc., 943 F.Supp.2d 531, 538 (W.D. Pa. 2013). This caveat necessarily draws the Court back to the standing concerns it raised in its Order dismissing Plaintiff's original Complaint. (ECF No. 4).
“[T]o satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) [he or she] has suffered an ‘injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Because only injunctive relief is available to plaintiffs under Title III, the key question is not whether a plaintiff's rights have been violated in the past, but rather whether there is a “real and immediate threat” of continued injury. See Anderson, 943 F.Supp.2d at 538 (quoting Access 4 All, Inc. v. Absecon Hosp. Corp., No. 04-06060, 2006 WL 3109966, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2006)); see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974) (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”).
Here, it seems clear to the Court that Plaintiff continues to lack constitutional standing to raise his Title III claims because there is no ongoing threat that any of his rights will be violated. The Executive Orders on which Defendants' policy was based are no longer in effect. N.J.A.C. Exec. Order No. 242 (2021). Although Plaintiff rightly alleges that this is no guarantee that a new mandate might be imposed someday, (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5, ¶ 92), he offers no factual support for the contention that there is an actual, imminent risk that this may occur or that the Borgata will again refuse him the opportunity to visit without a mask.[2] Lacking as much, Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to pursue his Title III claims, which cannot be allowed to proceed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
§ 794(b). Thus, the Act only applies to those entities which receive federal funds. E.g., Hair v. Fayette County, 265 F.Supp.3d 544, 556 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (citing U.S. Dept. of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605 (1986)).[3]
To state a claim under the Act, a plaintiff must show that (1) they are an individual with a disability; (2) they are otherwise qualified for participation in the program or activity, or for the potion sought; (3) they were excluded from the position sought, denied the benefits of, or subject to discrimination under the program or activity solely by reason of their disability; and (4) the relevant program or activity receives federal financial assistance. Id.
As to the fourth element, here, Plaintiff merely alleges that (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5, ¶ 69). This...
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