Abadi v. Target Corp.
| Decision Date | 09 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-CV-2854 |
| Parties | AARON ABADI, Plaintiff, v. TARGET CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Pro se Plaintiff Aaron Abadi[1] (“Plaintiff”) maintains three claims against Target Corporation (“Target”) and unnamed employees of Target Corporation (collectively “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of a disability in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“Title III”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq, (“PHRA”). ECF No. 2. Before the Court is Target's fully briefed Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(A). ECF Nos. 23, 25, 26. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Target's Motion and dismiss this case. An appropriate order will follow.
The incident giving rise to this case is straightforward. On the evening of January 11, 2021, Plaintiff entered a Target store located at 4000 Monument Road in Philadelphia (the “Store”). ECF No. 2 ¶ 24. At the time, Target maintained policies for its retail stores to ensure the health and safety of its guests and employees during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. ECF No. 23 at 5. One such policy was the requirement that customers entering the Store wear a face mask. ECF No. 2 at ¶ 24.
However, Plaintiff entered the Store without wearing a mask due to a medical condition. ECF No. 2, Ex. B (letter from Dr. Karasina). Plaintiff suffers from a sensory processing disorder and is extremely sensitive to touch. ECF No. 2 at ¶ 10-12. Plaintiff cannot wear glasses, hats, neckties, starched shirts, or face masks without experiencing headaches and anxiety. Id. When approached by an employee of the Store, Plaintiff attempted to explain his disorder and reason for not wearing a mask to no avail. Id. at ¶ 24. Eventually, several employees of the Store were following Plaintiff and imploring him to put on a mask or otherwise leave the Store. Id. at ¶ 25. Plaintiff asked to speak with the Store Manager, who told Plaintiff that he had to leave, notwithstanding Plaintiff's attempts to explain that his medical condition exempted him from mask requirements. See id. at ¶ 26-32. Plaintiff left the Store after this exchange. Id. at ¶ 33. Though Plaintiff does not specify the total duration of the incident, the Court infers that it lasted only “several minutes.” See id. at ¶ 29.
After unsuccessfully pursuing a claim with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, Plaintiff initiated this action on July 19, 2022 when he filed the Complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 1-2. The Pro se Complaint asserted five claims against Target and unnamed employees of Target: discrimination in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“Count I”); conspiracy to interfere with civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (“Count II”); negligence in preventing an interference with civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (“Count III”); discrimination in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“Count IV”); and discrimination in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Count IV”). ECF No. 2. As set forth in the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks: (i) compensatory damages of at least $300,000; (ii) punitive damages as determined by the Court; (iii) declaratory relief providing that Plaintiff is exempt from wearing a mask and is “allowed to go anywhere and everywhere without harassment or discrimination” and that “disability laws did not go into abeyance until Covid disappears”; (iv) injunctive relief requiring Target to “notify every employee[] and staff member that disability laws are applicable to all, and that they are all required to become familiar with those laws”; (v) injunctive relief requiring that Target “allow Plaintiff to enter all its facilities”; and (vi) any other relief deemed appropriate. Id. at 20-21.
On July 28, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis but dismissed Counts II and III with prejudice.[2] ECF No. 7. Plaintiff sought reconsideration of the dismissed claims on August 8, 2022, which the Court denied on August 29, 2022. ECF Nos. 11, 15. Plaintiff then appealed to the Third Circuit on September 8, 2022. ECF No. 18. On December 1, 2022, the Third Circuit dismissed Plaintiff's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. ECF No. 28.
Following the Court's dismissal of Counts II and III, Target filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's remaining claims (Counts I, IV, and V) on October 11, 2022. ECF No. 23. Plaintiff filed a Response on October 13, 2022, to which Target Replied on October 31, 2022. ECF Nos. 25-26. The Motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for consideration.
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion addresses a Court's “very power to hear the case.” Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). The Third Circuit has identified two types of Rule 12(b)(1) motions: “[those] that attack the complaint on its face and [those] that attack subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of fact[.]” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. In the present matter, Target purports to raise a factual attack. ECF No. 23 at 11. However, a factual attack may be raised “at any stage of the proceedings, from the time the answer has been served until after the trial has been completed.” Id. at 889-92 (emphasis added); see also Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357-58 (3d Cir. 2014) (). Here, Target's Rule 12(b)(1) motion was filed prior to an answer and will therefore be “considered a facial challenge to jurisdiction.” Aichele, 757 F.3d at 357.
In reviewing a facial attack, “the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron / Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a facial attack calls for a district court to apply the same standard of review it would use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), i.e., construing the alleged facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Accordingly, “well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true, and reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor.” Id. Dismissal is proper for claims that “clearly appear to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” or are “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Complaint must contain sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint is plausible on its face when the plaintiff pleads factual contention that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Courts are required to “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)).
However, the complaint must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The pro se litigant's complaint is “to be liberally construed” and held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).; Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011). Yet Pro se plaintiffs must still meet a minimum standard by “alleg[ing] sufficient facts in their complaint to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
Viewed in the light most favorable to him, Plaintiff has not shown that he has standing to pursue injunctive relief under Title III, and dismissal of Count I is appropriate pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Additionally, Plaintiff's factual allegations fail to state any plausible claims for relief under Section 504, and dismissal of Count V is warranted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Finally, the Court will construe the Complaint to confer subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claim but will nevertheless dismiss Count IV because Plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law. Because dismissal is otherwise appropriate, the Court does not reach Target's assertion that dismissal is required pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(A).[3]
a. Plaintiff's Title III Claim
Plaintiff brings his first claim under Title III of the ADA which prohibits discrimination on “the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,...
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