Abadjian v. Gulf Oil Corp.
| Decision Date | 09 March 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 83-6686:TJH(Px),CV 83-6686:TJH(Px) |
| Citation | 602 F. Supp. 874 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | Jack ABADJIAN, Mark Ball, Joseph Brown, Ben Ceson, John Eghenian, Brad May, Nassir Mazarei, Donald Prouse, Al Rosenstein, Herb Schweizer, Aram Shishmanian, Joe Smiderle, and Stephen Webber, Plaintiffs, v. GULF OIL CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation; Gulf Oil Real Estate Development Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation; Robert W. Baldwin; J. Roger Kemple; Tom Otjen; Joe Mayers; George Williams; Otto Meyer; Glen R. Jensen, Thrifty Oil Co., a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants. |
Kenneth P. Roberts, Mark E. Lehman, Shapiro, Laufer, Krane, Jacobson & Posell, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs.
Jack D. Fudge, Michael L. Hickok, Ralph Zarefsky, McCutchen, Black, Verleger & Shea, Los Angeles, Cal., Donald C. Smaltz, Leighton M. Anderson, Thomas H. Mabie, Smaltz & Neelley, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.
This cause of action arises from the decision of Gulf Oil Corporation ("Gulf") to withdraw from the Southern California gasoline market and to sell its service stations in the area to Thrifty Oil Company ("Thrifty"). With the exception of plaintiff Herb Schweizer,1 each plaintiff occupies and operates a gasoline service station under a lease originally executed with Gulf before June, 1978. Plaintiffs can be classified into two sub-groups according to the marketing plan they have adopted from Gulf. Some of the plaintiffs operate their leased service stations under a single supply agreement with Gulf and market fuel purchased from the company using its trademark, trade name and symbol.2 The remaining plaintiffs operate "unbranded" service stations pursuant to several continuous supply agreements with Gulf. All these stations were included in the service stations Gulf agreed to sell to Thrifty.
The "unbranded" operators allegedly discontinued their use of Gulf trademarks and symbols on the suggestion of the company. Plaintiffs contend that because Gulf had difficulty competing in the Southern California market it decided to create a debranding program for its independent operators. The first amended complaint alleges that in January, 1978, Gulf called a general operators meeting which several plaintiffs attended. (See First Amended Complaint, ¶ 14.) According to plaintiffs, Gulf announced a new marketing program at this meeting, whereby branded Gulf service station operators would debrand their stations and sell Gulf motor fuel without the benefit of trademarks and logos. (See First Amended Complaint, ¶ 14.) In exchange, Gulf allegedly promised the proposed debranded operators an increased supply of motor fuel at reduced rates, if they agreed to the new marketing plan. Id. Consequently, several operators agreed to adopt this plan.
Following the announced debranding program, Gulf prepared to sell its assets in the Southern California market to another oil distributor. In 1979, Gulf initially planned to sell all of its assets located in the Los Angeles Division, which covered the states of Arizona, California, and Nevada, as part of a "package deal." The available package included Gulf's asphalt plants, its Santa Fe Springs Refinery, and more than three hundred service stations, including the stations leased to the plaintiffs. By September, 1980, Gulf had accepted an offer from Thrifty covering the leased service stations (rather than the entire "package deal") and the parties executed a written agreement (the "1980 Letter Agreement") acknowledging the proposed transaction.
After Gulf notified the independent operators about the Thrifty sale, the relationship between Gulf and the independent operators deteriorated. In August 1981, plaintiffs filed their original complaint in state court alleging several violations of state and federal law. Most of the counts in the complaint were premised on state law. The state counts involved claims for fraud, violations of the California Franchise Investment Law, estoppel, unfair competition and requests for declaratory and injunctive relief arising from an alleged conspiracy between Gulf and Thrifty to violate plaintiffs' rights under both state and federal law. Thrifty sought unlawful detainer actions against the leases as their new landlord.
The alleged federal question jurisdiction arises from plaintiffs' claim that the September, 1980, sales agreement between Thrifty and Gulf terminated plaintiffs' franchises and obligated Gulf, under the provisions of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (the "PMPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2801 et seq., to offer plaintiffs first refusal rights before closing the Thrifty sale. In opposition, Gulf argues: (1) whether there is a franchise relationship with each plaintiff, and (2) if yes, then the franchise relationship has been assigned to Thrifty as part of the sale of assets transaction. Thus, the defendants claim none of plaintiffs' rights have been violated under the PMPA.
In November, 1981, defendants first petitioned for removal to federal court asserting that the amended state complaint alleged a federal question under the PMPA. However, this Court remanded the entire case to state court for the following reasons. First, the Court found jurisdiction over Thrifty unattainable under the Act since Thrifty is not plaintiffs' franchisor. Secondly, the Court found jurisdiction over the claims against Gulf could not be maintained because it could not sever Gulf's claims from the nonremovable claims against Thrifty. Finally, the Court remanded on the grounds that the Ninth Circuit does not recognize pendent party jurisdiction. See Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir.1975), aff'd. 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976).
Defendants now seek a second opportunity at removal. This most recent removal petition, filed October 17, 1983, contends that plaintiffs' October, 1983, filing of a motion for summary adjudication in state court under the PMPA justifies removal to federal court. At the subsequent removal hearing, the Court requested additional information concerning the merits of defendants' claim that Thrifty is a franchisor as contemplated under the Act. Defendants submit the Santa Fe Springs Refinery Contract ("SFSR Contract"), which assigns Gulf's rights in supply agreements with independent dealer-operators to Thrifty, as proof supporting their renewed claim of federal jurisdiction of the counts relating to Thrifty. Thus, the Court faces a reconsideration of its earlier remand order and addresses the issue of defendant's timeliness in this second removal petition.
Plaintiffs are generally considered the masters of their complaints and free to decide the forum in which to bring an action. However, Congress has provided a mechanism for a defendant to gain access to a federal tribunal though the plaintiff brings his action in state court. Under the removal statute, a defendant need only show that the removal petition is timely filed and that a federal court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(b) and 1446(a).
Section 1446(b) sets forth a thirty day limitation for filing a petition once a basis for removability exists. Here, plaintiffs assert that defendants second removal petition, filed October 17, 1983, is untimely and should relate back to the filing date for the original complaint, not the date when plaintiffs filed for summary adjudication in state court. Thus, plaintiffs argue this Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition.
However, the statutory time limit for removal petitions is merely a "formal and modal requirement"; it is not jurisdictional. See Fristoe v. Reynolds Metal Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir.1980); 1A Moore's Federal Practice and Procedure ¶ 0.1683.-5 (1974 ed.). Even if the Court adopted the relation back argument, plaintiffs would be estopped from objecting to the timeliness of the removal petition, since defendants' present petition for removal is based on plaintiffs' own October 5, 1983 motion for summary adjudication of actions arising "under PMPA." Id. At a minimum, the court may find that plaintiffs most recent summary judgment motion extends the time period for defendants to file a removal petition. Moreover, the plain language of the removal statute provides that the thirty day period commences after defendants receive "a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper" from which removability can be ascertained. § 1446(b) (emphasis added). Thus, defendants' petition falls within the necessary time limitation.
In a removal action involving multiple defendants, movants can invoke several theories to support federal jurisdiction. They can remove on the grounds that the cause of action arises under federal law, or they can rely on diversity of citizenship, or they can remove under the pendent party theory. 28 U.S.C. § 1441; See also Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd., 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976); Schroeder v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 702 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir.1983). In the present action, diversity and pendent party jurisdiction are unavailable to these defendants. The complaint indicates that several defendants, including Thrifty, are California residents or citizens, thus, complete diversity does not exist as to them. In addition, the Ninth Circuit strongly disapproves of pendent party jurisdiction unless the parties can show an independent ground of jurisdiction exists over the claims against the pendent party. See, Benson v. U.S. Small Business Administration, 644 F.2d 1366, 1367 (9th Cir.1981); Libby, McNeill, and Libby v. City National Bank, 592 F.2d 504, 510 (9th Cir.1978); Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.1977). Therefore, this Court's decision on removability turns on the federal character of the claims...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rustom v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
...however, to remand to state court a preempted claim over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. 2 Abadjian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 602 F.Supp. 874 (C.D.Cal.1984), involved an action brought under the PMPA that had been removed from state court. The court there held that it lacked remo......
-
Douglass v. Weyerhaeuser Co.
...removable, it would only mean that the pendent parties could not remain in federal court. Defendant's reliance upon Abadjian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 602 F.Supp. 874 (C.D.Cal.1984) is misplaced. In Abadjian, Judge Hatter remanded the entire action to the state court because there was no basis for......
-
Chestnut Hill Gulf, Inc. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc.
...607 (D.Mass.1990); it was decided by the same district judge who decided the case before us. Plaintiffs cite Abadjian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 602 F.Supp. 874 (C.D.Cal.1984), as support for their argument, stating that the court "held that the assignment [of a Gulf franchise] violated the PMPA.........
-
Hutchens v. Eli Roberts Oil Co.
...they have no contract if the relationship between the refiner and its distributor is less than arm's length. See Abadjian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 602 F.Supp. 874, 881 (C.D.Cal.1984); Bsales v. Texaco, Inc., 516 F.Supp. 655, 661-62 (D.N.J.1981). The district court, however, found that Hutchens ha......