Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State

• Decision Date: 12 November 2014
• Docket Number: No. 27466.,27466.
• Citation: 767 S.E.2d 157,410 S.C. 619
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: ABBEVILLE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Appellants–Respondents, v. The STATE of South Carolina, et al., of whom Hugh K. Leatherman, Sr., as President Pro Tempore of the Senate and as a representative of the South Carolina Senate and James H. Lucas, as Speaker Pro Tempore of the House of Representatives and as a representative of the South Carolina House of Representatives are, Respondents–Appellants, and The State of South Carolina, Nikki R. Haley, as Governor of the State of South Carolina, are, Respondents. Appellate Case No. 2007–065159.

410 S.C. 619

767 S.E.2d 157

ABBEVILLE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Appellants–Respondents

v.The STATE of South Carolina, et al., of whom Hugh K. Leatherman, Sr., as President Pro Tempore of the Senate and as a representative of the South Carolina Senate and James H. Lucas, as Speaker Pro Tempore of the House of Representatives and as a representative of the South Carolina House of Representatives are, Respondents–AppellantsandThe State of South Carolina, Nikki R. Haley, as Governor of the State of South Carolina, are, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2007–065159.

No. 27466.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Sept. 18, 2012.

Decided Nov. 12, 2014.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 2015.

Carl B. Epps, III, Stephen G. Morrison, and Elizabeth Scott Moise, and Rachel Atkin Hedley, all of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, of Columbia, and Laura Callaway Hart, of Duff, White, & Turner, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellants–Respondents.

Robert E. Stepp, Elizabeth Van Doren Gray, and Roland M. Franklin, Jr., all of Sowell Gray Stepp & Lafitte, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondents–Appellants. Attorney General Alan Wilson, Deputy Solicitor General J. Emory Smith, Jr., and Swati Shah Patel, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

Kenneth L. Childs, William F. Halligan and Keith R. Powell, all of Childs & Halligan, of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae, South Carolina Association of School Administrators

and South Carolina School Boards Association.

W. Allen Nickles, III and Susan M. Fittipaldi, both of Nickles Law Firm, of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae, The South Carolina Education Association.

Amanda G. Adler and Sue Berkowitz, both of Columbia, of South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center, for Amicus Curiae, The South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center.

Matthew T. Richardson, of Wyche, Burgess, Freeman & Parham, P.A., of Columbia, and Ellen M. Boylan, of Education Law Center, of Newark, New Jersey, for Amicus Curiae, The League of Women Voters of South Carolina and the South Carolina State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Stephen K. Benjamin and Tina N. Herbert, of McAngus, Goudelock & Courie, of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae, South Carolina Association of School Administrators and South Carolina School Boards Association.

Edward W. Laney, IV and R. Hawthorne Barrett, both of Turner Padget Graham & Laney, P.A., of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae, South Carolina Association of School Nurses.

Opinion

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).

Chief Justice TOAL.

The South Carolina Constitution requires there be a system of free public schools that affords each student the opportunity to receive a minimally adequate education.¹ The plaintiffs, including eight South Carolina school districts, claim that the State has failed to meet this constitutional obligation. The trial court held that the State's failure to address the effects of pervasive poverty on students within the plaintiffs' school districts prevented those students from receiving the required opportunity. The trial court performed a thorough and cogent examination of the issues of this case. While we agree with the trial court's conclusion regarding the adverse effects of poverty, the Record demonstrates that there are myriad other issues, under the State's control, working to prevent students within these districts from receiving the constitutionally required opportunity. Thus, we find in favor of the plaintiffs, and affirm as modified.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs in this action are school districts, students, parents, and taxpayers (collectively, the Plaintiff Districts) individually and collectively challenging South Carolina's method of funding public schools.² The defendants include the State of South Carolina; Nikki R. Haley, as Governor of South Carolina; Hugh K. Leatherman, Sr., as President Pro Tempore of the South Carolina Senate, and as a representativeof the South Carolina Senate; and James H. Lucas, as Speaker Pro Tempore of the South Carolina House of Representatives and as a representative of the South Carolina House of Representatives (collectively, the Defendants).

I. Abbeville I

In Abbeville County School District v. State (Abbeville I), 335 S.C. 58, 515 S.E.2d 535 (1999), the Plaintiff Districts brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the Defendants' funding of public primary and secondary education. Specifically, the Plaintiff Districts claimed that South Carolina's education system was underfunded, resulting in a violation of the state constitution's education clause, and that to the extent the Defendants distributed funds without regard for school district wealth under the Education Improvement Act (EIA), the system violated the state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection. Id. at 64, 515 S.E.2d at 538. The Plaintiff Districts also asserted that the Education Finance Act (EFA) created a private cause of action. Id. (citing EIA, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 59–21–420 to –450 (1990 & Supp.1998); EFA, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 59–2010 to –80 (1990 & Supp.1998)). The Plaintiff Districts did not seek “equal” state funding, but instead alleged that the current funding scheme resulted in inadequate education. Id. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Id. at 63, 515 S.E.2d at 538. This Court reversed the trial court's ruling as to the state constitution's education clause, and affirmed as to the remaining issues. Id. at 64, 515 S.E.2d at 538.

Prior to hearing Abbeville I, this Court denied constitutional challenges to the EFA and EIA statutory distribution methods. Richland Cnty. v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 349–50, 364 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1988). We relied on Campbell, and the United States Supreme Court's ruling in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), to deny the Plaintiff Districts' equal protection claims. Abbeville I, 335 S.C. at 64–65, 515 S.E.2d at 538; see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (“The argument here is not that the children in districts having relatively low assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of education may be determined by the amount of money expended for it, a sufficient answer to appellees' argument is that, at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.” (footnotes omitted)). The Abbeville I Court also upheld the trial court's ruling that the EFA did not create a private cause of action. Abbeville I, 335 S.C. at 65, 515 S.E.2d at 539 (citing S.C.Code Ann. § 59–20–30 (1990 & Supp.1998) ; Citizens for Lee Cnty. v. Lee Cnty., 308 S.C. 23, 29, 416 S.E.2d 641, 645 (1992) ).

The most prominent issue in Abbeville I concerned Article XI, section 3 of the South Carolina Constitution, entitled “System of free public schools and other public institutions.” Id. at 66, 515 S.E.2d at 539 (quoting S.C. Const. art. XI, § 3 ). That section of the constitution provides:

The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free public schools open to all children in the state and shall establish, organize and support such other public institutions of learning as may be desirable.

S.C. Const. art. XI, § 3.

The trial court held that the section did not impose qualitative standards, and unless the Plaintiff Districts claimed that a universal system of free public schools did not exist, they could state no claim under the education clause. Abbeville I, 335 S.C. at 66, 515 S.E.2d at 539. This Court disagreed, and held that the South Carolina Constitution requires the General Assembly to “provide for the opportunity for each child to receive a minimally adequate education.” Id. at 68, 515 S.E.2d at 540. The Court defined “minimally adequate” to include the provision of adequate and safe facilities in which students have the opportunity to acquire:

(1) The ability to read, write, and speak the English language, and knowledge of mathematics and physical science;

(2) A fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, and of history and governmental processes; and(3) Academic and vocational skills.

Id. at 68–69, 515 S.E.2d at 540 (“We recognize that we are not experts in education, and we do not intend to dictate the programs utilized in our public schools. Instead we have defined, within deliberately broad parameters, the outlines of the constitution's requirement of minimally adequate education.”). The Court found the complaint stated a claim of inadequate educational opportunity, and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 69, 515 S.E.2d at 541.

II. Abbeville I Remand

On remand, the trial court commenced a non-jury trial from July 18, 2003, until December 9, 2004. According to the trial court, this Court's decision in Abbeville I created a single issue on remand: “Are the...