Abbott-Davis v. United States
| Decision Date | 25 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 8:19-cv-2819-TPB-CPT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | BEVERLY ABBOTT-DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
Before me on referral are Defendant United States's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 20), Plaintiff Beverly Abbott-Davis's response in opposition (Doc. 22), and the government's reply (Doc. 23). I heard oral argument on the matter on February 15, 2022. For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that the government's motion be denied.
This premises-liability action stems from Abbott-Davis's visit to the James A. Haley Veterans Hospital in Tampa, Florida on Sunday, June 11, 2017. (Doc. 20-2 at 20, 105-06, 108-09 210). The purpose of Abbott-Davis's visit was to see her brother- in-law, who was then a patient at the hospital. Id. at 20. Abbott-Davis was accompanied on the visit by her husband, Darrel Davis, Sr., and her stepson, Darrel Davis Jr. Id. The weather that day was sunny, and the hospital's pathways were dry. Id. at 23.
Abbott-Davis and her family left the hospital in the early evening hours while it was still daylight. Id. To get to their parked vehicles, they proceeded along one of the concrete sidewalks on the property, which the hospital's groundskeepers cleared of debris each morning, except on the weekends.[2] Id. at 22; (Doc. 22-2 at 16-17).
Abbott-Davis was wearing six- to eight-inch wedge heels at the time. (Doc. 20-2 at 24).
As Abbott-Davis was walking on the sidewalk, she stepped on “something, ” causing her leg to “buckle” and her body to fall. Id. at 20. The area of the pathway where Abbott-Davis tumbled was bordered on either side by mounded landscaped beds, which contained loose decorative rocks but no apparent physical barrier or edging to separate the rocks from the walkway. Id. at 110; (Doc. 22-2 at 13, 14, 17). According to Abbott-Davis, she saw two “small”-size rocks and one “normal”-size rock on the sidewalk after she fell. (Doc. 20-2 at 26). She estimated that “[o]ne was a little smaller than [a] quarter[, o]ne was about the size of a quarter or a little bigger[, a]nd one was the size of a half dollar or a little bigger.” Id. at 27. All three rocks were brown or orange-brown in color. Id. at 26, 138.
Abbott-Davis's husband witnessed the accident and testified that he saw his wife's foot “slipping” or “sliding on something” immediately before she hit the ground. Id. at 138-140. He attributed her spill to one “main rock” among “quite a few” rocks or pebbles that were present on the pathway. Id. at 137-140. After the fall, Abbott-Davis's husband and stepson located the rock on the walkway within a short distance of Abbott-Davis and approximated its size to be anywhere between that of a half-dollar and a golf ball. Id. at 138-39, 212-13. The hospital's supervising groundskeeper, Simpson, as well as the hospital police officer, Hector Velez, who investigated the incident acknowledged that they had seen decorative rocks on the sidewalk on prior occasions. (Docs. 22-2 at 18; 22-3 at 26). Simpson and Velez maintained, however, that they were not aware of any previous slip-and-fall accidents caused by such rocks during their respective tenures at the hospital. (Doc. 20-2 at 275, 285).
Claiming that she “suffered serious physical and emotional injuries” as a result of her fall (Doc. 22 at 1), Abbott-Davis initiated this action in November 2019 pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (FTCA) (Docs. 1, 8).[3] In her operative complaint, Abbott-Davis alleges a single count of negligence and seeks $15, 000 in damages. Id. In its answer, the government denies any wrongdoing and asserts several affirmative defenses. (Doc. 9).
Following the close of discovery, the government filed the instant motion for summary judgment, arguing that Abbott-Davis cannot establish a prima facie case of negligence. (Doc. 20). Abbott-Davis countered in her response that the government's summary judgment motion should be denied because genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to her negligence claim. (Doc. 22). After careful review of the parties' submissions and with the benefit of oral argument, the matter is now ripe for the Court's resolution.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir. 2007). “An issue of fact is ‘material' if, under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case.” Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014) ). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Id.
If a moving party makes the requisite showing, the non-movant must then designate specific facts (by her own affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file) evidencing that there is a contested question of material fact for trial. Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). To do so, the non-movant must rely on more than conclusory statements and unsubstantiated allegations. Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”) (citations omitted). If a party fails to properly buttress “an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact, ” the court may “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to” the sought-after relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Welding Servs., 509 F.3d at 1356. That is, it must credit the evidence tendered by the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences in her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citation omitted). In doing so, the court may not “weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations” regarding a party or its presentation of the facts. Wate v. Kubler, 839 F.3d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
In an FTCA action, the law of the state where the act or omission occurred is controlling. Gonzalez-Jiminez De Ruiz v. U.S., 378 F.3d 1229, 1230 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) () (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962)). Because Abbott-Davis's accident transpired in Florida, the substantive law of Florida applies here. Id. ( that, “[u]nder Florida's choice of law provisions, Florida law governs all substantive issues”); Mokris v. United States, 2021 WL 6135191, at *6 n.3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2021) (same).
Under Florida law, a plaintiff seeking to prevail on a negligence claim must show: 1) the defendant had a duty “to conform to a certain standard of conduct;” 2) the defendant breached that duty; 3) there is a causal connection between the defendant's breach and the plaintiff's injury; and 4) the plaintiff suffered a loss or damages as a result of the defendant's breach. Reyes v. BJ's Restaurants, Inc., 774 Fed.Appx. 514, 518 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citing Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So.2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003)); Vallot v. Logan's Roadhouse, Inc., 567 Fed.Appx. 723, 735 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So.3d 1087, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)).[4]
The government originally maintained in its motion that Abbott-Davis cannot satisfy the second and third elements (i.e., breach of duty and causation) (Doc. 20 at 1-2) but conceded at oral argument that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to the causation requirement.[5] I therefore turn to the government's breach of duty argument.
Florida common law has historically recognized three separate legal categories for persons entering onto a premises: invitee, licensee, and trespasser. Seaberg v. Steak N' Shake Operations, Inc., 154 F.Supp.3d 1294, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2015). It is uncontested here that Abbott-Davis was an invitee at the time of the incident. (Doc. 20 at 9) (government stating that Abbott-Davis “was an invitee at the VA hospital on June 11, 2017”).
A property owner owes two duties to an invitee: 1) “the duty to warn of dangers of which the owner has or should have knowledge and which are unknown to the invitee and cannot be discovered by the invitee through the exercise of reasonable care;” and 2) “the duty to use reasonable care in maintaining the property in a reasonably safe condition.” Pratus v. Marzucco's Constr. & Coatings, Inc., 310 So.3d 146, 149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Seaberg, 154 F.Supp.3d at 1299-3000 (same) (citing Krol v. City of Orlando, 778 So.2d 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)). These two duties are distinct. Wolford v. Ostenbridge, 861 So.2d 455, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
As to the first duty, the government posits that it had no obligation to warn Abbott-Davis about the decorative rocks because the rocks purportedly constituted an open and obvious condition as a matter of law. (Doc. 20 at 12). This argument is predicated upon the principle that a property owner ordinarily does not have an “obligation to protect [an] invitee against dangers...
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