Abbott v. Crown Motor Co. Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-3365.,02-3365. |
| Citation | 348 F.3d 537 |
| Parties | Donald ABBOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWN MOTOR COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED: Brian K. Murphy, MURRAY, MURPHY, MOUL & BASIL, (briefed) Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
Robert P. Foster, FISHER & PHILLIPS, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Geoffrey J. Moul, MURRAY, MURPHY, MOUL & BASIL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
Robert P. Foster, (argued and briefed), Rebecca J. Jakubcin (briefed), FISHER & PHILLIPS, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee.
Before: KENNEDY, GUY, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff appeals from the grant of summary judgment to his former employer, defendant Crown Motor Company, Inc. ("Crown"), on his claims of illegal retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 and of intentional infliction of emotional distress in violation of Ohio common law. For the reasons explained below, we REVERSE the district court's award of summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's federal and state claims of illegal retaliation, AFFIRM summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's state claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and REMAND to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We review the district court's order granting summary judgment de novo. Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1999). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). We must accept the non-moving party's evidence, and draw all justifiable inferences in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "material" fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A "genuine" issue exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
Defendant Crown, which sells and repairs cars, hired plaintiff Abbott, a white male, as an automotive technician in June of 1995.1 In March of 1996, Crown hired Donald Crump, a black male, as an automotive detailer. Scott Morrison, the Parts & Services Director, and Jim Purnell, the work dispatcher, both white males, were Crump's and plaintiff's immediate superiors. On July 8, 1997, Crump filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC)/Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that, since June 2, 1997, Purnell and Morrison had been harassing him and that Purnell had denied Crump work hours. With respect to the harassment, in particular, Crump alleged that Purnell used various racial epithets and that Morrison told a joke that disparaged blacks. Crump informed plaintiff that Crump had identified plaintiff to the OCRC/EEOC as a witness to the race discrimination, and that the OCRC might contact plaintiff. After the OCRC served Crump's formal charge upon Crown, Morrison launched an investigation into Crump's allegation that Purnell had racially harassed him. Crump testified that upon receiving a copy of Crump's OCRC/ EEOC charge, Morrison advised Crump that he had better watch his back. Plaintiff testified that Crump had warned him that Morrison had told Crump that Morrison would retaliate against anyone who was trying to disrupt the shop's operations.
About a week after receiving the charge, Morrison held a Service Department meeting at which he announced that allegations of discrimination had been made and asked any witnesses to come forward. On September 22, 1997, plaintiff informed Morrison that he had witnessed Purnell's use of racial epithets and that he would testify to it in a court of law in support of Crump's race discrimination claim against Crown. According to plaintiff, while he was discussing his grievances with Morrison, Morrison was "very attentive, very abiding," in "some agreement" with plaintiff, and "pretty well shocked" about Purnell's use of racial slurs. Yet, plaintiff also described Morrison, after he had learned that plaintiff would testify about the discrimination, as being "amazed, befuddled, surprised, disbelieving," gritting his teeth, and expressing contempt. Morrison told plaintiff that he would take care of the situation. Morrison fired Purnell the following day. In March of 1998, approximately eight months after filing the charge, Crump moved to withdraw his OCRC/EEOC charge against Crown. According to OCRC's letter granting his withdrawal, dated March 12, 1998, Crump no longer wished to pursue the matter and had stated "that the racial harassment and derogatory remarks have ceased." Sometime in July of 1998, approximately eleven months after Morrison fired Purnell, Crump tendered his resignation to Crown, subject to two weeks' notice, and took a job with Coca Cola at a higher rate of pay. The parties dispute whether Crown's alleged retaliation against Crump was a factor in his resignation.
On August 28, 1998, defendant discharged plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that his discharge was in retaliation for his having come forward to support Crump's discrimination claim. In support of that theory, he points to various statements made to Crump indicating Crown's continued displeasure with Crump's having filed the OCRC/EEOC charge as well as Morrison's continued discriminatory treatment of Crump. Plaintiff testified that, approximately one month before his termination, Millard Ripley, Crown's Managing Partner, held "a shop meeting at which he threatened that it was inappropriate for employees to take complaints outside of Crown Motors." Crump also testified that Ripley had stated that "all complaints regarding employment should be made internally." According to Crump, after that meeting, which occurred on the day that Crump tendered his resignation, Ripley told Crump that he should not have gone behind Crown's back to file the OCRC charge and that Crump should have taken his complaint directly to Morrison instead. In an affidavit filed before Crump's deposition, Crump stated that, around his last day of employment, Morrison reminded Crump that he had told Crump that he would "get back at those who had supported the charge of discrimination against he and Crown."
The parties dispute many of the events preceding the date of plaintiff's termination. For approximately four weeks before plaintiff was fired, the lift in plaintiff's bay was out of commission. Many of plaintiff's assigned jobs required the use of a lift. Morrison told plaintiff that he should wheel his tool box to a substitute lift across the garage, and that his lift would be repaired. Morrison testified that plaintiff complained to him every day about the lift, and was carting his tool box back and forth and "throwing his tools around." Plaintiff testified that he complained only about once a week, and that he never threw his tools. Morrison testified that plaintiff had engaged in other disruptive conduct, which plaintiff denies. The parties also dispute what occurred on the date that plaintiff was fired. Morrison testified that plaintiff demanded that he be sent home with pay until the lift was repaired. Crown later informed the Bureau of Worker's Compensation that it had discharged plaintiff for insubordination. Plaintiff testified that, at the end of the fourth week, Morrison had promised that the lift would be repaired over the weekend. On Monday when it was still broken, plaintiff went to Morrison's office to find out when the lift would be repaired. Plaintiff testified that Morrison immediately became angry and asked whether plaintiff wanted Morrison to fix the lift. Plaintiff answered that he did not expect Morrison to fix it, but that he had to come to Morrison about it. Morrison then replied that they did not want plaintiff to work there any more, stating that he had already spoken with Ripley and received his permission to discharge plaintiff. Morrison told plaintiff that he was firing him for bringing "the morale of the shop down." Plaintiff denies ever raising his voice to Morrison; threatening Morrison; expressing "rage or any other emotions that could be considered confrontational"; storming into Morrison's office; slamming the door; or giving Morrison an ultimatum to get the lift "fixed or else." On the day after Morrison fired plaintiff, Greg Wade, whom Morrison had hired earlier in June of 1998, had started work in the service bay made available only by plaintiff's termination. According to plaintiff, a few days after his termination, Ripley informed plaintiff that Morrison had fired him because plaintiff had put his nose in other people's business. Plaintiff testified that he understood this to mean that Morrison fired him for his involvement in Crump's discrimination complaint because "[t]hat was the only thing that ... [plaintiff] had his nose in."
Plaintiff also contends that, after his unlawful termination, Morrison further retaliated against plaintiff for his involvement in Crump's OCRC/EEOC charge by giving a negative recommendation of him to a potential employer. Crown conceded that Morrison had informed a potential employer that he had terminated plaintiff "during the busy season" and that plaintiff "was not eligible for rehire." As Morrison admitted, it violated company policy to provide such a reference.2
"Summary judgment is proper where the plaintiff fails to present evidence sufficient to create a dispute of material fact with respect to an element of his retaliation claim." Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d...
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