Abbott v. Mette
| Decision Date | 31 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 20-131-RGA |
| Parties | RICHARD L. ABBOTT, Plaintiff, v. LUKE W. METTE, KATHLEEN M. VAVALA, COLLINS J. SEITZ, JR., JAMES T. VAUGHN, JR., TAMIKA R. MONTGOMERY-REEVES, GARY F. TRAYNOR, and KAREN L. VALIHURA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Pending before the Court in this matter is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Richard L. Abbott's ("Plaintiff") Amended Complaint (the "Motion"). (D.I. 17) The Motion is brought by Defendants Luke W. Mette, Kathleen M. Vavala, Collins J. Seitz, Jr., James T. Vaughn, Jr., Tamika R. Montgomery-Reeves, Gary F. Traynor and Karen L. Valihura (collectively "Defendants") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the Motion be GRANTED.
Plaintiff is a Delaware resident and a member of the Delaware Bar ("the Bar"). (D.I. 16 at ¶ 1) He has been a member of the Bar in good standing since December 14, 1989. (Id.)
L. Valihura are Justices of the Delaware Supreme Court. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-8) Defendants Luke W. Mette and Kathleen M. Vavala are respectively employed as the Chief Disciplinary Counsel and Disciplinary Counsel of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC"), which is an agency of the Delaware Judicial Branch. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3)
The Delaware Supreme Court Rules and the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Disciplinary Procedure ("DLRDP") established the ODC, as well as the Preliminary Review Committee ("PRC"). (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13) The Delaware Supreme Court established the ODC to investigate attorney misconduct that may be grounds for discipline. Del. Supr. Ct. R. 64(e). The ODC, in turn, may present a matter to the PRC and recommend the filing of a petition for discipline ("Petition") with the Board of Professional Responsibility ("BPR"). (D.I. 16 at ¶¶ 17-18)
If the ODC presents a matter to the PRC in this way, the respondent attorney ("respondent") may submit written information for the PRC's consideration. DLRDP 9(b). The PRC determines whether there is probable cause to conclude that the respondent engaged in professional misconduct and it may either approve, disapprove or modify the ODC's recommendation. DLRDP 9(b)(3). If the PRC approves a petition for discipline recommended by the ODC, then the ODC files the Petition with the BPR; thereafter, the respondent may file an Answer. DLRDP 9(c). The BPR next conducts an evidentiary hearing, at which the ODC bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. DLRDP 15(d). If the BPR finds that the respondent engaged in professional misconduct, it makes a finding as to what is the appropriate disciplinary action. DLRDP 9(d). The BPR submits a final report containing its recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended discipline to the Delaware Supreme Court. Id. The parties may file objections to this report and recommendation, and thereafter, theDelaware Supreme Court makes the final decision as to whether to impose discipline on the respondent. Id.; Del. Supr. Ct. R. 63.
The Amended Complaint alleges that in May 2015, Sam Glasscock, III, a Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery, filed a complaint (the "complaint") with the ODC regarding Plaintiff. (D.I. 16 at ¶ 21) In the complaint, Vice Chancellor Glasscock took issue with Plaintiff's conduct while litigating a civil action in Delaware state court; more specifically, the substance of the complaint related to Plaintiff's: (1) "advice to his client on how to potentially avoid a [c]ourt [j]udgment;" and (2) "[Plaintiff's] preparation of [two] [d]eeds transferring title to [two] houses owned by his client to his client's wife[.]" (Id. at ¶ 23)
On September 13, 2016, the ODC advised Plaintiff by letter that it intended to present a Petition regarding his conduct to a panel of the PRC on October 5, 2016. (Id., ex. B) With the Petition, the ODC intended to assert that, as part of his work on the civil matter before Vice Chancellor Glasscock, Plaintiff had violated Rules 3.5(d), 4.4(a) and 8.4(d) of the Delaware Lawyer's Rules of Professional Conduct ("DLRPC"). (Id., ex. C) Plaintiff thereafter submitted a written statement to the PRC on September 29, 2016 in which, inter alia, Plaintiff requested that the matter before the PRC be postponed and stayed pending resolution of a separate state legal action that Plaintiff had filed against then-Chief Disciplinary Counsel Jennifer-Kate Aaronson. (Id., ex. D at 3) The matter was later stayed, pending the resolution of the state court action. (D.I. 18 at 4)
In March 2018, the ODC filed a Petition for Interim Suspension regarding Plaintiff (the "March 2018 Petition"); thereafter, the Delaware Supreme Court stayed that matter. (D.I. 16 at ¶ 41) Plaintiff alleges that he then "sought relief from [the] [s]tay to file a response, but theSupreme Court ignored it[.]" (Id. at ¶ 41) In 2019, Defendant Mette ("Mette"), who had by this point become Chief Disciplinary Counsel, dismissed the March 2018 Petition. (Id. at ¶ 43)
On December 16, 2019, the ODC notified Plaintiff that it would now present its Petition to the PRC on January 8, 2020, and that it now asserted that Plaintiff had violated Rules 3.4(c), 3.5(d), 8.4(a) and 8.4(d) of the DLRPC. (Id., ex. E; D.I. 18 at 4) After another postponement, on January 14, 2020, Plaintiff was notified by the ODC that it intended to present the Petition to the PRC on February 5, 2020, and that it was now alleging that Plaintiff had violated Rules 3.4(c), 3.5(d), 8.4(a), 8.4(c) and 8.4(d) of the DLRPC.
Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant suit in this Court on January 27, 2020. (D.I. 1) On the same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO" or the "TRO Motion"), in which he requested that the Court "prohibit further action by Defendants regarding the investigation and any attempts at prosecution in a pending lawyer discipline matter[.]" (D.I. 3 at 1) The instant case was assigned to United States District Judge Richard G. Andrews. On February 3, 2020, the District Court denied the TRO Motion in a written Order. (D.I. 12)
Thereafter on February 5, 2020, the PRC approved a Petition for Discipline (the "2020 Petition") against Plaintiff. (D.I. 16 at ¶ 67; id., ex. K) The 2020 Petition alleges that Plaintiff violated each of the five rules that had been referenced in the ODC's January 14, 2020 letter. (D.I. 16 at ¶¶ 67-77; id., ex. K) Plaintiff contends that all of these allegations are "factually and/or legally spurious." (Id. at ¶ 78)
As noted above, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this case on January 27, 2020. (D.I. 1) Plaintiff then filed the currently operative Amended Complaint on March 9, 2020. (D.I. 16) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges six counts against Defendants: Count I is a federal claimfor violation of the civil RICO statute, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962, (id. at ¶¶ 87-106); Count II alleges violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") relating to claims brought pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments, (id. at ¶¶ 107-17); Count III is a claim alleging violation of the Delaware state RICO statute, pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1502 & 1503, (id. at ¶¶ 118-28); Count IV is a claim seeking a declaratory judgment pursuant to the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, (id. at ¶¶ 129-32); Count V is a claim seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, filed pursuant to Section 1983 and Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (id. at ¶¶ 133-40); and Count VI is a claim seeking a permanent injunction, (id. at ¶¶ 141-44).
After Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, Defendants filed the instant Motion on March 23, 2020. (D.I. 17) The Motion was fully briefed as of April 29, 2020. (See D.I. 22) The District Court referred the Motion to the Court for resolution on July 14, 2020. (D.I. 23)
In their Motion, Defendants' leading argument is that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed under the abstention doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and clarified in Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982). (D.I. 18 at 5-9; D.I. 22 at 1-6) The Court will first set out the applicable legal standard. It will then explain why it agrees with Defendants that abstention is the proper course here, requiring dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.1
As a general matter, assuming that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, the federal court's "obligation to hear and decide [the] case is virtually unflagging." Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Younger abstention doctrine is an exception to that rule, however, and it "requires federal courts to abstain from deciding cases that would interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings." Malhan v. Sec'y U.S. Dept. of State, 938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d. Cir. 2019); see also Sprint, 571 U.S. at 77-78. The doctrine is rooted in principles of comity (i.e., a proper respect for state functions) and federalism. Sprint, 571 U.S. at 77; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
Younger abstention applies to only "three exceptional categories" of parallel state actions: (1) criminal prosecutions; (2) certain civil enforcement proceedings; and (3) pending civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions. Sprint, 57 U.S. at 78-79; Harmon v. Dep't of Fin., 811 F. App'x 156, 157 (3d Cir. 2020). If a court determines that a state proceeding fits into one...
To continue reading
Request your trial