Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce

• Decision Date: 11 December 1899
• Docket Number: No. 376,376
• Citation: 20 S.Ct. 153,44 L.Ed. 217,175 U.S. 409
• Parties: T. O. ABBOTT, Plff. in Err. , v. NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE of Tacoma, Washington, A Corporation, Chester Thorne, J. W. Wallace, Edward Huggins, and W. H. Bogle and Charles Richardson as Copartners under the Firm Name and Style of Bogle & Richardson
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

175 U.S. 409

20 S.Ct. 153

44 L.Ed. 217

T. O. ABBOTT, Plff. in Err.,

v NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE of Tacoma, Washington, A Corporation, Chester Thorne, J. W. Wallace, Edward Huggins, and W. H. Bogle and Charles Richardson as Copartners under the Firm Name and Style of Bogle & Richardson.

No. 376.

Submitted November 6, 1899.

Decided December 11, 1899.

Messrs. John H. Mitchell and W. C. Sharpstein for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Thomas R. Shepard, W. H. Bogle, and Charles Richardson for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff in error, Abbott, brought this action in the superior court of the state of Washington to recover damages sustained by the plaintiff on account of an alleged libel published against him by the National Bank of Commerce of Tacoma, Washington, and the individual defendants above named.

It appears that in 1895 the defendant bank, at the instance of the other defendants as its directors and attorneys, instituted a suit in the United States circuit court for the district of Washington against three of its former directors to recover certain alleged losses on account of loans made by them. The complaint in that suit alleged that Abbott was one of the per- sons to whom the loans were made, and among other things charged substantially that he was insolvent when they were made.

In the present action Abbott alleged in his complaint that the statements in reference to him and his financial condition in the other suit were defamatory and untrue; that the defendants not only had no reason to believe them to be true, but knew them to be untrue, and that those statements were not pertinent, relevant, or material to the bank's cause of action.

The defendants in their answer averred that the language referred to was contained in the complaint filed by the bank, and not otherwise; that the court in which that complaint was filed had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter of the action; and that the language used was pertinent, relevant, and material to the issues, and was in good faith believed by defendants to be true, and was true.

In his reply the plaintiff, besides denying the averments of the answer, alleged that he was not a party to the action in which that complaint was filed, was not bound by any proceedings therein, that his rights cannot be determined in any manner thereby, and that 'any attempt to deprive him of his rights or his property by any process therein or thereunder is contrary to and in violation of the Constitution and laws of the state of Washington, and of § 1 of article 14 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.'

The trial court, on motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissed the suit upon the ground that the facts stated did not constitute a cause of action, and because the matters alleged to be libelous were privileged.

This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of Washington. Among other things that court said: 'Whether the Federal court had jurisdiction of the cause in which the pleading was filed, and of the parties thereto, is purely a legal question, to be determined from an inspection of the pleading itself. The Federal court overruled a demurrer to the bill which contained the objectionable matter, and we are constrained to hold, as did that court, that it had jurisdiction. See National Bank of Commerce argument to demonstrate that the words complained of were pertinent and material to the cause, and the question to be determined is, Were they absolutely privileged, regardless of whether they were true or false, used maliciously or in good faith? The doctrine of privilege communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.' Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 14 Atl. 518. It cannot be doubted that it is a privilege liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to great hardships; but to give legal sanction to such suits as the present would, we think, give rise to far greater hardships.' Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce, 20 Wash. 552, 56 Pac. 376.

Among the errors assigned in this court are that the supreme court of Washington erred in affirming the judgment of the superior court of Pierce county because the effect of such judgment was to deprive plaintiff in error of his property without due process of law, contrary to the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; in holding that the United States circuit court for the district of Washington, western division, had jurisdiction of the suit brought by the National Bank of Commerce of Tacoma; in holding that the libelous matter contained in the bill of complaint filed in that suit was privileged; and in holding that such matter was pertinent and material to the issue in that suit.

This case is now before us upon motion to dismiss the present writ of error for want of jurisdiction in this court, and, that motion failing, to affirm the judgment below on the ground that the question upon which jurisdiction...