Abdul-Wadood v. State, ABDUL-WADOOD

Docket NºABDUL-WADOOD
Citation521 N.E.2d 1299
Case DateApril 12, 1988
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

Page 1299

521 N.E.2d 1299
Lokmar Yazid ABDUL-WADOOD a/k/a Lincoln Love, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 48S00-8602-CR-209.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
April 12, 1988.
Rehearing Denied June 27, 1988.

Page 1300

Thomas G. Godfrey, Anderson, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., John D. Shuman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DeBRULER, Justice.

This is a direct appeal following conviction in a trial by jury of the offenses of attempted murder and class C battery. Appellant was sentenced to consecutive fifty and eight year terms of imprisonment, those sentences to also run consecutively to the time appellant was already serving.

There are five issues presented for review: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that specific intent to commit murder is an element of attempted murder; (2) whether the trial court erred by excluding defense evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred by not permitting the defense to recall State's witness officer Abel; (4) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce incident reports from Pendleton Reformatory; and (5) whether the trial court erred by not permitting the defense to recall Byron Alston as a surrebuttal witness.

These are the facts pertinent to this appeal. Appellant was an inmate at the reformatory in Pendleton, Indiana. On Nov. 5, 1984, correction officers attempted to transfer appellant from J cell house to administrative segregation. The standard procedure for such a move is to go to the cell door and handcuff the prisoner and then another officer mechanically releases the door from a remote location. When appellant was ordered to pack his belongings for the move he refused. The door to his cell was then mistakenly released. Appellant left the cell, armed himself with a knife, and was eventually cornered by correction officers.

In restraining appellant, officer Stonebarger was cut on the hand by appellant and officer Abel was stabbed in the back by appellant. Appellant asserts that he had no intent to kill the officers but had been informed by other inmates that the officers intended to physically assault him during the transfer. He claims he obtained the knife for his own self preservation and that the stabbing was accidental and a result of his being sprayed with mace and losing his balance.

I

Appellant urges that the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to instruct the jury that specific intent to kill is a requisite element of the crime of attempted murder. He is correct.

The trial court gave the following instruction to the jury:

"To sustain the charge of attempted murder, the State must prove the following propositions:

First: That the Defendant knowingly engaged in conduct against DAVID ABEL.

Second: That the Defendant's conduct against DAVID ABEL constituted a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of murder."

This instruction is defective in that it fails to inform the jury that the substantial step toward the crime of murder must have been accompanied by the state of mind which is required for the crime of murder. In Smith v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 355 we declared the giving of this instruction to be fundamental error. See also Santana v. State (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1010. The error in the instruction creates a serious risk of wrongful conviction. This instruction purports to set out the complete burden of the prosecution. It is an instruction, which when given at a trial, creates a moment of focus and special attention. The judge takes special care in reading it loudly and distinctly. The jury perceives its special and crucial character. Armed with the information in this instruction, the jury could rationally deem itself authorized to convict because it was convinced beyond

Page 1301

a reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately engaged in cooperative conduct, in a series of developing events, which culminated in an enterprise carrying the death risk, even though there could have been...

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27 practice notes
  • Harrison v. State, No. 65S00-9105-DP-380
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • 4 Enero 1995
    ...Murder in Indiana. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (1988); Vance v. State (1993), Ind., 620 N.E.2d 687, 690; Abdul-Wadood v. State (1988), Ind., 521 N.E.2d 1299, 1300, reh'g denied. "[T]he Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] protects the accused against conviction except upon proof bey......
  • Buie v. State, No. 68S00-9202-CR-00109
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • 11 Abril 1994
    ...essential element constituting the crime of Murder in Indiana. Vance v. State, 620 N.E.2d 687, 690; Abdul-Wadood v. State (1988), Ind., 521 N.E.2d 1299, 1300. "[T]he Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonabl......
  • Brown v. State, No. 49A02-9010-PC-626
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 3 Marzo 1992
    ...the jury on the element of specific intent in the crime of attempted murder is fundamental error. In Abdul-Wadood v. State (1988) Ind., 521 N.E.2d 1299, 1301, the court explained that it is error for the instructions to leave the impression that the jury may convict if it believes that the ......
  • Dunlap v. State, No. 49S00-0002-CR-104.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • 29 Enero 2002
    ...some indication that the fact was different from the testimony of the witness whom it sought to contradict."); Abdul-Wadood v. State, 521 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Ind.1988)("[S]light discrepancy in the two statements by [the witness] is not of fundamental importance nor necessarily inconsistent."......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
27 cases
  • Harrison v. State, No. 65S00-9105-DP-380
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • 4 Enero 1995
    ...Murder in Indiana. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (1988); Vance v. State (1993), Ind., 620 N.E.2d 687, 690; Abdul-Wadood v. State (1988), Ind., 521 N.E.2d 1299, 1300, reh'g denied. "[T]he Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] protects the accused against conviction except upon proof bey......
  • Buie v. State, No. 68S00-9202-CR-00109
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • 11 Abril 1994
    ...essential element constituting the crime of Murder in Indiana. Vance v. State, 620 N.E.2d 687, 690; Abdul-Wadood v. State (1988), Ind., 521 N.E.2d 1299, 1300. "[T]he Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonabl......
  • Brown v. State, No. 49A02-9010-PC-626
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 3 Marzo 1992
    ...the jury on the element of specific intent in the crime of attempted murder is fundamental error. In Abdul-Wadood v. State (1988) Ind., 521 N.E.2d 1299, 1301, the court explained that it is error for the instructions to leave the impression that the jury may convict if it believes that the ......
  • Dunlap v. State, No. 49S00-0002-CR-104.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • 29 Enero 2002
    ...some indication that the fact was different from the testimony of the witness whom it sought to contradict."); Abdul-Wadood v. State, 521 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Ind.1988)("[S]light discrepancy in the two statements by [the witness] is not of fundamental importance nor necessarily inconsistent."......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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