Abdulhussain v. MV Pub. Transp.

• Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 22-0522
• Decision Date: 06 June 2023
• Citation: Abdulhussain v. MV Pub. Transp., 1 CA-CV 22-0522 (Ariz. App. Jun 06, 2023)
• Parties: HAMEED ABDULHUSSAIN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. MV PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

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HAMEED ABDULHUSSAIN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. MV PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0522

Court of Appeals of Arizona, First Division

June 6, 2023

Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County CV2022-090183 The Honorable Rodrick J. Coffey, Judge

AFFIRMED

Law Offices of Kimberly A. Eckert, Tempe

By Kimberly A. Eckert

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Littler Mendelson, P.C., Phoenix

By Jacqueline Langland, R. Shawn Oller

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

KILEY, JUDGE

¶1 Hameed Abdulhussain appeals the superior court's dismissal of his complaint against his former employer, MV Public Transportation ("MV Public") for compensation for unused vacation time. Because Abdulhussain's claim for unused vacation time arises out of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), his claim is preempted under § 301 ("Section 301") of 29 U.S.C. § 185, the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The allegations in the complaint, accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to Abdulhussain as the non-moving party, see Albers v. Edelson Tech. Partners L.P., 201 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 7 (App. 2001), establish that Abdulhussain was employed as a driver for MV Public for almost 12 years as of July 2021. As a member of the Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1433, Abdulhussain was covered by a CBA that contains detailed provisions regarding wages, hours, overtime, and other employment terms. Article 25 of the CBA entitles employees with 10 or more years of service to 160 hours of paid vacation time each year, which could be "cash[ed] in" each year if unused. Article 25 further provides that vacation time does not accrue on a monthly basis but is awarded annually on the employee's service anniversary date.

¶3 Article 9 of the CBA requires arbitration of any grievance or dispute "as to any matter involving the interpretation or application of the terms" of the CBA. Under the CBA, grievances are to be submitted in writing to the company's General Manager within 10 days of the alleged infraction, to be followed by a meeting if one is requested. If not resolved internally, grievances are then referred to an arbitrator to "hear and decide the issue." The arbitration process commences with a written demand for arbitration followed by a request to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service for a list, from which the parties choose, of seven individuals available to serve as arbitrator.

¶4 In August 2020, Abdulhussain attempted to cash in 160 hours of unused vacation time that he claimed to have accrued. MV Public denied his request, asserting that he had accrued only 80 hours of unused vacation time. Abdulhussain spoke to MV Public's General Manager and Human Resources Director about the discrepancy but did not reach a satisfactory resolution. In June 2021, Abdulhussain "filed a claim for [his] vacation hours" with the Industrial Commission of Arizona. MV Public then "placed [him] on administrative paid leave" before terminating his employment in July 2021.

¶5 Abdulhussain later withdrew his complaint with the Industrial Commission and sued MV Public in superior court, alleging that it wrongfully failed to pay him for 160 hours of accrued but unused vacation time. Abdulhussain asked that the court "triple [his] vacation hours number of 160 to be 480 hours," presumably under A.R.S. § 23-355, which allows an employee to "recover in a civil action against [a] . . . former employer an amount that is treble the amount of the unpaid wages."

¶6 MV Public moved to dismiss the complaint under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(5) due to purportedly insufficient service of process and, alternatively, under Rule 12(b)(6) because Section 301 preempted Abdulhussain's state law claim.

¶7 Citing both Rule 12(b)(5) and Rule 12(b)(6), the superior court granted MV Public's motion and dismissed Abdulhussain's complaint with prejudice. Abdulhussain now appeals. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is only appropriate if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff "would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof." Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352 356, ¶ 8 (2012) (citation omitted). We review the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, assuming the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulging all reasonable inferences therefrom. Id. at 355-56, ¶¶ 7-9. We likewise review "issues of law relating to alleged federal preemption of state law claims" de novo. Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc., 245 Ariz. 501, 504, ¶ 7 (2018).

¶9 Section 301 of the LMRA states that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Although Section 301 "contains no express language of preemption," Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019), the United States Supreme Court has long recognized its preemptive effect, see Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962) (holding that Section 301 preempts state law claims because "Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules."). Specifically, the Court has long held that "any suit alleging a violation of a provision of a labor contract must be brought under [Section 301] and be resolved by reference to federal law." Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1151-52 (cleaned up) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985)).

¶10 The Ninth Circuit has "articulated a two-step inquiry to analyze [Section 301] preemption of state law claims." Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg'l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2019). First, if an "asserted cause of action involves a right . . . [that] exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and the analysis ends there." Id. (cleaned up). If the right "exists independently of the CBA," the court "moves to the second step," under which the state law claim is preempted if the right underlying the cause of action is "substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement." Id. at 1032-33 (citation omitted).

¶11 Abdulhussain argues his claim is not preempted because it is simply a "claim[] for unpaid wages" that "[does] not require interpretation of the CBA." Noting that Arizona statutorily defines "wages" as "nondiscretionary compensation due an employee in return for labor or services rendered . . . for which the employee has a reasonable expectation to be paid," see A.R.S. § 23-350(7), Abdulhussain asserts that the monies he sought fall squarely within this definition. Because pay for unused vacation time "was part of his compensation package," Abdulhussain asserts, he had "a reasonable expectation to be paid" for that time irrespective of whether "the vacation pay was offered as part of the collective bargaining agreement."

¶12 We disagree. Arizona statute creates no right to paid vacation time nor to exchange accrued vacation time for pay. See A.R.S. §§ 23-350 et seq. The right to paid vacation time, and to exchange accrued vacation time for pay, exists, if at all, solely by agreement of the parties. Without Article 25 of the CBA, therefore, Abdulhussain would have had no reasonable expectation of entitlement to compensation for unused vacation time. See Mitchell v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 602 F.Supp.2d 258, 261 (D. Mass. 2009) (holding that Section 301 preempted a former employees' claim for unpaid vacation benefits because former employees "would not be entitled to any vacation pay absent the CBA," rendering the claim "in no sense independent of the CBA"); cf. Bell v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 733 F.3d 490, 491, 494 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that employees' wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act were not preempted because "[a]n employee's right to relief under [that act] . . . is distinct from an employee's contractual rights as provided in a collective bargaining agreement").

¶13 Because state law confers no right to compensation for unused vacation time absent agreement of the parties, Abdulhussain's claim for such compensation "exists solely as a result of the CBA." See Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1032 (citation omitted). His claim is therefore preempted under the first step of the Ninth Circuit's test, "and the analysis ends there." Id. (cleaned up); see also Barton v. Creasey Co. of Clarksburg, 718 F.Supp. 1284, 1287 (N.D. W.Va. 1989) (holding that Section 301 preempted former employees' claim for unpaid vacation benefits because right to such benefits was created by CBA, not state law); cf. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that employees' claim for compensation for employer-mandated travel time was not preempted by Section 301 where "the right to be compensated for employer-mandated travel exists as a matter of [California] state law").

¶14 Abdulhussain's claim is likewise preempted under the second step of the Kobold test. See Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1032-33 (state law claim "substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement" is preempted (citation omitted)). Abdulhussain asserts that he accrued 160 hours of unused vacation time under the CBA, while MV Public insists that he accrued only 80 hours of unused vacation time. Determining the "proper rate of vacation pay under [a] CBA . . ....