Abdulina v. Eberl's Temp. Servs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 February 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14–cv–00314–RM–BNB
• Citation: 79 F.Supp.3d 1201
• Parties: Dina Abdulina, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. Eberl's Temporary Services, Inc., a Colorado corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

79 F.Supp.3d 1201

Dina Abdulina, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated persons, Plaintiff

v.Eberl's Temporary Services, Inc., a Colorado corporation, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 14–cv–00314–RM–BNB

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Signed February 3, 2015

Brian David Gonzales, Fort Collins, CO, Charles Leonard Scalise, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff.

John D. Martin, Denver, CO, Jennifer Lynn Anderson, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant.

ORDER

RAYMOND P. MOORE, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Eberl's Temporary Services, Inc.'s (“ETS”)

(1) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Dina Abdulina's complaint, or, in the alternative for a more definite statement (ECF No. 15);

(2) motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Colorado Wage Claim Act and Breach of Contract claims in the First Amended Class Action Complaint (ECF No. 19); and

(3) unopposed motion for leave to provide supplemental authority in support of its motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Colorado Wage Claim Act and Breach of Contract claims in the First Amended Class Action Complaint (ECF No. 55).

For the reasons stated below, the Court:

(1) DENIES as MOOT Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 15);

(2) GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Colorado Wage Claim Act and Breach of Contract claims in the First Amended Class Action Complaint (ECF No. 19); and

(3) GRANTS Defendant's motion for leave to provide supplemental authority in support of its motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Colorado Wage Claim Act and Breach of Contract claims in the First Amended Class Action Complaint (ECF No. 55).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On February 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed her original complaint (“Complaint”) on behalf of herself and other allegedly similarly situated individuals seeking back pay and other damages allegedly owed under the (1) Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., (2) Colorado Wage Claim Act (“Wage Claim Act”), Colo.Rev.Stat. § 8–4–101, et seq., and (3) Colorado Minimum Wage Act (“Minimum Wage Act”), Colo.Rev.Stat. § 8–6–101 et seq . (ECF No. 1.)

On May 5, 2014, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement. (ECF No. 15.)

On May 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”) on behalf of herself and other allegedly similarly situated individuals. (ECF No. 18 at 1.) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint asserts three claims for relief based upon Defendant's allegedly (1) violating the Wage Claim Act, (2) violating the FLSA, and (3) breaching a contract. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 19–32.) Plaintiff alleges that ETS violated the Colorado Minimum Wage Act, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 8–6–101, et seq., as implemented by the Colorado Minimum Wage Order. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 1.)

On June 3, 2014, Defendant moved to dismiss, from the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's Wage Claim Act claim and breach of contract claim. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff responded to Defendant's June 3 motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 26.) Plaintiff opposes the relief Defendant seeks with regard to the Wage Claim Act claim. (ECF No. 26 at 1–4.) Plaintiff does not oppose the relief Defendant seeks with regard to the breach of contract claim. (ECF No. 26 at 4.)

On January 20, 2015, Defendant, unopposed, moved for leave to file supplemental authority in support of its motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Colorado Wage Claim Act and Breach of Contract Claims in the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 55.)

B. Factual Background

The following facts are taken as true from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

ETS contracts with insurance companies to provide supplemental insurance-adjustment services after catastrophic events. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 10.) Subsequent to a catastrophic event, there would be a need for ETS to provide supplemental insurance-adjustment services to insurance companies. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 10, 12.)

Plaintiff is a former ETS employee and a resident of the State of Indiana. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff worked for ETS, during 2011 and 2012, in Maryland and Missouri as a rope and harness assistant. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 5, 21, 26.) In this position, Plaintiff assisted insurance claims adjusters. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 5.) ETS did not pay Plaintiff properly for all of her hours worked. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 5.) Further, ETS did not pay similarly situated ETS employees to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 5.) ETS failed to pay overtime pay for hours worked by Plaintiff and other employees in excess of twelve per day and/or forty per week. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff frequently worked twelve or more hours per day, seven days per week. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 12.) ETS had a standard pay policy for its rope and harness assistants. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 12.) ETS paid Plaintiff “$175 per day of which $162 was a non-wage per diem reimbursement of expenses.” (ECF No. 18 ¶ 12 (italics in original).) Plaintiff “received approximately $13 per day in wages,” regardless of how many hours she worked. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 12.) Plaintiff had an employment contract with ETS. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 31.) The contract memorialized this “pay scheme” between ETS and all of its rope and harness assistants. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 12.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must be dismissed if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, ... a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do....” Id . at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id . A “plaintiff must ‘nudge [ ][his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible’ in order to survive a motion to dismiss.... Thus, the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.2007) (emphasis in original, internal citation and quotation omitted).

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held “that plausibility refers to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.2012) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has further noted “that the nature and specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary based on context.” Id . (Internal quotation and citation omitted.) Thus, the Tenth Circuit “concluded the Twombly /Iqbal standard is ‘a middle ground between heightened fact pleading, which is expressly rejected, and allowing complaints that are no more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, which the [Supreme C]ourt stated will not do.’ ” Id . (Citation omitted.)

For purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint as true and resolve all reasonable inferences in a plaintiff's favor. Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124, 1126–27 (10th Cir.1998) (citation omitted); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). However, “when legal conclusions are involved in the complaint ‘the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to [those] conclusions....' ” Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). “Accordingly, in examining a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), [the court] will disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Id .

III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, or, in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement (ECF No. 15)

On May 5, 2014, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement. (ECF No. 15.) On May 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 18.)

Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course “if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(B). Plaintiff properly amended her pleading within the time constraints. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(B). Thus, the Court DENIES as MOOT Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint, or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement (ECF No. 15).

B. Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Colorado Wage Claim Act and Breach of Contract Claims in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 55)

The Court GRANTS Defendant's unopposed...