Abdullah v. Comm'r Of Correction., No. 31039.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 31039.
• Citation: 1 A.3d 1102,123 Conn.App. 197
• Parties: Munsur ABDULLAH v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

123 Conn.App. 197

1 A.3d 1102

Munsur ABDULLAH

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 31039.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 8, 2010.

Decided Aug. 10, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Jennifer C. Vickery, special public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).

Harry Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Jo Anne Sulik, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

GRUENDEL, ROBINSON and BORDEN, Js.

BORDEN, J.

The petitioner, Munsur Abdullah, appeals, following a grant of certification to appeal by the habeas court, from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition asserts that this state's judicial procedures for prosecuting and sentencing criminal defendants result in disproportionately longer sentences for black defendants who refuse to plea bargain than for white defendants who refuse to plea bargain. The petitioner claims that the court, in dismissing his petition, concluded improperly that this alleged system of racial disparity did not violate his right to equal protection as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution. ¹ We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of habeas court. ²

In State v. Townsend, 211 Conn. 215, 558 A.2d 669 (1989), the petitioner's direct appeal to our Supreme Court, the facts underlying his criminal conviction were set forth as follows. On February 18, 1986, the petitioner entered the Gary Crooks Center in Bridgeport carrying a rifle under his coat and searching for the victim, Joseph Kelly. The petitioner found and shot the victim, who died as a result of his gunshot wounds. Upon his arrest, the petitioner admitted to shooting the victim and stated that, as a Muslim, he was permitted to do so under Muslim law because the victim had insulted his wife. See id., at 216, 558 A.2d 669. Following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. He was sentenced by the court to life imprisonment. Our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. Id., at 216, 558 A.2d 669.

The petitioner thereafter brought the habeas corpus action underlying this appeal. ³ In his second amended petition, filed February 24, 2009, the petitioner claimed that “Connecticut's judicial system, including its procedures for charging, negotiating and/or processing criminal cases, systematically result[s] in a disproportionately greater ‘trial penalty’ to black defendants, including the petitioner, who refuse the plea bargain sentences offered to them than to white defendants who refuse the plea bargain sentences offered to them.” This system, according to the petitioner, discriminates on the basis of race against black defendants because “[t]he disparity in the sentences received by black defendants versus those received by white defendants is statistically not explainable by any other variable than race.” The petitioner claimed that these unexplainable disparities are causally related to state actions and therefore violated his federal and state equal protection rights on the ground that his “sentence is longer than it would have been absent the influence of the racially discriminatory aspects of Connecticut's judicial system.” His petition also referenced certain reports and statistical analysis concerning Connecticut's incarcerated population that he claimed detail the significant impact race has had on the sentencing of criminal defendants in Connecticut. Furthermore, he alleged, his right to equal protection was violated “[w]ithout regard to whether the [s]tate of Connecticut ... or any individual acting [therefor], has displayed purpose or intent [to] create or [to] maintain these disparities....”

Citing Practice Book § 23-29(2), ⁴ the respondent, the commissioner of correction, filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim, which was granted by the habeas court. The respondent claimed, and the court agreed, that dismissal was warranted because the petitioner had failed to allege in his habeas corpus petition the existence of any purposeful discrimination. In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the petitioner's federal equal protection claim was governed by the United States Supreme Court's holding in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), which demands that, in order to prevail, a party alleging an equal protection violation under the fourteenth amendment must demonstrate the existence of purposeful discrimination. Additionally, the habeas court concluded that the petitioner was not relieved under the Connecticut constitution of his burden to plead facts that demonstrated that his sentence was the result of purposeful discrimination. The court, accordingly, granted the respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim for which habeas corpus relief may have been granted. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the applicable standard of review. “The standard of review of a motion to dismiss is ... well established. In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.... The conclusions reached by the [habeas] court in its decision to dismiss the habeas petition are matters of law, subject to plenary review.... Thus, [w]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct ... and whether they find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Young v. Commissioner of Correction, 104 Conn.App. 188, 193, 932 A.2d 467 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 907, 942 A.2d 416 (2008).

“It is well settled that [t]he petition for a writ of habeas corpus is essentially a pleading and, as such, it should conform generally to a complaint in a civil action.... The principle that a plaintiff may rely only upon what he has alleged is basic.... It is fundamental in our law that the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited to the allegations of his complaint.... While the habeas court has considerable discretion to frame a remedy that is commensurate with the scope of the established constitutional violations ... it does not have the discretion to look beyond the pleadings and trial evidence to decide claims not raised.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Arriaga v. Commissioner of Correction, 120 Conn.App. 258, 262-63, 990 A.2d 910 (2010).

I FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM

In his amended habeas corpus petition, the petitioner alleged that a system of racial disparity underlying Connecticut's judicial procedures for prosecuting and sentencing criminal defendants violated his right to equal protection as guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. On appeal, he contends that his petition was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim even though he states expressly in his pleading that his constitutional claim exists “[w]ithout regard to whether the [s]tate of Connecticut ... or any individual acting [therefor], has displayed purpose or intent [to] create or [to] maintain these disparities....” We disagree.

As set forth by the court in its memorandum of decision, the petitioner's federal equal protection claim is governed by the Unites States Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, supra, 481 U.S. at 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756. In McCleskey, the petitioner, a black man, had been convicted of two counts of armed robbery and one count of murder in Fulton County, Georgia, and thereafter sentenced to death. Id., at 283-85, 107 S.Ct. 1756. The United States Supreme Court reviewed the petitioner's habeas corpus action, in which he claimed that the Georgia capital sentencing statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it was administered in a racially discriminatory manner. Id., at 285-86, 107 S.Ct. 1756. In support of his claim, the petitioner offered a statistical study that demonstrated that Georgia defendants whose victims were white were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as those whose victims were black (Baldus study). Id., at 286-87, 107 S.Ct. 1756. He failed, however, to offer any other specific evidence that would support an inference that racial bias played a role in his sentence. Id., at 292-93, 107 S.Ct. 1756.

In denying his claim, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's reliance on the Baldus study was insufficient to support an inference that the imposition of the death penalty in his particular case was the product of purposeful discrimination. Id., at 297, 107 S.Ct. 1756. The court elucidated: “Our analysis begins with the basic principle that a defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving ‘the existence of purposeful discrimination.’ Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 [87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599] (1967). A corollary to this principle is that a criminal defendant must prove that the purposeful discrimination ‘had a discriminatory effect’ on him. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 [105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547] (1985). Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [the petitioner] must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.” (Emphasis in original.) McCleskey v. Kemp, supra, 481 U.S. at 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756; see also Knight v. Dept. of Public Health, 275 F.3d 156, 166 (2d Cir.2001) (appellants must prove decision makers in their cases purposely discriminated); Ricketts v. Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1407 (2d Cir.) (...