Abel v. JC Penney Co., Inc.
Decision Date | 27 May 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 4-75-civ-175,4-76-civ-204 and 4-76-civ-454.,4-75-civ-175 |
Citation | 488 F. Supp. 891 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Parties | Melanie ABEL, a minor, by her father and natural guardian, Raymond J. Abel, and Raymond J. Abel, Individually, Plaintiffs, v. J. C. PENNEY CO., INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant. Melanie ABEL, a minor, by her father and natural guardian, Raymond J. Abel, and Raymond J. Abel, Individually, Plaintiffs, v. SIMPLICITY PATTERN CO., INC., Defendant. Melanie ABEL, a minor, by her father and natural guardian, Raymond J. Abel, and Raymond J. Abel, Individually, v. M. LOWENSTEIN & SONS, INC., a corporation, Defendant. |
Thomas J. Lyons, St. Paul, Minn., for plaintiffs.
John J. Killen, Jr., Johnson, Fredin, Killen, Thibodeau & Seiler, Duluth, Minn., for defendant J. C. Penney & Company.
Robert T. White, Murnane, Conlin, White, Brandt & Hoffman, St. Paul, Minn., for defendant Simplicity Pattern Company, Inc.
Richard D. Allen, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc.
The above-captioned case comes before the Court pursuant to the following pretrial motions: (1) of defendant Simplicity Pattern Company, Inc., (hereinafter "Simplicity") to determine that Fed.R.Evid. 407 prevents any testimony regarding changes that it made in its warnings or labelings after January 4, 1975; (2) of Simplicity to determine that the Flammable Fabrics Act does not apply to it and for striking said cause of action from the complaint; and (3) of plaintiffs for submission of their claim for punitive damages to the jury.
Based upon the briefs and arguments of counsel and the entire record herein, the Court issues the following Memorandum Order.
This is a products liability case in which plaintiffs seek both compensatory and punitive damages for injuries sustained when plaintiff Melanie Abel's pajama nightgown caught fire in January of 1975. The pajamas were a gift from her grandmother who had obtained the material and a pattern and had sewn the pajamas herself. Plaintiffs allege liability of J. C. Penney Company, the retailer of the cloth used to make the pajamas, M. Lowenstein & Sons, the manufacturer of the cloth, and Simplicity, the manufacturer of the pattern, under theories of strict liability in tort, negligence and breach of warranty.
Plaintiffs' case against Simplicity is premised on Simplicity's suggestion that cotton flannelette was an appropriate fabric to use with its pattern and its failure to warn concerning the highly flammable nature of the fabric.
Defendant Simplicity Pattern Company, Inc., moves the Court, in essence, for an order striking plaintiffs' strict liability claim as to it on grounds that a pattern manufacturer does not come within the purview of the requirements of the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191 et seq., or the common law doctrine of strict liability. Restatement of Torts 2nd, § 402A; McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., Inc., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
Regulations promulgated by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (hereinafter "CPSC") under the Act require that warnings shall be given where a product does not meet Standard for the Flammability of Sleepwear, DOC FF 3-71. Title 16 C.F.R. § 1615.31(b) reads, in pertinent part:
Simplicity argues that the standards do not apply to pattern manufacturers who simply suggest possible fabrics for use with a pattern even though among those listed is one subject to the Flammable Fabrics Act standards. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the pattern is a "related material intended or promoted for use in children's sleepwear" or, alternatively, "samples, swatches, or specimens used to promote or effect the sale of items subject to the Standard".
In deciding this issue, the Court must give great deference to the interpretation of the statute and regulation given by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 99 S.Ct. 2470, 61 L.Ed.2d 68 (1979); Minnehaha Creek Watershed District v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1979). The May 18, 1978 opinion of W. Harry Garber, Assistant Associate Executive Director for Legal and Technical Review or the Directorate of Compliance and Enforcement of the CPSC, that "neither the Flammable Fabrics Act nor the Standard for the Flammability of Children's Sleepwear Sizes 0 through 6X apply to patterns intended for use by a home sewer for making sleepwear items" is, therefore, persuasive authority for Simplicity's position.
Furthermore, while deference is constrained by the Court's obligation to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose or history, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979), the statutes and regulations at issue are plain and unambiguous on their face, and the court need not delve further into their legislative history to discover their meaning. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978).
In construing the regulation, the Court is not limited to the dictionary definition of the terms involved, for the Act and regulations themselves provide some guidance. For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1191(g) defines "related material" as "paper, plastic, rubber, synthetic film, or synthetic foam which is intended for use or which may reasonably be expected to be used in any product as defined in subsection (h)." (Emphasis added.) Subsection (h) defines "product" as "any article of wearing apparel or interior furnishing." "Item" is "any product of children's sleepwear, or any fabric or related material intended or promoted for use in children's sleepwear." 16 C.F.R. §§ 1615.1(c) and 1615.31(a)(3).
Plaintiff does not contend that Simplicity's pattern is an article of wearing apparel or an interior furnishing, or that the pattern itself was meant to be physically embodied in the final product.
However, in order to be bound by the sleepwear standards of the Flammable Fabrics Act the manufacturer or seller of a product must have produced its product for use "in" sleepwear. Thus, a plain reading of the statutes and regulations indicates that neither Congress nor the CPSC intended to require pattern manufacturers to warn of the dangers of using cotton flannelette.
Simplicity cannot, therefore, be held liable on the basis of violation of the Standard for Flammability of Children's Sleepwear, DOC FF 3-71.
Simplicity does not contend that this conclusion bars imposition of strict liability as a matter of law, and it is clear that application of the common law doctrine of strict liability is not inconsistent with any provisions of the Flammable Fabrics Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1203; Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1027 (1st Cir. 1973). It does contend, however, that the doctrine is inapplicable where, as here, the defect complained of is the mere failure of a pattern manufacturer to warn of a defect in a fabric suggested for use along with others. The Court agrees.
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2nd states:
Under Minnesota law, a manufacturer has a duty to warn users of its products of all dangers of which it has actual or constructive knowledge associated with those products. Failure to warn renders the manufacturer strictly liable in tort. Karjala v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir. 1975); Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,...
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