Abel v. Johnson
Decision Date | 05 November 2019 |
Docket Number | AC 41058 |
Citation | 194 Conn.App. 120,220 A.3d 843 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Michael ABEL et al. v. Celeste M. JOHNSON |
Heather M. Brown-Olsen, for the appellant (defendant).
John R. Harness, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Keller, Moll and Beach, Js.
In this action to enforce restrictive covenants, the defendant, Celeste M. Johnson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following a trial to the court, in favor of the plaintiffs, Michael Abel and Carol Abel. The defendant claims that the court erred (1) in its determination that the plaintiffs had standing to enforce a restrictive covenant that appears in a deed that was executed by the original grantors of the parties' real properties1 and (2) by granting the plaintiffs injunctive relief on the basis of two restrictive covenants that appeared in a declaration of restrictions that applied to the parties' real properties. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following procedural history. In their one count complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they own real property located at 37 Mill Stream Road in Stamford and that the defendant owns real property located at 59 Mill Stream Road in Stamford. The plaintiffs alleged that their property abutted that of the defendant, and that both properties are located in a subdivision named the Saw Mill Association.
The plaintiffs alleged: "The plaintiffs' property and the defendant's property are subject to certain restrictive covenants recorded in volume 792 at page 118 of the Stamford land records which states that property shall be used for private residential purposes only." Also, the plaintiffs alleged: "The plaintiffs' property and the defendant's property are also subject to certain restrictive covenants recorded in volume 917 at page 114 of the Stamford land records which state in relevant part that no animals, poultry or water fowl, except usual pets quartered within the family dwelling at night shall be kept on a tract." The plaintiffs alleged that the restrictive covenants "are common to all tracts or parcels of land located within the area or subdivision known as the Saw Mill Association."
The plaintiffs further alleged: "The defendant is violating the restrictive covenants by maintaining chickens and chicken coops upon the defendant's property and by conducting a landscaping business from the defendant's property." Also, the plaintiffs alleged: "The defendant has not obtained consent from the Saw Mill Association ... the plaintiffs or any neighboring property owner to maintain chickens upon the defendant's property or to conduct a landscaping business from the defendant's property." The plaintiffs alleged that they had demanded that the defendant cease and desist the activities at issue, but the defendant had failed to comply with their demand. The plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered and would continue to suffer irreparable harm as a result of the activities at issue, and that they lacked an adequate remedy at law. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief ordering the defendant to immediately cease and desist from violating the restrictive covenants and such other relief as the court deemed equitable and proper.
In her answer, the defendant admitted owning 59 Mill Stream Road, which abuts the plaintiffs' property, but she denied that she had violated any restrictive covenant by virtue of her keeping chickens or by virtue of her landscaping business, denied that she had failed to obtain consent to conduct her landscaping business, and denied that the plaintiffs had suffered harm or would continue to suffer harm as a result of her alleged violation of the restrictive covenants at issue. Otherwise, the defendant left the plaintiffs to their proof.
The defendant raised four special defenses sounding in the following legal theories: (1) equitable estoppel and waiver; (2) unclean hands;2 (3) ripeness, mootness, and frustration of purpose; and (4) a claim that the action was time barred pursuant to General Statutes § 52-575a in that the plaintiffs did not commence the action within three years from the time that they had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged violations of the restrictive covenants. By way of a reply, the plaintiffs denied all of the special defenses.
The trial court, Hon. Edward R. Karazin, Jr. , judge trial referee, held a trial in this matter on June 29 and 30, 2017. On August 24, 2017, the court rendered its judgment by way of a memorandum of decision that provides, in relevant part, as follows:
After setting forth relevant legal principles, the court stated:
The court then addressed the special defenses: "The defendant argues that the plaintiffs are estopped from enforcing the restrictive covenants regarding the operation of a home business because they previously utilized services from the landscaping business....
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Abel v. Johnson
...and two other use restrictions that appeared in a separate declaration that applied to the properties. See Abel v. Johnson , 194 Conn. App. 120, 142–43, 156, 220 A.3d 843 (2019). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that they lacked standing to enfo......
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Windham Solar, LLC v. Pub. Utilities Regulatory Auth.
... ... ] court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Abel v. Johnson , 194 Conn. App. 120, 14950, 220 A.3d 843 (2019), cert. granted on other grounds, 334 Conn. 917, 222 A.3d 104 (2020). Our review of the ... ...
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Abel v. Johnson
...of the petition.Heather M. Brown Olsen, in opposition.The plaintiffs' petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 194 Conn. App. 120, 220 A.3d 843 (2019), is granted, limited to the following issues:"1. Does the ‘subject to’ language in the deeds only provide notice of pr......