Abellon v. Hartford Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 17 April 1985 |
Citation | 212 Cal.Rptr. 852,167 Cal.App.3d 21 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | Jeanne Claire B. ABELLON, Petitioner and Appellant, v. HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. D000971. Civ. 31154. |
James A. McIntyre, Virginia R. Gilson, and McInnis, Fitzgerald, Rees, Sharkey & McIntyre, San Diego, for plaintiff and appellant.
Morris, Polich & Purdy, Michael M. Edwards, and Richard R. Sooy, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.
Jeanne Claire B. Abellon (Jeanne) appeals a partial summary judgment in favor of Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford), declaring that under a policy issued by Hartford the total policy limit applicable to the claims of Jeanne and her husband Carlos is the "per person" limit of $250,000.
The fundamental issue posed in this appeal is whether a spouse's claim for loss of consortium is subject to a "per person" liability limitation or a "per occurrence" limitation under a general liability insurance policy.
On February 19, 1980, a driver of a tractor-trailer owned by Ron's Delivery Service collided with Carlos' car. As a result of the accident, Carlos lost sight in one eye and suffered severe brain damage. Jeanne suffered the loss of her husband's consortium.
Ron's Delivery Service was insured under a truck liability policy issued by Hartford. Carlos brought suit against Ron's Delivery Service for the personal injuries he sustained. Jeanne sought damages for loss of services and loss of consortium. A stipulated judgment between the Abellons and Ron's Delivery Service was entered in favor of Carlos in the amount of $750,000 and in favor of Jeanne in the amount of $250,000.
Hartford paid the $250,000 policy limits on Carlos' claim but refused to pay Jeanne's $250,000 claim on two grounds: (1) as a matter of law Hartford's liability under the terms of the insurance policy was limited to $250,000, which had already been paid; and (2) the stipulated judgment in favor of Jeanne was not binding upon Hartford. Hartford moved for summary judgment in this matter and the lower court granted partial summary judgment on the first issue submitted. The court dismissed the action and Jeanne appeals.
The trial court's findings of fact are undisputed, including the finding Jeanne suffered a loss of consortium as a consequence of the serious injuries her husband Carlos sustained. The sole question before this court is whether Jeanne's injury is an injury subject to the "per person" limitation or the "per occurrence" limitation of the policy.
The relevant policy language provides:
The policy limits for bodily injury are $250,000 for each person and $500,000 for each occurrence.
Jeanne contends her claim for loss of consortium is a separate bodily injury caused by the accident which is subject to the $500,000 "per occurrence" limit. On the other hand, Hartford asserts Jeanne's claim is governed by the same "per person" limit applicable to her husband. Hartford claims that upon Carlos' receipt of the $250,000 "per person" policy limit, all claims were exhausted and the insurance company was under no obligation to pay Jeanne's claim.
Hartford urges Jeanne's loss of consortium is derived from the injuries Carlos sustained and her consequential damages are therefore subject to the "per person" limitation. Hartford's contention has been negated by the California Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.3d 382, 115 Cal.Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669. There the court acknowledged loss of companionship, emotional support, love, felicity and sexual relations as real and direct injuries to the claimant. (Id., at p. 400, 115 Cal.Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669.) The court stressed the personal and direct injury inflicted upon a wife suffering loss of her husband's consortium, stating:
" " (Ibid.)
Conforming to the holding in Rodriguez, in Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal.App.3d 152, 157, 157 Cal.Rptr. 22 (hg. den.), the appeal court stated:
"Although the wife's cause of action 'arises' from bodily injury to her husband [citation], the injury suffered is personal to the wife [citation]."
The court concluded an injury to one's psychological and emotional state should be treated no differently than an injury to one's physical well-being. (Id., at p. 157, 157 Cal.Rptr. 22.)
Authorizing coverage and recovery by more than one injured person is, patently, the prime reason the "per occurrence" paragraph is placed in the policy. To merge Jeanne's injury with that of her husband under the "per person" limitation would not "achieve coverage for the losses to which the policy relates." (Employers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Foust, 29 Cal.App.3d 382, 386, 105 Cal.Rptr. 505.) Such an interpretation would defeat the public policy of this state as expressed by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez. Loss of consortium is a distinct and individual injury. By merging Jeanne's injury with that of her husband, her injury, in effect, becomes derivative and noncompensable under the terms of the insurance contract, thus effectively negating public policy.
The reasoning of Rodriguez and Lantis supports the inevitable conclusion Jeanne has suffered an independent, nonparasitic personal injury as a result of an automobile accident negligently caused by Hartford's insured. She is a second person injured by the accident.
Did Jeanne sustain a "bodily injury"? In the final analysis, this is a question of fact. It involves a medical or psychological problem of proof rather than purely a question of law. In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916, 929, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813, the Supreme Court reasoned:
But because of a definitional morass surrounding the use of the words "physical" and "mental," it is often difficult to accurately predict what types of injuries will be considered worthy of compensation. (Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case For An Independent Tort (1971) 59 Geo.L.J. 1237, 1241, fn. 24.) 1 Modern California case law addressing this issue as a legal proposition has determined (1) bodily injury can and does result from emotional distress and (2) the injury so sustained may be compensable.
In Employers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Foust, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d 382, 385, 105 Cal.Rptr. 505, the court held:
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