Aberdeen-Springfield Canal v. Peiper

• Citation: 133 Idaho 82,982 P.2d 917
• Decision Date: 26 May 1999
• Docket Number: No. 23912.,23912.
• Parties: ABERDEEN-SPRINGFIELD CANAL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, v. George PEIPER and Lavaudis Peiper, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Respondents.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

982 P.2d 917

133 Idaho 82

ABERDEEN-SPRINGFIELD CANAL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, v. George PEIPER and Lavaudis Peiper, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Respondents.

No. 23912.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Twin Falls, March 1999 Term.

May 26, 1999.

Rehearing Denied August 18, 1999.

Jim Jones & Associates, Boise, for appellants. Jim Jones argued.

Ling, Nielsen & Robinson, Rupert, for respondent. Brent C. Tingey argued.

SILAK, Justice.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment and entering foreclosure of assessment liens in favor of the Aberdeen-Spring-field Canal Company (ASCC), pursuant to Chapter 22, Title 42 of the Idaho Code. We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Facts

In 1969, George and LaVaudis Peiper (the Peipers) purchased agricultural property in Bingham County. The Peiper property is located within the ASCC irrigation system, and the Peipers' predecessor was a stock-holder of the ASCC. The ASCC is an operating company created under the Carey Act of 1894, 43 U.S.C. § 641.

The Carey Act aided states in the reclamation of desert lands to provide irrigation water to settlers by authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to contract to patent such desert lands as the State should cause to be irrigated and occupied, provided, however, that the lands would be restored to the public domain if reclamation had not begun and plans were not carried out within stated time limits. See Andrus v. Idaho, 445 U.S. 715, 717-18, 100 S.Ct. 1450, 1451-52, 63 L.Ed.2d 739, 743-44 (1980)

. Since "the average farmer did not have sufficient means to construct, own, or operate an irrigation ditch to convey water to his land," the creation of Carey Act canal companies "made possible the distribution of water over large areas of land, often remote from the source of supply, and increased the availability of irrigated farmland at reasonable costs." Jacobucci v. District Court, 189 Colo. 380, 541 P.2d 667, 671 (1975).

ASCC's by-laws provide that the transfer of a stockholder's land operates as a transfer of the stock and the corresponding right to use ASCC water, "whether expressed therein or not." When the Peipers purchased the property, all irrigation water was supplied by a well installed by their predecessor. The Peipers investigated the possibility of irrigating with ASCC water, but found that the ditch connecting the property to the ASCC headgate had been destroyed a few years before. The Peipers sought permission to install a new ditch, but the owner of the intervening land was using wheel lines to irrigate, and told the Peipers they "could forget about putting in another [ditch]." The Peipers have requested no water from the ASCC since purchasing the land, and the ASCC has delivered no water to the property since 1962. ASCC has always been able to deliver water to the Peipers at Headgate No. M-21-5, located approximately three-quarters of a mile from the Peiper property. The ASCC has continued to assess maintenance charges against the Peipers.

B. Procedural Background

On December 24, 1986, ASCC filed suit against the Peipers in Bingham County Case No. CV-86-13282, seeking foreclosure of liens for assessments levied against the property for 1983, 1984 and 1985. The Peipers filed an answer on February 12, 1987. On December 16, 1991, the Peipers moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The motion was denied. On October 2, 1992, ASCC filed its second amended complaint in Bingham County Case No. CV-90-13836, seeking recovery of assessments for the years 1984 through 1990. The district court dismissed the claims for 1983, 1986 and 1987 because the statute of limitations had run with respect to those claims. ASCC filed another complaint, Bingham County Case No. CV-93-14195, seeking assessments for 1991 through 1993. On August 9, 1994, the district court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the Peipers' claim that ASCC had forfeited its right appurtenant to the Peiper property. On January 12, 1995, the Peipers filed their answer and counterclaim in Case No. CV-93-14195, alleging partial forfeiture of the ASCC water right appurtenant to their property, the unconstitutionality of I.C. § 42-2201, a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, the Peipers sought restitution damages for the unjust enrichment claim, and a declaratory judgment stating they were not liable for the assessments. The three cases were eventually consolidated and transferred to the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) court on January 31, 1995.

On April 10, 1996, the SRBA court entered an amended order granting summary judgment in favor of ASCC. On June 5, 1996, the SRBA court entered an order granting the Peipers' motion to disallow attorney fees. ASCC later brought a motion to reconsider the order disallowing attorney fees, which was denied. That same day, the SRBA court also entered an order transferring venue back to the seventh district court in Bingham County, having resolved all issues over which it had exclusive jurisdiction. On December 9, 1996, ASCC filed its complaint in Bingham County Case No. CV-96-1395, seeking assessments for 1994 through 1996. ASCC sought summary judgment on that complaint, as well as a decree of foreclosure for that case and the three consolidated cases. On May 5, 1997, the district court entered summary judgment on the latest case and issued an order for decree of foreclosure. A judgment and decree on all four cases was entered on May 27, 1997.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

The issues presented on appeal are as follows:

1. Whether the SRBA court erred in holding that ASCC had not forfeited any water right it claimed to hold appurtenant to the Peiper property.

2. Whether the SRBA court erred in holding that the doctrine of unjust enrichment did not preclude recovery by ASCC.

3. Whether the SRBA court erred in holding that ASCC had the legal authority to assess landowners based on benefits received when no water was actually delivered.

4. Whether the SRBA court erred in holding that I.C. § 42-2201 was not violative of procedural and substantive due process rights.

5. Whether the lower courts erred in failing to dismiss the 1984 and 1985 claims for failure to prosecute.

6. Whether the rulings in favor of ASCC on its complaints were procedurally defective.

The issue presented on cross-appeal is as follows:

1. Whether the SRBA court erred in determining that ASCC is not entitled to attorneys fees under I.C. § 12-120(1).

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., First Security Bank v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998)

; Richards v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 131 Idaho 476, 478, 959 P.2d 457, 459 (1998). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Murphy, 131 Idaho at 790,

964 P.2d at 657.

Generally, when considering a motion for summary judgment, a court "liberally construes the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574, 576, 944 P.2d 709, 711 (1997). However, where the evidentiary facts are undisputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, "summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences." Murphy, 131 Idaho at 790, 964 P.2d at 657 (citing Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 n. 1, 650 P.2d 657, 661 n. 1 (1982)).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting ASCC's Motion For Summary Judgment.

1. The SRBA court did not err in holding that ASCC had not forfeited any water right it claimed to hold appurtenant to the Peiper property.

The Peipers argue that since no ASCC water has been applied to beneficial use on their property for more than thirty years, any ASCC water right appurtenant to their land has been forfeited. The forfeiture statute states:

All rights to the use of water acquired under this chapter or otherwise shall be lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated and when any right to the use of water shall be lost through nonuse or forfeiture such rights to such water shall revert to the state and be again subject to appropriation under this chapter.

I.C. § 42-222(2). This statute was recently held to provide for partial forfeiture of water rights where an appropriator "cannot apply a portion of a water right to beneficial use during any part of the statutory period." State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 735, 947 P.2d 400, 408 (1997). The SRBA court held as a matter of law that since ASCC was the appropriator who held legal title to the water rights, only ASCC could forfeit the portion of its water right appurtenant to the Peiper property.

ASCC, as a Carey Act operating company, holds title to the canal system and is the appropriator of the water rights involved in this case. See Big Wood Canal Co. v. Chapman, 45 Idaho 380, 391, 263 P. 45, 48 (1927). The Peipers are ASCC stockholders, and as such are entitled to a share of the water and obliged to pay a proportionate share of the operating company's maintenance costs, "regardless of whether such water is used or not...." I.C. § 42-2201. This Court has never addressed the question of whether a stockholder's decision not to use the water provided by a Carey Act operating...