Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. Lumpkin

• Decision Date: 28 February 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:10CV446.
• Citation: 808 F.Supp.2d 1003
• Parties: The ABILITY CENTER OF GREATER TOLEDO, et al., Plaintiff v. Douglas E. LUMPKIN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

808 F.Supp.2d 1003

The ABILITY CENTER OF GREATER TOLEDO, et al., Plaintiff

v.Douglas E. LUMPKIN, Defendant.

Case No. 3:10CV446.

United States District Court,N.D. Ohio,Western Division.

Feb. 28, 2011.

W. David Koeninger, Jesus R. Salas, Robert A. Cole, Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Toledo, OH, for Plaintiff.

Henry G. Appel, Mark W. Fowler, Office of the Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.

ORDER

JAMES G. CARR, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiffs, The Ability Center of Greater Toledo (Ability Center), Kathy Davis, Tanya Kohlhorst, Norman Napier, Victoria Bigelow, Michael Bickford, Mark Sahadi, Jan Ward, Antwan Williams, and Andrew Rajner filed this suit against Douglas Lumpkin in his official capacity as Director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS). Pending is defendant's motion to dismiss. [Doc. 13]. An Ohio non-profit corporation providing services to disabled individuals, Ability Center brings this suit on its own behalf and on behalf of its constituents, among whom are the named plaintiffs.

For the reasons that follow, the motion shall be granted in part and denied in part.

Background

Each of the nine individually-named plaintiffs applied for Medicaid for the disabled (MA–D) and in each case ODJFS failed to determine eligibility for services within ninety days. Plaintiffs claim that ODJFS has violated their statutory right—under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8) and 1396a(a)(10)-to a timely determination of their Medicaid eligibility and a prompt payment to eligible individuals; they sue to enforce that right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs also claim a violation of their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution preempts ODJFS' actions. Finally, plaintiffs claim that they have been discriminated against based on their alleged disabilities.

Plaintiff Kathy Davis is a fifty-one year-old woman living in Paulding County. She applied for Medicaid on February 11, 2009. On February 3, 2010, ODJFS approved her application for a period from February 1, 2009 to February 1, 2012

Plaintiff Tanya Kohlhorst is a forty-three year-old woman living in Auglaize County. ODJFS denied Ms. Kohlhorst's Medicaid application based on a lack of disability on November 23, 2009. Ms. Kohlhorst was verbally informed of the denial on May 5, 2010. She attempted to request a hearing to challenge the denial of her application, but the Auglaize County Department of Job and Family Services (AuCDJFS) refused to let her do so, requiring her to file a new application.

Plaintiff Norman Napier is a fifty-six year-old man living in Allen County. Napier applied for Medicaid on December 29, 2008, and was approved on May 27, 2010.

Plaintiff Victoria Bigelow is a forty-six year-old woman living in Lucas County. Ms. Bigelow applied for Medicaid on October 27, 2008, and was approved on May 26, 2010.

Plaintiff Michael Bickford is a sixty-one year-old man living in Lucas County. Mr. Bickford applied for Medicaid on April 15, 2009, and was approved on April 23, 2010.

Plaintiff Mark Sahadi is a forty-nine year-old man living in Lucas County. Mr. Sahadi applied for Medicaid on September 1, 2009, and was approved on June 1, 2010.

Plaintiff Jan Ward is a sixty-one year-old man living in Lucas County. Mr. Ward applied for Medicaid on December 1, 2009, and was approved on May 25, 2010.

Plaintiff Antwan Williams is a twenty-eight year-old man living in Lucas County. Mr. Williams applied for Medicaid on March 30, 2009, and was approved on May 25, 2010.

Plaintiff Andrew Rajner is a sixty year-old man living in Lucas County. Mr. Rajner applied for Medicaid on February 18, 2009, and was denied on February 1, 2010. Notice of the denial was sent to Mr. Rajner on February 10, 2010. Mr. Rajner did not request a hearing to challenge the denial.

Discussion

I. Standard

Review of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) requires a court to “accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Allegations in the complaint should be construed in favor of the pleader. Id. at 237, 94 S.Ct. 1683.

A claim survives a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

A complaint is insufficient “if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, supra, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal quotation omitted).

I must also “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir.2002). Plaintiff, however, must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, supra, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955; see also Iqbal, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendant contends that I should dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because ODJFS has already made determinations on each of the individual plaintiffs' Medicaid applications, thereby rendering their claims moot and leaving some plaintiffs without standing to bring a claim.

A. Mootness

Under Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution, a federal court only has jurisdiction over a live case or controversy. E.g., Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). The “case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.” Id. And “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself does not show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–496, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974).

ODJFS has approved the applications of plaintiffs Davis, Napier, Bigelow, Bickford, Sahadi, Ward and Williams. The agency has determined that plaintiffs Kohlhorst and Rajner are not disabled.¹ ODJFS argues that because it has processed the Medicaid applications of all nine individual plaintiffs and made a determination as to each, their claims and thus the case are moot.

Well-settled doctrine permits exceptions to the mootness rule under some circumstances. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) ( “voluntary cessation” exception). Plaintiffs contend that defendant ignores two applicable exceptions to the mootness doctrine, as well as the ruling made by Judge Marbley in Case v. Jones–Kelly, No. 2:08–CV–1171, 2010 WL 99086 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 5, 2010), on the same issue, and that accordingly defendant's motion should be denied.

1. Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review

A court will not dismiss a claim as moot if the injury is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148–149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 594, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540 (1999).

In the absence of a certified class, the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception requires: 1) the challenged action was in duration too short to be fully litigated before its cessation or expiration; and 2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again. Weinstein, supra, 423 U.S. at 149, 96 S.Ct. 347. “The party asserting that this exception applies bears the burden of establishing both prongs.” Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 371 (6th Cir.2005) (collecting cases).

Plaintiffs therefore bear the burden of supporting their argument that, as in Case v. Jones–Kelly, there is a reasonable expectation that plaintiffs will be subjected to the same violations by ODJFS again in the future.

As in this case, the plaintiffs in Case waited longer than the maximum period allowed for their eligibility determinations. Each plaintiff had his or her application approved following commencement of the lawsuit. On defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court held that either the ninety-day mandated maximum processing time or the actual average processing time of 258 days was sufficiently short to meet the first requirement of Weinstein. Case, supra, 2010 WL 99086 at *4. I agree.

Under the second element of this mootness exception, there generally must be a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982).

A reasonable expectation is more than a physical or theoretical possibility. Murphy, supra, 455 U.S. at 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181. A reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability can be shown by a plaintiff's history. See e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320–321, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) (disabled student with uncontrollable behavior was reasonably expected, based on personal history, to misbehave and again be subject to challenged school policy); see also Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 707 (3d Cir.1979) (discharged...