Aborn v. Lipson
| Decision Date | 26 February 1970 |
| Citation | 256 N.E.2d 442,357 Mass. 71 |
| Parties | Mark ABORN v. Norman LIPSON. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Charles F. Nayor, Boston, for plaintiff.
Lionel H. Perlo, Boston, for defendant.
Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, KIRK, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.
The amended declaration in this action of tort for defamation contains two counts. Count 1 is for slander and count 2 is for libel. 1
Both counts allege essentially the same facts, and we summarize them as follows. The plaintiff is an attorney-at-law licensed to practice in Massachusetts. Some time prior to the date of the alleged defamatory statements the defendant had brought a petition in the Probate Court for Middlesex County to remove Barbara Lipson, the plaintiff's daughter and the defendant's daughter-in-law, as administratrix of her husband's estate. At a hearing on this petition a son of the defendant testified that the plaintiff told his daughter, Barbara Lipson, that she should have a debtor of her husband's estate make out a check to her personally for the amount owed ($1,000) so that she could avoid paying the creditors of her husband's estate. The defendant testified on direct examination that he knew that his daughter-in-law had taken the sum of $1,000 which belonged in her husband's estate. On cross-examination by the plaintiff's counsel the defendant was asked whether he agreed with the testimony previously given by his son, Allan Lipson, that the plaintiff said to his daughter: 'Tear up that check and make another check to Barbara, so we don't pay the debt of the (e)state.' The defendant's answer was in the affirmative. He was further asked if he knew that he was charging the plaintiff with having given advice 'to defraud creditors' of the estate, and he answered that he was 'aware' of that fact.
Each count, after alleging the foregoing, concluded with the allegation that the defendant did 'falsely and maliciously charge and accuse the plaintiff of the crime of knowingly defrauding creditors of an estate; of the crime of knowingly conspiring to defraud creditors of an estate; and of giving improper and illegal advice as an attorney-at-law.' All of the alleged defamatory statements, it is said, were not 'pertinent to the matter in hearing.'
The defendant demurrer to each count on the ground that it did not state a legal cause of action. From an order sustaining the demurrer, the plaintiff appealed.
There was no error.
In Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 236, 118 N.E.2d 356, 358, after reviewing the cases on the subject, we said, '(W)ords spoken by a witness in the course of judicial proceedings which are pertinent to the matter in hearing are absolutely privileged, even if uttered maliciously or in bad faith.' The reason for the privilege is that it is more important that witnesses be free from the fear of civil liability for what they say than that a person who has been defamed by their testimony have a remedy.
The plaintiff...
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Hahn v. Sargent
...suit since testimony in a judicial proceeding is privileged against defamation suits as a matter of public policy. Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 256 N.E.2d 442 (1970); Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1954). That same public policy also proscribes civil liability for false......
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Roketenetz v. Woburn Daily Times, Inc.
...proceedings). Perry v. E. Anthony & Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 112, 228 N.E.2d 700 (report of litigation in a Federal court); Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 256 N.E.2d 442 (testimony of witness); See Cluff v. Picardi, 331 Mass. 320, 323, 118 N.E.2d 753, 754, holding a bill of complaint demurrabl......
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McGranahan v. Dahar
...absolutely privileged from civil actions, provided they are pertinent to the subject of the proceeding. See, e. g., Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 256 N.E.2d 442 (1979); Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 67 N.W.2d 413 (1954); Developments in the Law: Defamation, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 875, 920 (19......
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C.M. v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Children & Families
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