Abraham v. Baldwin
Decision Date | 11 December 1906 |
Citation | 42 So. 591,52 Fla. 151 |
Parties | ABRAHAM et ux. v. BALDWIN. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
In Banc. Error to Circuit Court, Duval County; Rhydon M. Call Judge.
Action by G. M. Baldwin against Abraham J. Abraham and Leonora J Abraham. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants bring error. Reversed and remanded.
Syllabus by the Court
Spoken words, falsely imputing to another a crimnal offense, are actionable per se, and the law presumes malice in their utterance. Therefore it is not necessary in such a case for the plaintiff in an action for slander to prove express malice, unless the words as spoken constitute a privileged communication.
A communication, although it contains criminating matter, is privileged, when made in good faith upon any subject in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a right or duty, if made to a person having a corresponding interest, right, or duty, and made upon an occasion to properly serve such right, interest, or duty, and in a manner and under circumstances fairly warranted by the occasion and the duty, right, or interest, and not so made as to unnecessarily or unduly injure another, or to show express malice.
The subject in relation to which a communication was made may be privileged, yet a communication made upon that subject may not be privileged. If the restraints and qualifications imposed by law upon the publicity to be given such communications be disregarded, the communication is not privileged. If reasonable bounds be exceeded in making the communication, or if the communication be made knowing it to be false, malice, might be inferred, which would destroy the privilege.
In an action for slander, the burden of proving a plea that the communication was privileged is on the defendant. When it is established or conceded that the communication was privileged, the burden is then cast upon the plaintiff to show that the words were uttered from an improper motive, and not for a reason that would otherwise render them privileged.
Whether slanderous words uttered are a privileged communication depends upon the circumstances under which they were uttered and whether or not the facts and circumstances, when conceded, establish the privilege, is a question of law for the court; but, when the facts and circumstances under which the communication was made are not conceded, the court cannot as a matter of law determine whether the communication was or was not privileged, and a jury must determine the facts under proper instructions from the court.
Good faith, a right, duty, or interest in a proper subject, a proper occasion, and a proper communication to those having a like right, duty, or interest, are all essential to constitute words spoken that are actionable per se a privileged communication, so as to make the proof by the plaintiff of express malice essential to liability.
In determining whether or not a communication is privileged, the nature of the subject, the right, duty, or interest of the parties in such subject, the time, place, and circumstances of the occasion, and the manner, character, and extent of the communication, should all be considered. When all these facts and circumstances are conceded, a court may decide whether a communication is a privileged one, so as to require the plaintiff to prove express malice. But, when all the essential facts and circumstances are not conceded, the existence or nonexistence of the privilege should be determined by the jury from all the facts and circumstances of the case, under proper instructions of the court applicable to the case.
In an action for slander, where there is a plea of privileged communication, and the testimony tends to show the interest of both the defendant and the person to whom the slanderous words were spoken in the subject of the communication, and there is testimony tending to show good faith of the defendant in the belief that the communication was true, and also testimony that the slanderous words were uttered on a public street in a high tone of voice in the presence of others not interested in the subject of the communication one of whom was a hackman who drove the defendant to the place where the slanderous words were spoken, it is error for the court to charge that 'there is no testimony in this case to establish the defendant's plea of privileged communication which the jury would be warranted in considering,' since the facts and circumstances attending the communication not being conceded, the jury should determine, under proper instructions from the court, whether or not the communication was privileged.
In an action for slander, it is not error for the court to charge the jury that, where a person has uttered words of and concerning another charging criminal conduct, 'the law imports liability' therefor, since the quoted words, so used, mean no more than an accountability to an action in which the liability would be determined.
Where the plea of justification is interposed in an action for slander for imputing a crime, the party justifying must produce evidence of the acts and intent which are material elements of the crime imputed, sufficiently preponderant to overcome in the minds of the jury the legal presumption of innocence as well as the opposing testimony; but this proof need not go to the extent of convincing the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the words imputing the crime. The rule announced in Schultz v. Pacific Insurance Company, 14 Fla. 73, text 121, and reluctantly followed in Williams v. Dickenson, 28 Fla. 90, text 113, 9 So. 847, requiring imputations of a crime to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in civil causes, is disapproved.
COUNSEL Pope & Pope and Walter M. Davis for plaintiffs in error.
C. B. Peeler, for defendant in error.
On March 6, 1905, the defendant in error brought an action for slander against the plaintiffs in error in the circuit court for Duval county, charging that the defendant, Leonora J. Abraham, a married woman, in September, 1904, and in January, 1905, falsely an maliciously, in the presence and hearing of divers persons, said of plaintiff: 'He stole my hoe.' 'He is a thief.' A demurrer to the declaration having been overruled, pleas of (1) not guilty, (2) justification, and (3) privileged communication were filed by the defendants. Issue was joined on the three pleas. Replications to the second and third pleas were stricken on motion. A motion for continuance was denied, and at the trial judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in the sum of $200. A motion for a new trial having been denied, and an exception taken, the defendants on writ of error assign as errors the giving of charges numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4, and the refusing to give charges numbered 1, 2, and 3 requested by the defendants; proper exceptions having been taken to the giving or refusing to give the charges.
In the charge numbered 1 the court instructed the jury that 'there is no testimony in this case to establish the defendants' plea of privileged communication which the jury would be warranted in considering.'
Spoken words, falsely imputing to another a criminal offense, are actionable per se, and the law presumes malice in their utterance. Therefore it is not necessary in such a case for the plaintiff in an action for slander to prove express malice, unless the words as spoken constitute a privileged communication.
A communication, although it contains criminating matter, is privileged when made in good faith upon any subject in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a right or duty, if made to a person having a corresponding interest, right, or duty, and made upon an occasion to properly serve such right, interest, or duty, and in a manner and under circumstances fairly warranted by the occasion and the duty, right, or interest, and not so made as to unnecessarily or unduly injure another, or to show express malice.
The subject in relation to which a communication was made may be privileged, yet a communication made upon that subject may not be privileged. If the restraints and qualifications imposed by law upon the publicity to be given such communications be disregarded, the communication is not privileged. If reasonable bounds be exceeded in making the communication, or if the communication be made knowing it to be false, malice might be inferred, which would destroy the privilege.
The burden of proving a plea that the communication was privileged is on the defendant. When it is established or conceded that the communication was privileged, the burden is then cast upon the plaintiff to show that the words were uttered from an improper motive, and not for a reason that would otherwise render them privileged.
Whether slanderous words uttered are a privileged communication depends upon the circumstances under which they were uttered, and whether or not the facts and circumstances, when conceded, establish the privilege, is a question of law for the court; but, when the facts and circumstances under which the communication was made are not conceded, the court cannot as a matter of law determine whether the communication was or was not privileged, and a jury must determine the facts under proper instructions from the court.
Good faith, a right, duty, or interest in a proper subject, a proper occasion, and a proper communication to those having a like right, duty, or interest, are all essential to constitute words spoken, that are actionable per se, a privileged communication, so as to make the proof by the plaintiff of express malice essential to liability. In determining whether or not a communication is privileged, the nature of...
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