Abraham v. Graphic Arts Intern. Union
| Citation | 212 U.S.App.D.C. 412,660 F.2d 811 |
| Decision Date | 14 August 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-1796,79-1796 |
| Parties | 26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 818, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,041, 212 U.S.App.D.C. 412 Laurie L. ABRAHAM, Appellant, v. GRAPHIC ARTS INTERNATIONAL UNION, et al. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. Civil Action No. 78-0823).
Before ROBINSON, Chief Judge, WRIGHT, Circuit Judge, and AUBREY E. ROBINSON, Jr., * District Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III.
The District Court entered a summary judgment dismissing appellant's employment discrimination suit, agreeing with the parties that no fact material to adjudication of the litigation was actually in controversy. Our examination of the record convinces us, however, that there are issues of fact critical to any disposition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the case for trial.
On June 30, 1975, appellee Graphic Arts International Union entered into a fifteen-month contract with the Department of Labor, pursuant to which the Department provided the union with funds to operate an on-the-job training program the "Project for Equal Progression" (PEP) for women entering the graphic arts industry. 1 This financial support included salaries for two full-time employees, a project coordinator and an administrative assistant, to manage the program. 2 The contract was subsequently extended for an additional eleven months, through August, 1977. 3
Appellant Laurie Abraham was hired as administrative assistant in late March, 1976. By her version, she was assured employment for as long as the project received funding. 4 During the course of her employ she received no adverse comment concerning her competence, 5 and on April 1, 1977, she was given a substantial raise in pay. 6
In February, 1977, however, appellant had informed her superior that she was pregnant and that she expected her child in September. 7 She reiterated this in June and inquired as to the permissible length of maternity leave, but never got a definite answer. 8 While the union unbeknownst to appellant decided in June or July to terminate her employment, 9 on August 5 she departed on what she believed to be that leave. 10
Meanwhile, the union entered into a new contract with the Department of Labor extending the training program through August, 1977. 11 During negotiations therefor, the union proposed additional responsibilities for the administrative assistant's position. 12 The Department apparently approved, 13 although the new contract did not expressly incorporate the changes. 14
At any rate, on September 10, 1977, appellant was informed of the union's decision to terminate her. 15 In October she filed a sex-discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 16 which made no determination on the merits but issued a right-to-sue letter. 17 When no further administrative action was forthcoming, appellant instituted an action in the District Court, where again she was left without relief. The court, perceiving no issue of material fact, concluded that appellant had not made out a prima facie case of employment discrimination because, on its reading of the record, she was not qualified for the administrative assistant's job as redefined. 18 Even granting the existence of a prima facie case, the court continued, the union had rebutted it through a showing of legitimate business necessity: appellant, the court said, 19 This appeal then ensued.
The District Court made its rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment. 20 The principles then governing are thoroughly settled. 21 Summary judgment is appropriate only on demonstration "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 22 The court's function is not to try disputed issues of fact, but only to ascertain whether such an issue is present, 23 and any doubt on that score is to be resolved against the movant. 24 Since it is he who bears the onus of establishing his entitlement to summary judgment, 25 his opponent enjoys the benefit of all favorable inferences from the evidence proffered; 26 moreover, facts asserted by the non-movant, if adequately buttressed by evidentiary material, 27 are to be taken as true. 28 These canons apply as forcefully on appellate review as earlier they did at the trial level. 29
Appellant lays her demands on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 30 Synthesis of a Title VII claim of disparate treatment the grievance here may be a three-step process, in which the burden of producing evidence shifts at each step. 31 The complainant first must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 32 The employer, in turn, must come forward with some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the treatment accorded. 33 The complainant may then show that the reason advanced is no more than a pretext for the discrimination asserted. 34 That analytical approach was to be taken here, of course, in the context of the summary disposition the District Court was asked to make. The court's task was to ascertain, successively at each stage reached, whether any issue of material fact emerged authentically and, if not, whether the case called for judgment as a matter of law. 35 Summary judgment was in order only if all facts essential to the Title VII claim or defense were free from genuine dispute, and all that remained was decision on a matter of law. 36 Our mission on this appeal is to determine whether the District Court observed these fundamental requirements. 37
We find that the union's summary judgment cannot be sustained on the theory that appellant failed to make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination. The District Court had grave doubts that she had done so, for two closely related reasons. 38 One was the court's feeling that appellant was not qualified to serve as administrative assistant in the PEP program, as that position was redefined for the 1977 extending contract; 39 the other was the court's impression that appellant's successor in that post was more experienced. 40 We cannot accept either of these grounds, for they incorporate resolutions of hotly contested issues of fact.
While the union's 1977 redefinition of the administrative assistant's tasks made some increase in duties and responsibilities, 41 the union's unelucidated opinion seemingly was the sole support for the view that appellant could not have measured up to them. 42 And on the other side of the ledger were facts impugning that proposition. Appellant had functioned as PEP's administrative assistant for sixteen months without complaint about her work, engaging in most of the activities required by the revised job description. 43 On the record as so far made, it was an open question whether appellant could have met the additional demands of the position as redefined. 44 And despite the qualifications of appellant's replacement, 45 the fact was that appellant held a wide margin of superiority sixteen months to none in experience in administration of the particular contract under which the PEP project was conducted. 46 Appellant was entitled to all favorable inferences afforded by the record, 47 and to the benefit of any doubt as to the propriety of summary judgment for the union. 48 Since the record, in present shape at least, does not establish indisputably that appellant was unqualified for the redefined position, or that her handling of the leave problem was unreasonable, 49 the work absence incidental to her impending motherhood loomed as a likely explanation for her discharge. Given that, we conclude that appellant survived the rigors of demonstrating the potential for a prima facie case at trial. 50
The legal principles activated at this juncture are relatively straightforward. Title VII declares it to "be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's ... sex." 51 This means that, unless indispensably demanded by the job, the gender of an employee cannot be utilized as a factor in a discharge decision, 52 or that the decision rested upon a characteristic peculiar to one of the sexes. 53 Pregnancy and childbirth are, of course, phenomena shared only by women, and only female employees are susceptible to employment losses which may be tied to either. So, if an employer grants employees leave for any and all temporary physical disabilities except pregnancy, and restoration to the employee's former job upon the expiration of leave, it is apparent that women employees are subject to "a substantial burden that men need not suffer." 54 Title VII outlaws any detrimental visitation on employees of either sex "because of their differing roles in 'the scheme of human existence;' " 55 by the same token, Title VII cannot be read "to permit an employer to burden female employees in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of their different role." 56 It follows that an employer extending job-reinstatement to employees generally after periods of temporary physical indisposition must pursue that policy equally when temporary disability is caused by pregnancy. 57
The instant case features a slight variant, however. The union has established leave policies for each of its three classes of regular full-time permanent employees, 58 but appellant was a full-time temporary employee, and consequently did not fit into any...
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