Abrahamson v. Amos
| Decision Date | 29 September 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 9211,9211 |
| Citation | 245 N.W.2d 888 |
| Parties | Edwin ABRAHAMSON and Ellen Abrahamson, parents of Paul Henry Abrahamson, Deceased, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. James R. AMOS, M.D., State Health Officer and D. E. Nelson, M. D., Burleigh County Coroner, Defendants and Appellees. Civ. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The cause of death, the manner and mode in which the death occurred, as delivered (determined) by the coroner and incorporated in the coroner's verdict, shall be incorporated in the death certificate filed with the registrar of vital statistics of this state.
2. Where a coroner records on the death certificate the cause of death as 'suicide,' such an essentially nonmedical opinion is a conclusion rather than a fact and is not admissible in evidence to rebut the presumption of accident.
3. Discretionary acts of public officials are reviewable by mandamus to compel the performance of duties and to correct abuses of discretion.
4. Only when no reasonable man would have reached the same conclusion can we say that there has been an abuse of discretion.
Wheeler, Wolf, Wefald & Peterson, Bismarck, for plaintiffs and appellants; argued by Robert O. Wefald, Bismarck.
Morris Tschider, Bismarck, for defendant and appellee James R. Amos. M.D., John M. Olson, State's Atty., Bismarck, for defendant and appellee, D. E. Nelson, M.D., argued by John M. Olson, State's Atty.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court of Burleigh County dismissing a complaint upon a finding that there is no remedy at law. On appeal, Edwin and Ellen Abrahamson contend that the determination by the Burleigh County coroner that suicide was the cause of death of their son, Paul Henry Abrahamson, is erroneous under the law and can be reviewed by the district court, and that the death certificate can be judicially corrected. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the action.
On September 5, 1973, Paul died of a gunshot wound fired at extremely close range north of Bismarck. There were no witnesses. From affidavits and stipulation we learn that: (1) Paul occasionally stumbled when getting up from a sitting position as a result of a knee injury suffered in the Viet Nam war; (2) prior to his death he had negotiated to sell his pickup truck; (3) he was making plans for a trip to Minnesota; (4) he had at one time discussed with his roommate the subject of suicide in a general way; and (5) friends and relatives considered Paul to be emotionally stable, cheerful, and friendly.
Just prior to his death Paul had been target shooting at objects in the river below him, and the Report of Coroner's Investigation indicates that there were several empty cartridges found along the cliff overlooking the river bank where his body was found.
Paul's parents and others found that the determination by the coroner was shocking and upsetting. Though sympathetic, the district court concluded that no appeal of the coroner's determination of cause of death was authorized by law and dismissed the complaint. We are concerned with § 11--19.1--08, NDCC, which provides in part:
'It shall be the duty of the coroner to keep a full and complete record and to fill in the cause of death upon the death certificate in all cases coming under his jurisdiction.'
And § 11--19.1--13, NDCC, which states:
'The cause of death, the manner and mode in which the death occurred, as delivered by the coroner and incorporated in the coroner's verdict, shall be incorporated in the death certificate filed with the registrar of vital statistics of this state.'
The coroner contends that his determination as to cause of death is merely advisory and not subject to judicial review. This argument is supported by a statement in 18 Am.Jur.2d 529, Coroners or Medical Examiners, § 15:
'It has been held that the verdict of a coroner or a coroner's jury is not subject to be reviewed * * * since it binds no one as a judgment, is merely advisory, and has itself no probative effect as evidence * * *.'
The majority of the cases cited to us are in agreement with the coroner's contention that, when his opinion is merely advisory and of no probative effect, it is not subject to review. Coffey v. Matera, 39 Misc.2d 80, 239 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1963); Boehme v. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World, 98 Tex. 376, 84 S.W. 422 (1905); Smalls v. State, 101 Ga. 570, 28 S.E. 981 (1897); 78 A.L.R.2d 1218.
However, in North Dakota, at least until the recent repeal of § 23--02--40, NDCC, a certified copy of a death certificate was admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 1 See also, Foss v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bur., 214 N.W.2d 519 (N.D.1974), and Brinkman v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 187 N.W.2d 657 (N.D.1971). See, however, Lohman v. General American Life Insurance Co., 478 F.2d 719, 730 (8th Cir. 1973), distinguishing Brinkman, supra, and pointing out the distinction between an opinion based upon medical facts and an essentially nonmedical opinion as to the ultimate fact of suicide or accident.
Presumably, the effect of the admissibility of the coroner's opinion under Section 23--02--40, NDCC, would be to alter the conclusions reached by some of the authorities cited above. In 28 A.L.R.2d 352, 354, the author discusses the reasons for excluding the coroner's opinion as to suicide in a civil proceeding:
It follows that when the coroner's opinion is admissible as evidence, and was arrived at not through an inquest but solely through a private, informal determination by the coroner, it would seem injudicious, if not a denial of due process, to admit it without subjecting it to some type of judicial review prior to its admission, and this is especially so if the coroner's opinion of suicide has the effect of overcoming the common law presumption against suicide existing in this State, as some authorities have held. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Wigley, 248 Ala. 676, 29 So.2d 218 (1947); 159 A.L.R. 181.
However, we do not reach this argument, for this court has never held that the coroner's opinion is admissible when that opinion has been formulated in terms of 'accident' or 'suicide.' In Lohman, supra, the Eighth Circuit Court held that, under North Dakota law, the coroner's conclusion of accidental death should be excised from the death certificate prior to its admission into evidence, thus distinguishing Brinkman, supra, where this court had held as properly admitted a death certificate containing the coroner's opinion that 'coronary thrombosis' was the cause of death. The circuit court stated:
'This was a medical conclusion based upon observable medical facts quite unlike the bald assertion of accidental death contained in Lohman's death certificate.
'Even more convincingly, we do not think that the imprimatur of 'prima facie evidence' should be given to such an assertion of an essentially nonmedical opinion as to the ultimate fact and pivotal issue in this case.' Lohman v. General American Life Insurance Co., 478 F.2d 719, 730.
In Foss, supra, this court held as properly admitted a death certificate which contained the coroner's opinion of cause of death as 'myocardial arrest.' We note that this was a medical opinion, not a nonmedical conclusion involving the ultimate fact in issue in the case.
We hold that where a coroner records on the death...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Kasper v. Provident Life Ins. Co., s. 9612
...on September 19, 1972, and noted thereon that the cause of death was acute myocardial infarction (heart failure). See Abrahamson v. Amos, 245 N.W.2d 888 (N.D.1976) for discussion as to the significance of a death certificate in determining cause of death. No autopsy was ever performed on th......
-
Fandrich v. WELLS CTY. BD. OF COUNTY COMM'RS, 20000054.
...beyond the scope of judicial review, but we apply a very deferential standard to correct abuses of that discretion. See Abrahamson v. Amos, 245 N.W.2d 888, 891 (N.D.1976). In reviewing a decision by a local government entity, a court must not substitute its judgment for that of the governme......