Abrahamson v. Bd of Educ., Wappingers Falls
| Decision Date | 01 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-7869(CON).,No. 02-7841(L).,No. 02-9409(XAP).,No. 02-9410(CON).,No. 02-9401(CON).,02-7841(L).,02-7869(CON).,02-9401(CON).,02-9409(XAP).,02-9410(CON). |
| Parties | Michael ABRAHAMSON, James A. Behler, John P. Calogero, Albert A. Cerilli, Jr., Andrea Dombrowski, John P. Hotrovich, John C. Lumia, Nancy Moreau, Richard L. Nadeau, Stephen T. O'Loughlin, Roseann C. Secchia, Pamela Seeger, Ellen Metzger O'Shea, Philip K. Cameron, Jr., Margaret Mealia, Assunta Das, Greta M. Woo, George M. Kaiser, Carlos Picciotti, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the WAPPINGERS FALLS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Wappingers Falls Central School District, The Wappingers Falls Congress of Teachers, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Richard Hamburger (David N. Yaffe, David H. Pearl, on the brief), Hamburger, Maxson, Yaffe, Wishod & Knauer, LLP, Melville, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Raymond G. Kuntz, Raymond G. Kuntz, P.C., Bedford Village, NY, for Defendants-Appellants Board of Education of the Wappingers Falls Central School District and Wappingers Falls Central School District.
James D. Bilik, Esq., Latham, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Wappingers Falls Congress of Teachers.
Before: STRAUB, B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges, STANTON, District Judge.*
Defendants-appellants Wappingers Falls Central School District and Board of Education of Wappingers Falls Central School District (collectively, "Wappingers" or the "School District") appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (McMahon, J.) granting summary judgment to plaintiffs-appellees ("the teachers") on their claim that a provision of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by Wappingers and the Wappingers Falls Congress of Teachers (the "Union") violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA" or "the Act"). The teachers contend that this provision excluded them from participation in an employment benefit on the basis of age and, therefore, violated the Act. They cross-appeal from the injunctive remedy fashioned by the District Judge, arguing that they are entitled to money damages, and from the District Court's refusal to award them attorneys' fees and costs. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the District Court's judgment that the collective bargaining agreement violated the ADEA and also affirm the injunctive remedy fashioned by the Court. We reverse in part and remand for further proceedings to determine an appropriate award of attorneys' fees.
Plaintiffs-appellees are all tenured teachers over the age of 55 in the Wappingers Falls Central School District. Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in effect from 1998-2001, certain teachers were offered a Salary Elective Program (SEP) that acted as a retirement incentive. That SEP applied to teachers who met three criteria:
(1) 15 years of District service,
(2) 20 years of member service in the New York State Teacher's Retirement System (NYSTRS), and
(3) eligibility for a service retirement pursuant to the rules and regulations of the NYSTRS.1
Teachers who met these criteria for the first time during the term of that CBA had the opportunity to elect retirement during the year they first became eligible and thereby obtain a $20,000 lump sum payment in addition to their other retirement benefits. Between 1998 and 2001, plaintiffs-appellees all met the three criteria for the first time but chose to continue working rather than to retire and collect the $20,000 payment. Under this provision of the SEP, the first year in which a teacher met all three of the criteria was the only time he or she could elect retirement and receive the $20,000 payment. If the teacher chose to continue to work, as each of the appellees did, she lost the opportunity to receive the $20,000 payment upon future retirement.
In June 2001, the Union and the School District negotiated and signed a new CBA governing the teachers' terms of employment to be in effect between 2001 and 2006. The new CBA modified the existing SEP by offering a second option, referred to by the parties as Option # 2. This second option retained the qualification criteria, and teachers continued to have the option to retire and receive the $20,000 payment when those criteria were met. However, teachers who met the retirement criteria for the first time between 2001 and 2006 were offered, under Option # 2, the additional choice to continue working and receive a $7,000 per year payment for three years. Thus, under the new CBA, a teacher who met all three of the eligibility criteria for the first time had two options in the year the teacher became eligible: (1) to retire and receive the same $20,000 payment that was available under the old CBA, or (2) to continue to work and receive an additional $7,000 per year for up to three years with no requirement that the teacher retire at any particular time. The practical effect of this arrangement would be that teachers who chose Option # 2 would receive an augmented salary for three years that would then serve to increase their pension payments upon retirement. Appellees, who had chosen continued employment rather than retirement under the old CBA, were never offered Option # 2; it was available only to teachers who became newly eligible for retirement during the term of the new CBA.
In December 2001, the appellees sued Wappingers and the Union claiming that Option # 2 discriminated against them on the basis of age in violation of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., as amended by the Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq. The District Court addressed the claims on cross-motions for summary judgment. Both parties agreed that whether Option # 2 was a retirement incentive plan or an employee benefit presented a question of law.
The District Court, in a comprehensive and thoughtful opinion, granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their ADEA and New York Human Rights Law claims.2 The decision, dated June 21, 2002, came before any payments to teachers who chose to participate in Option # 2 were scheduled to begin (in September 2002), so no such payment were made. The District Judge issued an injunction ordering the defendants to bring the CBA into compliance with the ADEA, specifically contemplating that removing Option # 2 would accomplish this result. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs' attorneys moved for an award of attorneys' fees under the ADEA in the amount of approximately $111,000. The District Judge denied the motion, finding that the appellees were not "prevailing parties" under relevant case law because the legal relationship between the teachers and the School District had not been altered by the judgment.
Defendants-appellants appeal the grant of summary judgment, arguing that Option # 2 does not discriminate on the basis of age and that, even if it does, it falls within the safe harbor for bona fide early retirement incentive plans specifically protected by the ADEA and OWBPA. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B). Plaintiffs-appellees cross-appeal, arguing that the injunctive remedy was improperly structured as they too should be allowed to participate fully in Option # 2, and that they were entitled to attorney's fees under the ADEA.
The District Court, with the consent of the parties, properly identified the question of whether Option # 2 was an employee early retirement incentive plan as a question of law, which we review de novo. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 302 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir.2002).
The ADEA was passed "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age" and "to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). The Act, in part, prohibits an employer from "fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In order to establish a disparate treatment claim under the ADEA, an employee must make a prima facie case of discrimination, Auerbach v. Bd. of Educ. of the Harborfields Cent. Sch. Dist. of Greenlawn, 136 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir.1998), by showing: (1) that the employee is a member of the protected class, (2) that the employee is qualified for the position, (3) that the employee suffered adverse employment action, and (4) that the circumstances surrounding the action give rise to an inference of age discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) ().
Here, the District Court found, and neither party disputes, that the plaintiffs-appellees were members of the protected class as they were all older than age 40 at the time they were denied the benefits of Option # 2. Further, no one disputes that the appellees were qualified to continue teaching in the Wappingers District as they all did exactly that. The teachers contend that they have also shown adverse employment action and that the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the CBA with Option # 2 raises an inference of age discrimination. The School District and the Union contend that no adverse employment action has been shown and that, even if a prima facie case has been established, Option # 2 falls within the safe harbor provision for bona fide early retirement incentive plans contained in § 623(f) of the ADEA.
The appellees argue, and the...
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