Abram v. State

• Decision Date: 26 November 1968
• Docket Number: No. K--56,K--56
• Citation: 216 So.2d 498
• Parties: Willie ABRAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 498

216 So.2d 498

Willie ABRAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. K--56.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 26, 1968.

T. Edward Austin, Jr., Public Defender, and Ralph W. Nimmons, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

WIGGINTON, Chief Judge.

Appellant was indicted for murder in the first degree, tried by a jury and found guilty with a recommendation of mercy. From the judgment of conviction and sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon him, he has taken this appeal.

By his first point appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence an alleged oral confession made by him while subject to police interrogation immediately following his arrest without being adequately warned of his constitutional rights as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Miranda v. State of Arizona. ¹

During the trial, and in the absence of the jury from the courtroom, appellee proffered testimony of a police officer regarding an alleged confession made by appellant. In response to questions by the prosecuting attorney, the police officer testified that before interrogating appellant the latter was warned of his right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used against him in court; and, that he had a right to an attorney to represent him if he so desired. Upon this showing the trial court overruled appellant's objection to the proffered confession, whereupon the witness testified that during his interrogation appellant admitted shooting the deceased, and that he did so because the deceased was taking advantage of appellant's little friend. The alleged confession testified to by the police officer included not only appellant's admission of having shot the decedent, but his motive for doing so.

In the case of Woods v. State ² the Third District Court of Appeal, speaking through Judge Pearson, paraphrased the holding by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, as follows:

'The United States Supreme Court in Miranda declared that 'unless and until' the prosecution demonstrates at trial that 'prior to any questioning' it has warned an individual 'taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and * * * subjected to questioning' that 'he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires,' 'no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.' The Court also declared that an individual can waive these rights (after he has been appropriately warned and been afforded an opportunity to exercise his rights throughout an interrogation) and agree to answer questions or make a statement; but the prosecution also has the burden of demonstrating at trial the waiver of any rights before any evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against an individual.'

It becomes apparent from the holdings in both the Woods and Miranda decisions that the warnings given appellant in the case sub judice were not sufficiently adequate to render admissible the alleged confession made by him. He was not advised of his right to consult with counsel prior to any interrogation by the police officers, nor was he advised that counsel would be furnished him at state expense if he were financially unable to employ counsel from his own resources.

In his opening statement to the jury appellant's counsel stated that appellant admits he shot and killed the decedent, but would establish by competent evidence that he did so in self-defense. The record reveals that in adducing testimony in his own behalf appellant established by the testimony of one of his witnesses that prior to his arrest he called a police officer and admitted having shot the decedent. Even though the admission of appellant's confession into evidence constituted error because the interrogation officers failed to warn appellant of his constitutional rights as set forth in Miranda, supra, the part of the confession which admitted that appellant shot the decedent would be harmless error and not grounds for reversal. The confession, however, as testified to by the police officers went much further than to merely admit that appellant shot the decedent. The confession also purported to reveal the motive which prompted appellant to do the shooting which resulted in decedent's death. This part of the confession is the only evidence adduced by the prosecution purporting to establish appellant's motive for committing the crime. In view of the fact that defendant was relying upon a plea of self-defense to prove his innocence, the portion of his alleged confession which purported to ascribe a motive for his act inconsistent with self-defense was inculpatory and extremely prejudicial. Because of the failure of the prosecution to establish that appellant was adequately warned of his constitutional rights as defined by Miranda and Woods, supra, the confession was illegally obtained and the court erred in admitting it into evidence over appellant's objection. We reach this conclusion with considerable reluctance because the record reflects overwhelming eyewitness testimony establishing defendant's guilt of the crime charged. The purported confession made by him was merely cumulative and added little if anything to the evidence already adduced concerning defendant's guilt. Under the circumstances we find it most difficult to understand why the prosecuting officer was willing to incur the risk of reversal by insisting upon the admission into evidence of the illegal confession obtained by the police officers in view of the highly questionable necessity for doing so. By taking such risk, the expense of the initial trial has been wasted and the time of the trial court and this court in considering this case has been needlessly encumbered. The necessity for reversing convictions of this kind in order to...