Abrams v. Bronstein

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: SAMUEL RABIN; BREITEL; STEVENS
• Citation: Abrams v. Bronstein, 354 N.Y.S.2d 926, 33 N.Y.2d 488, 310 N.E.2d 528 (N.Y. 1974)
• Decision Date: 27 March 1974
• Parties: , 310 N.E.2d 528 In the Matter of Lawrence ABRAMS et al., Appellants, v. Harry I. BRONSTEIN et al., Constituting the Department of Personnel of the City of New York and the Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.

Page 926

354 N.Y.S.2d 926

33 N.Y.2d 488, 310 N.E.2d 528

In the Matter of Lawrence ABRAMS et al., Appellants, v. Harry I. BRONSTEIN et al., Constituting the Department of Personnel of the City of New York and the Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 27, 1974.

John J. Mooney, Albert J. E. McLaughlin, New York City, and Samuel Lewis, for appellants.

Norman Redlich, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Beatrice Rothman and Stanley Buchsbaum, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

SAMUEL RABIN, Judge.

Petitioners herein are all members of the New York City Police Department who participated in an examination for promotion to lieutenant. They have all since been appointed to the lieutenant grade but claim that they have been unlawfully denied a certain benefit, 'retroactive annual salary increments' ¹ which the respondents, members of the New York City Department of Personnel and Bureau of the Budget and others (City), granted to other lieutenants appointed pursuant to the same examination.

These other lieutenants received the benefit in question pursuant to a stipulation in another lawsuit, entitled Amendola v. Hoberman (Sup.Ct., N.Y.County), an article 78 proceeding which challenged the validity of some of the approved answers to the examination questions. This Amendola proceeding was commenced after the grading of the test but before a list ranking those eligible for promotion as a result of the examination was compiled. As incidental relief, the Amendola petitioners wee seeking to stay the establishment of an eligible list until the completion of their litigation. To avoid this stay, and allow the Police Department to make appointments, the City entered into a stipulation whereby it was agreed that if the Amendola petitioners were successful in their challenge, a revised list would be established, and upon actual appointment, each Amendola petitioner would be granted a retroactive date of appointment for all purposes, except back pay. ²

The original eligible list was established by the City May 6, 1968, prior to judgment in Amendola. Subsequently, when the Amendola challenge was successful, the eligible list had to be revised in accordance with the various test answers newly approved by the judgment. While the judgment required only the rerating of the examinations of the participants in the Amendola lawsuit, the Department of Personnel, on its own initiative, equitably rerated the examinations of all candidates in accordance with the revised answers, and issued a revised list of eligibles. ³

The petitioners herein were not among the Amendola petitioners. They include candidates appearing for the first time on the revised list, and candidates who appeared on both the original and the revised lists but advanced in the revised ranking and thus would gain by use of the Amendola formula for calculating the date of appointment. ⁴ The present petitioners, like those in Amendola, were granted retroactive appointment dates in accordance with their positions on the revised list for the purpose of future promotion. The Amendola petitioners, pursuant to the stipulation in their lawsuit, were granted the additional benefit of retroactive salary increments.

The petitioners herein challenge this differentiation as a violation of the equal protection guarantees of the Federal and State Constitutions, ⁵ and seek a declaratory judgment stating that they are entitled to receive retroactive annual salary increments for the period between their actual and retroactive appointment dates, as was granted the Amendola petitioners.

The equal protection provisions of both the Federal and State Constitutions apply to the actions taken by administrative departments of local governmental units. (See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958); cf. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 289--291, 33 S.Ct. 312, 57 L.Ed. 510 (1913); Bauch v. City of New York, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 289 N.Y.S.2d 951, 237 N.E.2d 211 (1967), cert. den. 393 U.S. 834, 89 S.Ct. 108, 21 L.Ed.2d 105 (1968).) An agency of the State denies equal protection when it treats persons similarly situated differently under the law (see Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920)), and this difference may be created by the grant of a preference as well as by the imposition of a burden (cf. People v. Creeden, 281 N.Y. 413, 419--420, 24 N.E.2d 105, 107 (1939); People v. Havnor, 149 N.Y. 195, 205, 43 N.E. 541, 544 (1896)). Controversies involving compensation are also subject to review under the guarantees of equal protection (see, e.g., Harmon v. Board of Educ., 300 N.Y. 21, 88 N.E.2d 351 (1949)).

Of course, not every difference in treatment violates the equal protection guarantee. As formulated in a recent Supreme Court decision, the traditional test for a denial of equal protection under State law is 'whether the challenged classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a valid state objective.' (Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 541, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970); accord Matter of Hotel Assn. of N.Y. City v. Weaver, 3 N.Y.2d 206, 212--213, 165 N.Y.S.2d 17, 21--22, 144 N.E.2d 14, 17--18 (1957).) To apply this test we must, as an initial step, ascertain both the basis of the classification involved and the governmental objective purportedly advanced by the classification. The classification must then be compared to the objective to determine whether the classification rests 'upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation' to the object for which it is proposed. (Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527, 79 S.Ct. 437, 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989, Supra; accord Matter of Buttonow, 23 N.Y.2d 385, 392, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97, 102, 244 N.E.2d 677, 680 (1968).)

With these principles in mind, we turn to the facts at hand. The petitioners assert that they are similarly situated to those who have been granted the retroactive date of appointment for purposes of determining salary increment, in that they have all been appointed lieutenants pursuant to the same examination. Despite this similarity, the City argues that it has properly denied the retroactive annual salary increment to the petitioners, while granting it to others, by a classification based upon participation in the Amendola stipulation. ⁶ The City claims it is obligated to grant this benefit to those covered by the Amendola stipulation 'as a matter of law' but is not so obligated to the petitioners herein.

As to the governmental objective purportedly advanced by this classification, the City does not articulate a clear position. ⁷ However, since the petitioners' request for retroactive salary increments was denied by the City Bureau of the Budget, it becomes apparent that the governmental interest purportedly advanced is economy and fiscal responsibility.

Considering the classification involved and the governmental interest it purportedly advances, we may pose the question mandated by the equal protection guarantees of the State and Federal Constitutions: When granting salary benefits to police lieutenants, all of whom have been promoted as a result of the same competitive examination, is it reasonable, in order to limit expenditures, to classify the lieutenants on the basis of whether they participated in a stipulation incidental to a legal proceeding? On the present facts, the answer is clearly in the negative.

It is true, as respondents suggest, that the Amendola petitioners gave up a valuable litigation right, that of moving to stay the establishment of the eligible list, in order to achieve their retroactive benefits including the salary increments. However, in the present case, this right to stay the establishment of the eligible list may be said to have stemmed primarily from the Amendola petitioners' participation in the faulty promotion examination and not from their institution of a lawsuit. The thrust of the Amendola stipulation was to assure the...