Abramson v. Hard

Decision Date28 May 1934
Docket Number3 Div. 106.
Citation229 Ala. 2,155 So. 590
PartiesABRAMSON et al. v. HARD, Comptroller, et al.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Montgomery County; Walter B. Jones Judge.

Taxpayer's bill by W. A. Abramson and Elizabeth Baldwin Hill against J H. Hard, Jr., as State Comptroller, and S. H. Blan, as State Treasurer. From a decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill complainants appeal.

Affirmed.

Walter J. Knabe, Hill, Hill, Whiting, Thomas & Rives, and Rushton Crenshaw & Rushton, all of Montgomery, for appellants.

Thos. E. Knight, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Frontis H. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

CAFFEY, Special Justice, concurred in by MULKEY and MARTIN, Special Justices.

The bill of complaint in this case seeks an injunction to prevent the state comptroller from issuing, and the state treasurer from paying, any warrants out of an alleged balance of approximately $500,000 of general funds in the state treasury at the time the bill was filed on September 28, 1933, until the comptroller shall have issued warrants "sufficient to pay upon the Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) special appropriation for public schools and upon the One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,500,000.00) appropriation to the Alabama Special Educational Trust Fund for the year beginning October 1, 1932, such proportion of the said appropriations as the total sum of all appropriations bears to the total revenues available in said fiscal year" beginning October 1, 1932, and ending September 30, 1933. It also seeks a mandatory injunction to compel the state comptroller to issue, and the state treasurer to pay, upon the $2,000,000 appropriation for each of the fiscal years beginning October 1, 1933, and October 1, 1934, to the Special Educational Trust Fund, warrants drawn against the general fund in such proportion as the total sum of all appropriations made by the Legislature bears to the total estimated revenues for each of said fiscal years.

Based upon the language of section 19 of the Budget and Financial Control Act (Acts 1932 [Ex. Sess.] pp. 35, 44), together with article 23 of the Constitution adopted July 18, 1933 (see Acts 1933 [Ex. Sess.] p. 196), the appellants contend that in the event the state's revenue in any year is insufficient to pay appropriations made for that year in full then " all appropriations" of every kind and character are required by the express terms of this section to be prorated. The appellees, on the other hand, contend that all expenses of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the state government must be paid in full as preferred claims upon the state's revenues before there can be any proration, predicating their contention upon the requirement of the Constitution that such departments shall be maintained as the essential basis of our form of government. From the necessity that the essential departments of our government must be maintained, it is argued that all appropriations made for the carrying on of the work of each of these three great departments, through their various and sundry agencies, must be paid in full before any part of appropriations other than for the expenses of these departments can be paid.

In approaching the appellees' contentions, we do so with a consciousness that the necessary functions of the government must be performed, but also with a consciousness that full and exclusive power has been vested in the Legislature to determine the amount of appropriations necessary for the performance of the essential functions of government. Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. 276, 282; State ex rel. Turner v. Henderson, Governor, 199 Ala. 244, 249, 74 So. 344, L. R. A. 1917F, 770; State Docks Commission et al. v. State ex rel. Jones, 227 Ala. 521, 150 So. 537; Const. § 72.

In such matters the power of the Legislature is "transcendent." Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58, 44 Am. Rep. 128; State v. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co., 188 Ala. 487, 503, 66 So. 169, L. R. A. 1915A, 185, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 752; State ex rel. Gunter v. Thompson, 193 Ala. 561, 568, 69 So. 461; Finklea v. Farish, 160 Ala. 230, 235, 49 So. 366; State ex rel. City of Mobile v. Board of Revenue & Road Commissioners, 180 Ala. 489, 499, 61 So. 368.

In the exercise of that power the Legislature has made certain appropriations to various agencies of the three great state departments which are expressly declared to be "maximum, conditional and proportionate appropriations" to be prorated without discrimination in the event that the estimated budget resources are insufficient to pay all such appropriations in full. The Legislature has accordingly, within the exclusive power conferred on it, fixed maximum appropriations for these agencies of the government, but at the same time has declared these maximum appropriations "conditional" and in the event of a shortage of revenues for a given fiscal year has fixed such appropriations at a figure proportionate to the revenues received. In short, the Legislature has fixed a conditional maximum allowance, and in a certain contingency has provided for a reduction of this maximum. The Legislature being the sole judge of the amount necessary to support and carry on these governmental agencies and having determined that a pro rata of the maximum conditional appropriation is sufficient for that purpose, it is beyond the power of the judicial department to override this exercise of its judgment and discretion. Authorities, supra.

We turn then to a consideration of the question of construction of the provisions of the Budget Act.

Section 19 of the Budget Act provides: "The appropriations made shall not be available for expenditure until allotted as provided for in Section 20, except as may be otherwise provided in this Act. All appropriations now or hereafter made except per-capita appropriations now in force or hereafter made to Eleemosynary and correctional institutions and the Alabama School for Deaf and Blind at Talladega * * * are hereby declared to be maximum, conditional and proportionate appropriations, the purpose being to make the appropriations payable in full in the amounts named only in the event that the estimated budget resources during each fiscal year of the quadrennium for which such appropriations are made, are sufficient to pay all of the appropriations in full; the Governor shall restrict allotments to prevent an overdraft or deficit in any fiscal year for which appropriations are made by prorating without discrimination against any department, institution, commission or other State agency, the available revenues among the various departments, institutions, bureaus, boards, commissions and other State agencies. * * *"

It is, of course, a well-settled general rule of construction that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it should be given the meaning therein plainly expressed. Relying upon this rule, appellants contend that the use of the inclusive expression "all appropriations," in section 19 of the aforesaid act, expresses the plain and unambiguous intent on the part of the legislature to require that all appropriations of every kind and character, other than those therein specifically excepted, shall be prorated in the event the revenues of a given year are not sufficient to pay all. But manifestly this is not true, for other provisions of the same act demonstrate that it was not intended as claimed that " all appropriations" of every kind shall be so prorated. Certain departments and agencies have appropriated to them all " receipts" from the administration and operation of the department or agency. For instance, there is appropriated to the convict department "all receipts from its administration and operation of the convicts" [Act No. 328, supra, p. 324, § 14 (2)]; to the state securities commission "all fees or monies paid or payable" (Ib., § 24 1/2); to the highway department "so much of the gasoline taxes and motor vehicle licenses collected, as may be necessary" to pay the interest and sinking funds on outstanding highway bonds, and the rest and residue of such taxes and licenses and all other revenues coming in or accruing to the highway department for the maintenance and construction of roads and bridges (Ib., § 34); and to Confederate soldiers and sailors an amount "necessary to pay all the pensions allowed" out of the proceeds of the levy of the one mill tax for needy Confederate soldiers and sailors (Ib., § 36). These, and others of like character, manifestly are appropriations and as such are included in Act No. 328 and so would come within the broad term "all appropriations." It is clear, however, from the provisions of section 21 of the Budget Act that they are not appropriations intended to be prorated under section 19 or allotted under section 20.

Again, there are appropriations made pursuant to constitutional requirement which just as manifestly were not intended to be, and which in fact could not be, prorated, but the full amount of which, by express constitutional provision, must be appropriated by the Legislature to the purposes specified in the Constitution. Of this character are appropriations for the compensation of members of the Legislature (Const. § 49); the general school fund (Const.§ 260; Turnipseed v. Blan, 226 Ala. 549, 148 So. 116); interest on funds of the University of Alabama covered into the treasury (Const. § 265); the compensation of registrars (Const. § 186); and (at least after October 1, 1935) the salaries of the judges of the Supreme and circuit courts (Const. § 150) and of the Governor and other executive officers (Const. § 118).

Other parts of the same act and other parts of our fundamental law therefore, show that the language relied on cannot be given the broad meaning it...

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