Abromats v. Abromats
| Decision Date | 16 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-60653-BLOOM/Valle |
| Parties | G. CLIFFORD ABROMATS, individually and as Trustee of the Gloria J. Abromats Revocable Trust Agreement u/t/d September 15, 2005, as amended, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. PHILIP ABROMATS, individually and as qualified beneficiary Gloria J. Abromats Revocable Trust Agreement u/t/d September 15, 2005, as amended, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant G. Clifford Abromats's ("Clifford") Motion for Sanctions and Disqualification ("Motion for Sanctions"), ECF No. [122], and Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Philip Abromats's ("Philip") Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Fee-Injunction Motion and Hold Evidentiary Hearing ("Motion to Reconsider"), ECF No. [119] (collectively, the "Motions"). For the reasons that follow, both Motions are denied.
The background of these proceedings is well known to all parties and extensively documented in this Court's prior Orders. See Abromats v. Abromats, 2016 WL 5941888 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2016) (ECF No. [117]); Abromats v. Abromats, 2016 WL 4917153 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2016) (ECF No. [93]); Abromats v. Abromats, 2016 WL 4366480 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2016) (ECF No. [72]); see also ECF No. [52]. For purposes of the instant Motions, Clifford is Trustee of the Gloria Abromats ("Ms. Abromats" or "Gloria") Trust ("Gloria Trust"), and George Abromats Trust ("George Trust") (collectively, the "Trusts"), settled by the parties' parents before they passed away. Philip, a seasoned attorney, originally filed a pro se Complaint in the Western District of New York, but his wife Letitia Abromats ("Letitia"), also an attorney, began representing him shortly thereafter. See Motion for Sanctions, Factual Background ¶¶ 11, 16, 17, 25. Letitia has continued to represent Philip before this Court, but Philip has performed the majority of research and writing in this motion-heavy litigation. See id. ¶¶ 28, 29; see also ECF No. [88-1] at 3; [94-4] ¶¶ 3, 5; ECF No. [127] at 3, 15-16. Many of the documents filed with the Court on Philip's behalf have been signed by Letitia but submitted by Philip's law firm, Philip E. Abromats, P.C., while other filings have been made by Philip's local counsel, Allan A. Joseph. Clifford moves to sanction Philip and disqualify him, his law firm, and Letitia from appearing in these proceedings. See Motion for Sanctions. Unsurprisingly, Philip opposes the Motion, and additionally moves the Court to reconsider its prior Order denying his Fee-Injunction Motion, ECF No. [117]. See Motion to Reconsider. The parties' Responses and Replies have timely followed. See ECF Nos. [127], [132], [134], [139].
These proceedings concern a deeply personal and bitter dispute between two brothers. Among other accusations, each brother accuses the other of shamelessly taking advantage of their infirm mother to obtain an advantage over Trust assets. For over a year, the parties have litigated this matter intensely in three different venues before at least five different judges. At times, each side has supported its position by utilizing unpleasant phrasing and accusatorylanguage. It is little surprise,1 then, to see a similar tone used in Philip's October 10, 2016 email to Clifford, which serves as the primary basis for Clifford's Motion for Sanctions. See ECF No. [122-1] (the "October 10 Email"). Clifford argues that the Court should sanction Philip, stating that "[b]ecause he is unable to control his own conduct in this litigation, Philip and his law practice should be disqualified from participating in it and Philip should face sanctions for his violation of bar rules." Motion for Sanctions at 3-4. Philip argues that Clifford has failed to establish grounds for such a sanction.
The Court has an inherent power to sanction attorneys or parties to a case. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50-52 (1991). Such powers "must be exercised with restraint and discretion." Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). "The key to unlocking a court's inherent power is a finding of bad faith." Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1998). As with any motion, the movant - in this case, Clifford - bears the burden to establish grounds for the relief he seeks. Clifford argues that Philip's conduct in these proceedings constitutes the "practice of law," and that the Court should treat him as either a pro se litigant or an attorney practicing before the Court in violation of Court rules. See Motion for Sanctions at 9. Philip's practice of law, according to Clifford, has included the "drafting of pleadings and court papers and the supervision and direction of the legal work of an associate - i.e., Letitia Abromats," culminating in Philip's recent email entitled "Settlement Communication Confidential." Philip, however, has been represented by his wife Letitia, attorney Thomas E. Buck ("Buck"), and attorney Allan Joseph since the inception of these proceedings before this Court. While Philip concedes that he personally drafted many of the filings and conducted much of the underlying research utilized in this case, Philip states that Letitia "still oversees that work," as she "reads every motion and brief in the case, corresponds with opposing andco-counsel, reviews discovery and signs submissions to the court." ECF No. [127] at 15, 16 n.8. Philip further explains that Buck's duty is to "execute the actual trial and any other adversarial events, such as depositions," and that Letitia and Buck "share the duty of arguing motions hearings." Id. at 16.
Parties in federal court "may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Furthermore, in Florida, "[p]arties to a matter may communicate directly with each other." Fla. St. Bar R. 4-4.2 (Comment). Clifford argues that the Court should categorize Philip as a pro se attorney-litigant despite his being represented by attorneys, and sanction him for his improper email to Clifford. Clifford cites to no factually analogous case in support of his position, nor does he provide authority that holds an attorney-client such as Philip cannot draft his own filings on his own behalf if said filings are reviewed, signed, and filed by his counsel. The Court agrees with Philip that the cases Clifford relies upon are materially distinguishable, as they involve entirely pro se litigants, unlicensed attorneys or other improper representation, or conduct in violation of a court order. See, e.g., Bedoya v. Aventura Limousine & Transp. Serv., Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Suchite v. Kleppin, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2011); The Florida Bar v. D'Ambrosio, 25 So. 3d 1209, 1212 (Fla. 2009); The Florida Bar v. Neiman, 816 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. 2002); The Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d 559, 560 (Fla. 1978); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 109 (Wyo. 1994); see also Adams v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 2000 WL 33941852, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2000), report and recommendation adopted in part sub nom. Adams v. BellSouth Telecommuncations, Inc., 2001 WL 34032759 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2001), dismissed sub nom. Adams v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 45 F. App'x 876 (11th Cir. 2002) (). Since the transfer/removal of this case to this Court, Philip has admittedly assisted his attorneys, but has neither made a filing nor violated a court order. Regardless of whether Philip's actions constitute the practice of law under other circumstances, the Court does not believe that Philip's assistance in his own case, overseen, reviewed, and submitted to the Court by his attorneys, constitutes pro se litigating or the impermissible practice of law.2 Accordingly, the Court finds that Clifford has failed to establish grounds to sanction Philip, Letitia, or Philip E. Abromats, P.C.
As to the October 10 Email specifically, Clifford believes it "an outrage,"3 and makes clear that he does not wish to receive further emails from Philip (the individual) during the course of this litigation. Motion for Sanctions at 3, 5; see ECF No. [134] at 10. Accordingly, and in the interests of collegial resolution of this case, the Court orders that Philip (the individual) shall not initiate contact with Clifford (the individual) during the course of this litigation unless explicitly permitted by Clifford or his attorneys. Philip may be present at any meeting or copied on any communication initiated or responded to by his attorneys, unless otherwise prohibited by the Rules of Ethics or Southern District of Florida's Local Rules. Additionally, all submissions filed with the Court henceforth shall list the submitting law firm.Specifically, if Letitia Abromats is not an attorney with Philip E. Abromats, P.C. for the purposes of this case - as Letitia swears - and she and/or her law firm make a filing on Philip's behalf, "Letitia C. Abromats, P.C." must be listed above the signature line, as appropriate.
Philip separately moves the Court to reconsider its decision denying his motion to enjoin Clifford, as trustee, from using trust funds to litigate this case. As the Court has previously explained, "[c]ourts have delineated three major grounds justifying reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Williams v. Cruise Ships Catering & Serv. Int'l, N.V., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1357-58 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Sussman v. Sa...
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