Abromats v. Abromats

• Decision Date: 14 September 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 16-cv-60653-BLOOM/Valle
• Parties: G. CLIFFORD ABROMATS, individually and as Trustee of the Gloria J. Abromats Revocable Trust Agreement u/t/d September 15, 2005, as amended, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. PHILIP ABROMATS, individually and as qualified beneficiary Gloria J. Abromats Revocable Trust Agreement u/t/d September 15, 2005, as amended, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

G. CLIFFORD ABROMATS,individually and as Trustee of the Gloria J. Abromats Revocable Trust Agreement u/t/d September 15, 2005,as amended, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. PHILIP ABROMATS,individually and as qualified beneficiary Gloria J. Abromats Revocable Trust Agreement u/t/d September 15, 2005,as amended, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.

Case No. 16-cv-60653-BLOOM/Valle

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

September 14, 2016

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon a Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim filed by Counter Defendant Jack Baxter ("Baxter"), ECF No. [59] ("Baxter's Motion"), and a Motion for More Definite Statement and Motion to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff/Counter Defendant G. Clifford Abromats ("Clifford") and Counter Defendant Janice Worobec ("Worobec") (collectively, "Clifford" or "Clifford Defendants"), ECF No. [63] ("Motion" or "Clifford's Motion") (collectively, the "Motions"). All Counter Defendants move the Court to dismiss counterclaims brought by Defendant/Counter Plaintiff Philip Abromats ("Philip"). The Court has considered the Motions, the attached exhibits, the record in this case as appropriate, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons that follow, Baxter's Motion is granted, and Clifford's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The unique background of these proceedings is known to all parties, as extensively documented in this Court's prior Orders. See Abromats v. Abromats, 2016 WL 4366480 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2016) (ECF No. [72]); see also ECF No. [52]. For purposes of the instant Motions, the record reflects that on May 13, 2016, Philip filed an Amended Answer to Clifford's Complaint, ECF No. [1] ("Complaint"), including affirmative defenses and 16 counterclaims spanning 433 paragraphs. See ECF No. [37] ("Counterclaims"). Philip brings only one of his counterclaims, Count 14, against Baxter. The remaining counterclaims are brought against Clifford and/or Worobec, counterclaims Clifford Defendants argue must be dismissed in their entirety. See Motion. Baxter and Clifford filed their Motions to Dismiss on July 19 and August 1, 2016, respectively. See ECF Nos. [59] and [63]. Philip's Responses, and the Movants' Replies, timely followed. See ECF Nos. [68], [70], [75], [87].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation"). In the same vein, a complaint may not rest on "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. These elementsare required to survive a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requests dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009). However, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions, and courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006). A court considering a Rule 12(b) motion is generally limited to the facts contained in the complaint and attached exhibits, including documents referred to in the complaint that are central to the claim. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009); Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[A] document outside the four corners of the complaint may still be considered if it is central to the plaintiff's claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity.") (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1135 (11th Cir. 2002)).

III. DISCUSSION

Counter Defendants argue that Philip's Counterclaims must be dismissed for a multitude of reasons. The Court will first address the arguments applicable to the Counterclaims in their entirety, and then will address Baxter and Clifford Defendants' arguments for dismissing Count14. In subsections III.D through III.I, the Court adjudicates Clifford Defendants' remaining arguments.

A. Shotgun Pleading

Both Baxter and Clifford Defendants argue that Philip's Counterclaims constitutes an impermissible "shotgun pleading." Indeed, Philip's Counterclaims do consist of "multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint." Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015). However, the Court finds that "this is not a situation where a failure to more precisely parcel out and identify the facts relevant to each claim materially increased the burden of understanding the factual allegations underlying each count." Id. at 1324. The Motions indicate that all Counterclaim Defendants comprehend Philip's legal claims and recognize the specific factual allegations he pleads in support, and to the extent that Clifford Defendants may have been burdened in preparing their Motion, a review of the substantive arguments contained therein indicate that any "burden of understanding" has been overcome. Importantly, Philip supports each count of his Counterclaims with specific factual allegations, identifies the particular Defendants liable for each count, and lists his legal theories in 16 separate sections. The Court, therefore, believes it is likely for Defendants "to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claims for relief." Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Florida Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal alteration omitted). As in Weiland, the Court does not "retreat[ ] from this circuit's criticism of shotgun pleadings." 792 F.3d at 1326. Rather, the Court finds that under the specific circumstances of this case, the Motions will be adjudicated on the merits.

B. Clifford's Motion for More Definite Statement - Counts 2, , , , , , , and 15

Clifford Defendants move for a more definite statement of the above counts due to the inclusion of claims relevant to the George Abromats Trust ("George Trust"), with claims relevant to the Gloria Abromats Trust ("Gloria Trust" or "Trust") (collectively, the "Trusts"). See Motion at 2. Rule 10(b) states that

A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence-and each defense other than a denial-must be stated in a separate count or defense.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). A defendant may "move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). "The motion must . . . point out the defects complained of and the details desired." Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 983 n.70 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e)) (alterations in original).

Clifford claims that the offending counts improperly "comingle claims founded on duties that [Clifford] allegedly breached under the George Trust . . . with claims founded on duties that [Clifford] breached under the Gloria Trust." Motion at 5. Each one of the referenced counts, however, alleges a single legal theory, pleading factual allegations based in both Trusts. Therefore, unlike Anderson, infra, and Green v. C.B. Fleet Holding Co. Inc., 2008 WL 113668, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2008) relied upon by Clifford, the Counterclaims properly allege a single legal theory in each count, and the Court does not find a more definite statement required. See Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366 (finding a more definite statement where "each count also charges that the defendant or defendants violated the First, Fourth, and Thirteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Chapters 120 and 240 of the Florida Statutes, Chapter 28 of theFlorida Administrative Code, and the Florida law of contracts."); Green, 2008 WL 113668, at *1 ("In Count III of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff . . . attempts to assert two alternative claims-one for fraud and one for negligent misrepresentation."). Moreover, Clifford serves as Trustee of both Trusts, and many of Philip's claims involve related allegations of comingling and raiding of Trust assets. Given the nature of the claims he brings, the Court does not find Philip's pleading so "vague or ambiguous" that Clifford cannot reasonably prepare a response. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). To the contrary, Clifford has submitted extensive legal argument challenging every legal claim Philip brings - commingling allegations...