Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson
Citation | 204 Cal.App.2d 242,22 Cal.Rptr. 309 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Decision Date | 29 May 1962 |
Parties | ABSTRACT INVESTMENT CO., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William D. HUTCHINSON, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 26220. |
Miller & Malone and Loren Miller, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.
A. L. Wirin, Los Angeles, Richard J. Kamins, Beverly Hills, R. Milton Smith and Gerald L. Rosen, Los Angeles, as Amici Curiae, appearing on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union in support of defendant and appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Howard H. Jewel, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Manly D. Calof, Deputy Atty. Gen., as Amici Curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.
Fred W. Chase, Glendale, for plaintiff and respondent.
Lackman & Lackman, Samuel Lackman and Lawrence H. Lackman, Long Beach, as Amici Curiae, appearing on behalf of California Apartment Owners Association in support of plaintiff and respondent.
Should the court receive evidence on a tenant's affirmative defense that his tenancy is being terminated solely because of his race?
This is the question posed in this proceeding in unlawful detainer in the Municipal Court, Santa Anita Judicial District. The plaintiff, Abstract Investment Co., instituted the action for the purpose of obtaining possession of certain premises leased to defendant under a month-to-month tenancy. Defendant's answer acknowledged, in effect, that a proper notice to quit had been served and that plaintiff was entitled to possession except for the facts alleged in defendant's affirmative defenses. The trial court refused to admit any evidence on the allegations of the affirmative defenses and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff.
On appeal, the appellate department of the superior court in a split decision reversed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that it was error to exclude evidence under the affirmative defenses. In its opinion the appellate department held that if the allegations of the affirmative defenses were substantiated by competent evidence the judgment would violate the defendant's constitutional rights to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
The case was certified, on the superior court's own motion, 1 to the District Court of Appeal, which latter court ordered it transferred for a hearing and decision.
In this appeal we are concerned with whether or not the issues tendered by the second and third affirmative defenses may be recognized in an unlawful detainer proceeding. In those defenses defendant contends that his eviction was sought solely on the ground of his race and that the real reason for his eviction was the fact that he was a Negro. Thus, we must determine: Does judicial enforcement of the eviction of a tenant because of race violate the tenant's rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and by article I, section 13 of the Constitution of the State of California?
For the purpose of this appeal we must take as true the allegations of the affirmative defenses as to the sole motivation for plaintiff's eviction of its tenant.
The relief sought by plaintiff in the unlawful detainer action is judicial action enforcing its effort to evict the tenant and recover possession of the premises. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part that 'No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'
Section 13 of article I of the State Constitution provides in part that no person shall '* * * be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law * * *.' This provision has been held to be identical in scope and purpose with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. (Manford v. Singh, 40 Cal.App. 700, 181 P. 844.)
In the case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161, the Supreme Court of the United States declared (p. 13, 68 S.Ct. p. 842), Thus the court concluded that the restrictive covenants against use or occupancy of real property by any person by reason of his race could not be regarded by themselves as violative of any rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated (p. 13, 68 S.Ct. p. 842), The Supreme Court further declared (p. 14, 68 S.Ct. p. 842), 'That the action of state courts and of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court.' The Supreme Court held that enforcement by state courts of the restrictive covenant agreements constituted state action. The court noted that (pp. 20-21, 68 S.Ct. p. 845) '* * * freedom from discrimination by the States in the enjoyment of property rights was among the basic objectives sought to be effectuated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. That such discrimination has occurred in these cases is clear. Because of the race or color of these petitioners they have been denied rights of ownership or occupancy enjoyed as a matter of course by other citizens of different race or color. The Fourteenth Amendment declares 'that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color.' Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, 100 U.S. at 307, 25 L.Ed. 664
The rule announced in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161, has been followed and extended in subsequent cases, particularly in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586. 2 In that case signers of racial restrictive covenants and their successors in interest sought damages against cosigners who, disregarding such covenants, had sold property burdened thereby to non-Caucasians. The Supreme Court declared (p. 254, 73 S.Ct. p. 1033),
The Supreme Court stated further (in Barrows, supra, at p. 258, 73 S.Ct. p. 1036): 'This Court will not permit or require California to coerce respondent to respond in damages for failure to observe a restrictive covenant that this Court would deny California the right to enforce in equity, Shelley, supra; or that this Court would deny California the right to incorporate in a statute (citing case); or that could not be enforced in a federal jurisdiction because such a covenant would be contrary to public policy: * * *'
In the case at bar plaintiff's right to dispossess defendant rests upon statutory grounds which, without the interjection of the issue of discrimination, absolutely entitled plaintiff to judgment. The trial court apparently believed that it could not examine into plaintiff's motives since plaintiff was acting entirely within the law. However, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-348, 81 S.Ct. 125, 130, 5 L.Ed.2d 110, the Supreme Court of the United States held that "Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end, [citing case], and a constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional result." In Gomillion, supra, plaintiffs, Negro citizens of Alabama, sought an injunction to restrain city and county officials from enforcing a statute which altered the shape of the city and had the effect of removing practically all Negro voters but no white voters from the city. The Federal District Court dismissed the action on the ground that the court had no control over the boundaries of municipal corporations fixed by a duly convened and elected legislative body. On certiorari the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment below holding that assuming the truth of plaintiffs' allegations the statute was invalid because it violated the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clauses and the Fifteenth Amendment, which forbids a state from passing any law depriving a citizen of his vote because of race. In Gomillion the Supreme Court stated (p. 341, 81 S.Ct. p. 127),
Similarly, in the case at bar the court has the power to look beyond the allegations of the complaint in an...
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