Abu-Ali Rahman v. Warden
| Decision Date | 31 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 98-6568,98-6569,s. 98-6568 |
| Citation | 226 F.3d 696 |
| Parties | (6th Cir. 2000) Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman, Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Ricky Bell, Warden, Respondent-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee. Argued: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. No. 96-00380--Todd J. Campbell, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Bradley A. MacLean, FARRIS, WARFIELD & KANADAY, Nashville, Tennessee, William P. Redick, Jr., Whites Creek, Tennessee, Brian K. Frazier, NEAL & HARWELL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Gordon W. Smith, Asst. Atty. General, Glenn R. Pruden, Associate Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVISION, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Bradley A. MacLean, FARRIS, WARFIELD & KANADAY, Nashville, Tennessee, William P. Redick, Jr., Whites Creek, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: SILER, BATCHELDER, and COLE, Circuit Judges.
SILER, J., delivered the opinion of the court. BATCHELDER, J. (pp. __-__), delivered a separate concurring opinion. COLE, J. (pp. __-__), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Respondent, Ricky Bell, Warden ("State"), appeals the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to Petitioner, Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman ("Petitioner"),1 vacating Petitioner's sentence of death for first-degree murder on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of Petitioner's trial. Additionally, Petitioner cross-appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from his conviction for first-degree murder. We reverse the district court's finding that Petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance at the sentencing stage and vacate the portion of the district court's judgment granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus as to the death sentence. Additionally, we affirm the portion of the district court's judgment denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus as to the conviction.
Petitioner was tried and convicted of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and armed robbery. He received the death penalty for the murder conviction and two consecutive life terms for the each of the other convictions. The death sentence was imposed pursuant to the jury's finding of three aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; and (3) the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing, or was an accomplice in the commission of, or was attempting to commit, or was fleeing after committing or attempting to commit, any first-degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, or kidnaping. Petitioner's convictions arose out of an offense that occurred in 1986.
On February 16, 1986, Petitioner purchased a small amount of marijuana from Patrick Daniels at the duplex in which Daniels lived in Nashville, Tennessee. Petitioner and Harold Devalle Miller later agreed to rob Daniels. The plan was for Petitioner to enter the duplex under the pretext of making a drug purchase, at which point Miller would force his way into the duplex and "rob" both Daniels and Petitioner with a shotgun that Petitioner had supplied. This plan was never executed, however, as Miller became too frightened to go through with it. Petitioner then formulated a second plan to rob Daniels, this time using a knife to avoid making too much noise.
On February 17, 1986, Petitioner, armed with a shotgun, and Miller, armed with an unloaded pistol, entered the duplex under the pretext of making a drug purchase. Petitioner and Miller displayed their firearms and forced Daniels and his girlfriend, Norma Norman, to the floor. Petitioner then bound Daniels and Norman with duct tape about their hands, feet, eyes, and mouth. After stealing Daniels's bank card, Petitioner forced Daniels to reveal his PIN number. Petitioner also searched the house and found some marijuana in some sofa cushions.
Petitioner then told Daniels that he had been sent from Chicago to "clean up everything" and that he was there to teach Daniels a lesson. Petitioner obtained a butcher knife from the kitchen and stabbed Daniels six times in the chest, penetrating his heart four times. Prior to and during the stabbing, Daniels was crying and begging Petitioner not to hurt anyone. After Daniels became motionless, Petitioner stabbed Norman in the back several times, but Miller pulled Petitioner away and the two men fled, leaving the knife in Norman's back. Daniels died as the result of his wounds, but Norman survived. Petitioner and Miller also took $300 from a box in Norman's bedroom.
At trial, Petitioner argued that the real motivation for the crime was born out of the influence of his membership in a "quasi-religious paramilitary group" called the Southeastern Gospel Ministry ("SEGM"). Petitioner had a long criminal history, including a conviction for second-degree murder in 1972 and a conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon (a knife) in 1970. Following his incarceration for these offenses, he moved to a halfway house in Nashville. While living at the halfway house he worked for an organization called the Baptist Publishing Board, and eventually met Allen Boyd, one of the Board's owners, and Boyd's associate, William Beard. Boyd and Beard were the leaders of the SEGM; Miller was also a member of the SEGM. One of the alleged goals of the SEGM was to cleanse the black community of drug dealers and other undesirable elements. Boyd allegedly furnished the shotgun used during the offense and assisted Petitioner and Miller after the offense, including giving Miller some money to flee.
Petitioner was initially represented by Neal McAlpin, who was asked by Boyd to take on the representation. Boyd allegedly indicated to McAlpin that he would be paying Petitioner's attorney's fees. However, McAlpin subsequently determined that Boyd was a member of the SEGM. With Boyd being the source of his fees, as well as perhaps being involved in the crime, McAlpin felt that a conflict of interest existed within the third-party fee arrangement and that he could not continue the representation. Gail Hughes, an associate of Boyd's, then requested that Lionel Barrett represent Petitioner. Barrett agreed to do so for a retainer fee of $15,000, $5,000 of which was paid to him fairly soon, though he never inquired as to the source of the funds. Barrett and another attorney, Sumter Camp, represented Petitioner at trial.
Petitioner alleges that this representation was ineffective throughout the trial, including both the guilt phase and the sentencing phase. Barrett testified that at the time he received the first $5,000 of the retainer he decided he was not going to perform any work on the case until he received the balance of the retainer fee, a balance that was never paid. Petitioner also claims that Barrett performed no work on the case until he filed pre-trial motions. Petitioner alleges that Barrett's performance as counsel was ineffective due to failure to: (1) investigate; (2) present potentially exculpatory evidence; and (3) present mitigating evidence at the sentencing stage.
His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 789 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990). He sought post-conviction relief in the state trial court which conducted a hearing, made findings, and denied relief. The judgment was affirmed in Jones v. State, No. 01C01-9402-CR-00079, 1995 WL 75427 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 1995), and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in Jones v. Tennessee, 516 U.S. 1122 (1996). Petitioner later filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging both his conviction and sentence. After Petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment was denied, the district court held an evidentiary hearing to address the merits of his habeas petition. The district court granted the writ on Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage due to counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence despite its availability. However, the district court denied Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt stage, holding that although the performance of Barrett and Camp was deficient, Petitioner suffered no prejudice thereby. Abdur'Rahman v. Bell, 999 F.Supp. 1073 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). This is an appeal from that decision.
The State argues that the district court improperly dispensed with the presumption of correctness that is to be accorded to state court findings of fact under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)2 without providing a statement of its reasons for doing so as required by Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981), and Mitchell v. Rees, 114 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 1997). Petitioner responds that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed questions of law and fact that are not accorded the presumption of correctness under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
The post-conviction trial court held that Petitioner's trial counsel had failed to adequately investigate Petitioner's background and mental history, making the following factual findings in the process:
1. Testimony and files of trial counsel showed that few witnesses were investigated or interviewed regarding ...
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