AC v. Estate of Crabtree
| Decision Date | 02 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 55A01-0308-CV-295.,55A01-0308-CV-295. |
| Citation | 809 N.E.2d 433 |
| Parties | A.C. and J.C. b/n/f Kimberly Kemp, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. ESTATE OF Jackie L. CRABTREE, Jr., Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Stephen A. Oliver, Boren Oliver & Coffey, Martinsville, IN, Attorney for Appellants.
Seth M. Lahn, Yarling & Robinson, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
Appellants-Plaintiffs A.C. and J.C., by their next friend, Kimberly Kemp, (collectively, "Appellants") appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to correct error. We reverse and remand with instructions.1
Appellants raise two issues, which we reorder and restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Appellants' claim for punitive damages; and
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion to correct error because Allstate's subrogation rights should have been reduced by a pro rata share of the costs incurred in pursuing and obtaining a judgment against the tortfeasor, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-53-1-2.
The parties agree on the following relevant facts. On March 2, 2001, A.C. and J.C. were passengers in a car driven by their father, Jackie Crabtree, Jr., ("Crabtree"), which was involved in a two-car accident. The accident occurred because Crabtree suddenly turned in front of the driver of the second car. The police officer investigating the scene of the accident noticed a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on Crabtree's breath, and Crabtree was later found to have a breath alcohol content of .15.
On the date of the accident, the car driven by Crabtree was insured by an automobile liability insurance policy ("Policy") issued by Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") to John and Carmel Butler (the "Butlers"). On March 16, 2001, Kemp, who is A.C. and J.C.'s mother, was advised by Allstate that her daughters were each entitled to $5,000.00 of medical payment coverage benefits for all reasonable medical expenses incurred as a result of injuries received in the collision. Subsequently, between March 27, 2001, and December 21, 2001, Allstate made payments to various health-care providers who had provided medical services to A.C. and J.C., pursuant to the medical payments coverage provisions of the Policy. These payments totaled $3,203.05 for A.C. and $3,648.75 for J.C.
The Policy between the Butlers and Allstate contained Policy Declarations, which named the Butlers as the "named insureds" and provided a limit of $100,000.00 per person or $300,000.00 per occurrence for bodily injury associated with Automobile Liability Insurance, and $5,000.00 per person for Automobile Medical Payments. Appellants' App. at 81. The Policy provided, in pertinent part, that:
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Subrogation Rights When we2 pay under Automobile Medical Payments, ... an insured person's rights of recovery from anyone else become ours up to the amount we have paid. An insured person must protect these rights and, at our request, help us to enforce them.
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a. You3 and any resident relative who sustains bodily injury....
b. Any other person who sustains bodily injury while in, on, getting into or out of, or getting on or off of:
i. Your insured auto while being used as a vehicle by you, a resident relative, or any other person with your permission.
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Limit Of Liability
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There will be no duplication of payments made under the Bodily Injury Liability Insurance, Uninsured Motorists Insurance, and Automobile Medical Payments coverage of this [P]olicy. All payments made to or on behalf of any person under this coverage will be considered advance payment to that person. Any damages payable under the Bodily Injury Liability Insurance or Uninsured Motorists coverages of this [P]olicy will be reduced by that amount.
On June 3, 2002, Appellants filed an amended complaint against Crabtree's estate ("Estate")4 seeking compensatory and punitive damages. On December 12, 2002, the Estate moved to dismiss Appellants' claim for punitive damages, which the trial court granted. On May 15, 2003, after a two-day trial, the jury found in favor of Appellants and awarded $11,500.00 to A.C. and $11,500.00 to J.C. On May 21, 2003, the Estate filed a "Motion to Credit Advance Payments Made By Allstate Insurance Company Against the Judgments," which sought to reduce the $11,500.00 judgments by $3,203.05 for A.C.'s medical payments and $3,648.75 for J.C.'s medical payments. On May 29, 2003, the trial court reduced A.C.'s judgment to $8,296.95 and J.C.'s judgment to $7,851.25. The Appellants filed a timely motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. Appellants now appeal the trial court's dismissal of their claim for punitive damages and the trial court's denial of their motion to correct error.
In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint. City of Anderson v. Weatherford, 714 N.E.2d 181, 184 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999), trans. denied. We examine the legal sufficiency of the complaint, viewing the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing every reasonable inference in favor of that party. Am. Dry Cleaning & Laundry v. State, 725 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). We will affirm the denial of a motion to dismiss unless it is apparent that the facts alleged in the complaint are incapable of supporting relief under any set of circumstances. Id. Further, in determining whether any facts will support the claim, we look only to the complaint and may not resort to any other evidence in the record. Id.
First, Appellants argue that the trial court erred by granting the Estate's motion to dismiss their claim for punitive damages. Punitive damages may be awarded only "if there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with malice, fraud, gross negligence, or oppressiveness which was not the result of a mistake of fact or law, honest error or judgment, overzealousness, mere negligence, or other human failing." Foster v. Evergreen Healthcare, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citations omitted), trans. denied.
In the present case, Appellants' amended complaint alleged that Crabtree was "wanton, willful, reckless, and in heedless disregard for the safety of [Appellants] and others." Appellants' App. at 17. In addition, the amended complaint alleged that Crabtree drove the car with Appellants as passengers while he was intoxicated. These allegations, taken as true, are undoubtedly sufficient to maintain a cause of action for punitive damages against Crabtree, personally. See, e.g., Robbins v. McCarthy, 581 N.E.2d 929, 935 (Ind.Ct. App.1991) (), reh'g denied, trans. denied. However, the question before us is whether Appellants, via these allegations, may seek punitive damages against the Estate.
The issue of whether the recovery of punitive damages is permitted against a deceased tortfeasor's estate is one of first impression in Indiana;5 however many other jurisdictions have addressed this issue with differing results. See, e.g., G.J.D. v. Johnson, 552 Pa. 169, 713 A.2d 1127, 1129 n. 3 (1998) (). Several states have enacted legislation explicitly precluding the award of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate and, in the states that have no statutory bar to recovery, the courts are split as to whether recovery may be allowed. Id. at 1129. The majority rule holds that punitive damages may not be recovered from the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. Id. at 1129 n. 4; see also Stewart v. Estate of Cooper, 102 S.W.3d 913 (Ky.2003); and Olson-Roti v. Kilcoin, 653 N.W.2d 254 (S.D.2002). The rationale behind this rule appears to be that the primary purposes supporting a punitive damage award, i.e., punishing...
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Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 55S01-0409-CV-431.
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