Accelerated Receivable Solutions v. Hauf, No. S–14–0178.
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Writing for the Court | HILL, Justice. |
Parties | ACCELERATED RECEIVABLE SOLUTIONS, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Justin D. HAUF, Personal Representative of the Estate of Margaret A. Hauf, Deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Decision Date | 15 May 2015 |
Docket Number | No. S–14–0178. |
350 P.3d 731
2015 WY 71
ACCELERATED RECEIVABLE SOLUTIONS, Appellant (Plaintiff)
v.
Justin D. HAUF, Personal Representative of the Estate of Margaret A. Hauf, Deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff).
No. S–14–0178.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
May 15, 2015.
Representing Appellant: David W. Brostorm, Scottsbluff, NE.
Representing Appellee: Nathaniel S. Hibben, Torrington, WY.
Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.
Opinion
HILL, Justice.
ISSUES
[¶ 2] ARS states the issues on appeal as follows:
1. The personal representative failed to exercise due diligence in providing actual notice to a known creditor of the estate.
2. The notice sent was constitutionally inadequate under the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution, because the estate knew the creditor had not received it.
FACTS
[¶ 3] On April 17, 2012, a petition for probate of the Estate of Margaret A. Hauf (Estate) was filed in district court in Goshen County. On July 26, 2013, the Estate issued Notices of Time for Filing Creditors Claims to known creditors, including ARS's predecessors in interest. On August 26, 2013, ARS filed its Amended Creditor's Claim.
[¶ 4] On September 13, 2013, the Estate rejected ARS's amended claim. On that same day, the Estate filed the notice of rejection in district court and mailed the rejection notice to ARS via certified mail. The notice mailed to ARS was returned to the Estate marked “Return to Sender,” “Unclaimed,” and “Unable to Forward.”
[¶ 5] On December 18, 2013, counsel for ARS telephoned the district court for an update on the status of the ARS claim and was informed that the Estate had filed a rejection of the claim on September 13th. Counsel for ARS immediately contacted counsel for the Estate and was informed that the mailed notice had been returned unclaimed. Counsel for ARS then requested a copy of the claim rejection and received that copy on December 24, 2013, via first class mail. On January 7, 2014, counsel for ARS requested and received a faxed copy of the certified mailing. Upon further investigation and inquiries to the post office, counsel for ARS learned on January 10, 2014, that the postal service had erroneously stamped the certified mailing unclaimed and returned it to the sender.
[¶ 6] On February 18, 2014, ARS filed a complaint objecting to the rejection of its claim and seeking a judgment on that claim. On March 5, 2014, the Estate filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss seeking dismissal on the ground that ARS's complaint was time barred. On that same date, the district court issued an order setting hearing, which scheduled a hearing on the Estate's motion to dismiss for April 4, 2014.
[350 P.3d 734
[¶ 8] On April 4, 2014, the district court held a hearing on the Estate's motion to dismiss. During that hearing, the court ruled that it would not convert the Estate's motion to a summary judgment motion and would not consider the postmaster affidavit attached to ARS's opposition. The court then ruled:
Looking strictly at the pleadings the court has an allegation that the claim was rejected, that notice of the rejection was mailed by certified mail as required by the statute on September 13th, so that's the operative date to begin the time frame. And indeed the plaintiff didn't file a complaint within 30 days from that. Those are probably the only operative facts the court needs to decide this motion. And we have this additional issue of the notice was returned to sender unclaimed. And it sounds like [counsel for ARS] is asserting that, you know, the post office shouldn't have done that. That “They sent it back too quickly” or “They never put it in our mailbox” or something.
The court finds that those are not defenses to this particular issue and so the court will grant the motion to dismiss. Maybe the plaintiff has to take this up with the post office. But anyway, the court will grant the motion to dismiss.
[¶ 9] On April 4, 2014, the district court entered an Order Dismissing with Prejudice. ARS timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 10] This Court reviews dismissals pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) using the following standard of review:
When reviewing W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, we accept the facts stated in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. We will sustain such a dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any fact which would entitle him to relief.
In re Estate of Scherer, 2014 WY 129, ¶ 5, 336 P.3d 129, 131 (Wyo.2014) (quoting Sinclair v. City of Gillette, 2012 WY 19, ¶ 8, 270 P.3d 644, 646 (Wyo.2012) ).
[¶ 11] Constitutional questions present issues of law that we review de novo. Circuit Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. v. Lee Newspapers, 2014 WY 101, ¶ 9, 332 P.3d 523, 527 (Wyo.2014) (citing Operation Save Am. v. City of Jackson, 2012 WY 51, ¶ 17, 275 P.3d 438, 447 (Wyo.2012) ).
DISCUSSION
[¶ 12] ARS offers two arguments in contending that the district court erred in dismissing the ARS complaint: 1) the Estate failed to comply with the probate code's notice provisions; and 2) the notice provided by the Estate did not comport with the requirements of due process. In addressing these issues, we are mindful of this Court's admonition regarding strict compliance with the probate code's notice provisions:
We hold that, notice having not been given by certified mail as required, the thirty-day period did not begin to run and the action is not barred. We note the rule of law that, generally, actual notice is a sufficient substitute for notice by mail and that defects in complying with technicalities can be ignored when actual notice is proved. However, in this situation, the thirty-day period for filing of a claim is so short, that strict compliance with the requirements of notice by certified mail ought to be required. The statute is clear and precise. The notice of rejection by certified mail to the claimant is not burdensome.
[350 P.3d 735
There are some practical reasons for requiring notice of rejection by certified mail. One is more likely to pay close attention to a letter that is certified than one received by ordinary mail. In addition, certified mail avoids any question as to whether or when actual notice of rejection was received.
Hanson v. Estate of Belden, 668 P.2d 1331, 1332 (Wyo.1983).
A. Statutory Notice Requirements
[¶ 14] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2–7–712 governs the allowance and rejection of claims against an estate and the requirements for notice of a rejected claim. It provides:
(a) When a claim, accompanied by the affidavit required in W.S. 2–7–704, has been filed with the clerk, the personal representative shall allow or reject it and his allowance or rejection shall be in writing and filed with the clerk within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the time for filing claims.
(b) If the claim is filed with the clerk before the expiration of the time limited for the filing of claims, the same is filed in time though acted upon by the personal representative after the expiration of such time.
(c) Every claim allowed by the personal representative shall be ranked among the acknowledged debts of the estate to be paid in due course of administration.
(d) When a claim has been filed with the clerk and is rejected in whole or in part, the...
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...other remedy the court deems appropriate to bring about prompt closing of the estate.[¶ 30] In Accelerated Receivable Solutions v. Hauf, 2015 WY 71, ¶ 26, 350 P.3d 731, 737 (Wyo. 2015), this Court held that a provision in the probate code which requires a personal representative to notify a......
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...to modify probation, and we will not add terms to the statute governing that authority. See Accelerated Receivable Solutions v. Hauf, 2015 WY 71, ¶ 16, 350 P.3d 731, 736 (Wyo.2015) (Court will not add language when interpreting a statute). A sentencing court is not statutorily required to s......
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...the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any fact which would entitle him to relief.Accelerated Receivable Sols. v. Hauf, 2015 WY 71, ¶ 10, 350 P.3d 731, 734 (Wyo.2015) (citations omitted).[¶ 7] Article 10, section 4(c) of the Wyoming Constitution directs the legislature t......
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Dellit v. Tracy, No. S–15–0085.
...To interpret this statute to say otherwise would require us to improperly add words to it. See Accelerated Receivable Solutions v. Hauf, 2015 WY 71, ¶ 16, 350 P.3d 731, 736 (Wyo.2015) ("This Court will not add language or choose other words to change the meaning of a statute." (internal quo......
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Britain v. Britain (In re Estate of Britain), S-17-0325
...other remedy the court deems appropriate to bring about prompt closing of the estate.[¶ 30] In Accelerated Receivable Solutions v. Hauf, 2015 WY 71, ¶ 26, 350 P.3d 731, 737 (Wyo. 2015), this Court held that a provision in the probate code which requires a personal representative to notify a......
-
Harada v. State, No. S–15–0181.
...to modify probation, and we will not add terms to the statute governing that authority. See Accelerated Receivable Solutions v. Hauf, 2015 WY 71, ¶ 16, 350 P.3d 731, 736 (Wyo.2015) (Court will not add language when interpreting a statute). A sentencing court is not statutorily required to s......
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Collins v. COP Wyo., LLC, No. S–15–0098.
...the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any fact which would entitle him to relief.Accelerated Receivable Sols. v. Hauf, 2015 WY 71, ¶ 10, 350 P.3d 731, 734 (Wyo.2015) (citations omitted).[¶ 7] Article 10, section 4(c) of the Wyoming Constitution directs the legislature t......
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Dellit v. Tracy, No. S–15–0085.
...To interpret this statute to say otherwise would require us to improperly add words to it. See Accelerated Receivable Solutions v. Hauf, 2015 WY 71, ¶ 16, 350 P.3d 731, 736 (Wyo.2015) ("This Court will not add language or choose other words to change the meaning of a statute." (internal quo......