Accident Index Bureau, Inc. v. Male

• Decision Date: 05 May 1967
• Docket Number: No. A--410,A--410
• Citation: 95 N.J.Super. 39,229 A.2d 812
• Parties: ACCIDENT INDEX BUREAU, INC., and Hillside Metal Products, Inc., both corporations of the State of New Jersey, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Raymond F. MALE, Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry, and Herbert Koransky, Director of the Division of Workmen's Compensation, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 39

95 N.J.Super. 39

229 A.2d 812

ACCIDENT INDEX BUREAU, INC., and Hillside Metal Products Inc., both corporations of the State of New Jersey, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.Raymond F. MALE, Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry, and Herbert Koransky, Director of the Division of Workmen's CompensationDefendants-Respondents.

No. A--410.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued April 17, 1967.

Decided May 5, 1967.

Edward B. Meredith, Trenton, for appellants(Meredith & Meredith, Trenton, attorneys).

Richard Newman, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondents(Arthur J. Sills, Atty Gen., attorney).

Before Judges GOLDMANN, KILKENNY and COLLESTER.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

KILKENNY, J.A.D.

Pursuant to leave granted under R.R. 2:2--3(a), plaintiffs appeal from an interlocutory order of the Law Division denying their application for a preliminary injunction pending final hearing, and dissolving an Ex parte temporary restraint theretofore granted.

In their complaint plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment (1) permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing the provisions of chapter 164 of the Laws of 1966;(2) permanently enjoining defendantHerbert Koransky from enforcing his Division DirectiveNo. 14;(3) permanently enjoining defendants from interfering with or hindering plaintiffAccident Index Bureau, Inc. from examining and making copies of records made public by R.S. 34:15--59, N.J.S.A.; (4) adjudging and declaring chapter 164 unconstitutional and void, and (5) adjudging and declaring the directive unconstitutional and void.

At oral argument the parties stipulated that we might make a final disposition of the appeal upon the basis of the record before us, except for a copy of the present advertising brochure now circulated by Accident Index Bureau, Inc. to be furnished to the court, as though the final hearing had been concluded upon the basis of the record as supplemented and the relief sought by plaintiffs had been denied.The brochure has been furnished and the record is agreeably supplemented thereby.Hillside Metal Products, Inc., a customer of the coplaintiff, has been joined as a partyplaintiff, but the issue really concerns the validity of the statute and directive in their relation to Accident Index Bureau, Inc.

This appeal is a sequel to our decision in Accident Index Bureau, Inc. v. Hughes, 83 N.J.Super. 293, 199 A.2d 656(App.Div.1964), affirmed46 N.J. 160, 215 A.2d 529(1965).We there held that an executive order by the Governor under 'The Right to Know Law,'L.1963, c. 73, N.J.S.A. 47:1A--1 et seq., and a regulation based thereon by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry, deeming workmen's compensation records not to be public if the purpose of inspecting or copying them was to provide employers with information concerning prospective employees, were invalid.We concluded that the order and regulation contravened substantive due process.We need not repeat herein all of the reasons which impelled that conclusion or the details of the rationale of the Supreme Court in its affirmance.

Following that litigation and evidently motivated by a statement in the Supreme Court opinion to the effect that 'nothing we have said should be thought to question the power of the Legislature to deal with the problem'(46 N.J. at p. 166, 215 A.2d, at p. 532), there was adopted chapter 164 of the Laws of 1966, which provides:

'Notwithstanding any other provision of the chapter to which this act is a supplement or of any other law, no records maintained by the Division of Workmen's Compensation shall be open to inspection or copying by or on behalf of any person who seeks such inspection or copying for the purpose of selling or furnishing for a consideration to others reports or abstracts of workmen's compensation records or work-injury records pertaining to any individual, except in the case of an investigation by or on behalf of an employer in connection with any pending workmen's compensation case.'

Obviously, this new statute is aimed at curbing only the activities of commercial agencies, such as Accident Index Bureau, Inc., engaged in the business of 'selling or furnishing for a consideration to others' reports or abstracts of workmen's compensation records.The employers themselves, or their employees, are not barred from inspecting or copying the workmen's compensation records for any purpose.It is the performance of this inspecting and copying by those who 'sell or furnish' the information to others 'for a consideration' which alone comes within the statutory bar.By way of exception the ban does not extend to the commercial agencies if the information is gathered in connection with any pending workmen's compensation case.

DirectiveNo. 14, issued by defendant Koransky as Director of the Division of Workmen's Compensation to all personnel on June 29, 1966, provides:

'No records of the Division of Workmen's Compensation shall be inspected or copied by anyone unless and until the hereinafter form is signed by the persons seeking such inspection:

I, the undersigned, do hereby state under penalty of the law, that I seek the inspection or copying of the records of the Division of Workmen's Compensation concerning $ $ on behalf of $ $ (employer) in connection with a pending workmen's compensation case by said $ $ (petitioner.)

Date: .'

This directive is based upon chapter 164 of the Laws of 1966, effective June 18, 1966.The word 'anyone' appearing therein, we are told, is 'only meant to refer to parties covered by chapter 164, and it is applied by the Division in accordance with this construction.'If that is so the directive should have been no broader in its limitation than chapter 164.

Manifestly, validity of the directive depends upon the statute upon which it is bottomed.Accordingly, we concern ourselves only with the challenge made to the constitutionality of this statute.In substance then, the new statute and directive thereunder would accomplish essentially what the executive order and Commissioner's regulation in the former case were intended to effect-preclusion of a commercial agency from inspecting and copying workmen's compensation records for the purpose of informing employers of the industrial accident histories of prospective employees.

Chapter 164 represents a departure from the previous legislative policy with reference to workmen's compensation records.R.S. 34:15--59, N.J.S.A., had provided: 'Such records shall be open to the inspection of the public.'The present enactment states plainly that they shall Not be open to inspection and copying by persons who seek such inspection or copying in order to sell or furnish the information thus gathered to others 'for a consideration,' except in connection with any pending workmen's compensation case.Thus, plaintiff reporting agency is now effectively precluded from inspecting these records in order to supply employers with the workmen's compensation histories of prospective employees.On the other hand, the employers themselves have free access to these records for the very purpose for which the reporting agency has been heretofore engaged to gather the information.

It is clear, then, that the law discriminates between those who may and those who may not inspect and copy these records--albeit the purpose for the inspection and the copying is the same.The issue is whether such discrimination comports with the constitutional guarantees of due process of law and the equal protection of the laws.United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section I.

Not all classifications for purposes of Legislation are invalid.It is the invidious discrimination, lacking any valid basis for its existence, which violates the constitutional mandates.David v. Vesta, 45 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345(1965).In that case, our Supreme Court upheld the New Jersey 'Law against Discrimination,'N.J.S.A. 18:25--1 et seq., applicable generally to the sale or rental of housing accommodations, even though accommodations in single-family homes and in certain two-family homes and three-family residences were not covered.As the court said:

'More specifically, evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, and the reform may therefore take one step at a time, attacking the evil where it seems most acute to the legislative mind.'(at p. 315, 212 A.2d, at p. 352.)

The court noted that the one who assails legislative classification must carry the burden of showing its arbitrariness.It further observed that a legislative classification having some reasonable basis is not invalid merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.(45 N.J., at pp. 314--315, 212 A.2d 345.)

David v. Vesta reiterated what Chief Justice Weintraub had said earlier for the court in New Jersey Restaurant Ass'n v. Holderman, 24 N.J. 295, 131 A.2d 773(1957):

'Thus it is not enough to demonstrate that the legislative objective might be more fully achieved by another, more expansive classification, for the Legislature may recognize degrees of harm and hit the evil where it is most felt.* * * The Legislature may thus limit its action upon a decision to proceed cautiously, step by step, or because of practical exigencies, including administrative convenience and expense, * * * or because of 'some substantial consideration of public policy or convenience or the service of the general welfare.'* * * Hence it may 'stop short of those cases in which the harm to the few concerned is thought less important than the harm to the public that would ensue if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact."(at pp. 300--301, 131 A.2d, at p. 776)

In that case the Commissioner of Labor and Industry had made a minimum fair wages standards order relating to restaurant occupations, but excepted restaurants operating in hotels.The order was held to be not violative of the equal...