Accord v. Anderson Cnty.
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-00077 |
| Decision Date | 01 March 2022 |
| Parties | GARY ACCORD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ANDERSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Pending before the Court is Defendant Cocke County's “Motion to Dismiss”(Doc. No. 117“Motion”), and accompanying Memorandum of Law.(Doc. No. 118).Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. No. 132) and Defendant filed a reply.(Doc. No. 138).The Motion is ripe for review.For the reasons discussed below Defendant's Motion will be granted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND[1]
On June 29, 2018, Plaintiff, Gary Accord, was arrested by Tennessee Highway Patrolman Paul Kilday in Cocke County, Tennessee.(Doc. No. 103at 7).[2] Kilday prepared a complaint-affidavit on a State of Tennessee Uniform Citation Form.(Id.).Plaintiff then was prosecuted using the Uniform Citation Form/Affidavit of Complaint as a charging instrument.(Id. at 8).Plaintiff was charged with a DUI, which was eventually reduced to reckless endangerment.(Id.).He was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days in jail, with a suspended sentence.(Id.).
Plaintiff filed the present case on February 1, 2021 as a class action complaint against every county in Tennessee (but no one else).[3] Thereafter, he filed an Amended Complaint against the same Defendants, which asserted (in Counts I-III) several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for various kinds of alleged violations of the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as a Tennessee common law claim for false light invasion of privacy (in Count IV).
Upon motion of Plaintiff(Doc. No. 94), the Court dismissed Counts II and III.This left remaining a single count asserting claims under Section 1983().That count (Count I) was styled as one for violations of the Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and of Tennessee Constitution Article I, Section 7.[4]
Various Defendants then filed motions to dismiss, including the present Motion whereby Defendant Cocke County(and various other counties) requested dismissal of Plaintiff's claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).Ultimately, during its review of some of these motions, the Court determined that Plaintiff had failed to establish standing to bring a claim against any DefendantexceptCocke County.(Doc. No. 168at 11).Accordingly, the Court ordered that all Defendants except Cocke County be dismissed (and administratively terminated as parties)[5] and that the present Motion remain pending only as to Cocke County.(Doc. No. 169).
Cocke County, the sole remaining Defendant, subsequently filed a purported “supplement” to its Motion, requesting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(3) based on allegedly improper venue, or alternatively, a transfer of venue to the Eastern District of Tennessee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).(Doc. No. 172).The Court treated the supplemental filing as an independent motion but declined to dismiss on the basis of improper venue, as venue remained proper in this district as to Cocke County under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).However, the Court did inform the parties that it was considering sua sponte transferring the case to the Eastern District of Tennessee under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).(Doc. No. 176).Both parties were given the opportunity to provide notice to the Court of their position regarding the potential transfer.(Id.).In doing so, Plaintiff suggested that the Court should refrain from transferring venue until it had ruled on the present Motion (Doc. No. 177), and Defendant did not oppose this suggestion.(Doc. No. 178).Accordingly, the Court will proceed with consideration of Defendant's Motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true.Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678(2009).To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.Id.A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.Id.Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.Id.When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.A legal conclusion, including one couched as a factual allegation, need not be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss, nor are mere recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient.Id.;Fritz v. Charter Township of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722(6th Cir.2010), cited inAbriq v. Hall, 295 F.Supp.3d 874, 877(M.D. Tenn.2018).Moreover, factual allegations that are merely consistent with the defendant's liability do not satisfy the claimant's burden, as mere consistency does not establish plausibility of entitlement to relief even if it supports the possibility of relief.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a complaint is sufficient under the standards of Iqbal and its predecessor and complementary case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544(2007), it may be appropriate to “begin [the] analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680.This can be crucial, as no such allegations count toward the plaintiff's goal of reaching plausibility of relief.To reiterate, such allegations include “bare assertions, ” formulaic recitation of the elements, and “conclusory” or “bold” allegations.Id. at 681.The question is whether the remaining allegations - factual allegations, i.e., allegations of factual matter - plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.Id.If not, the pleading fails to meet the standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and thus must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).Id. at 683.
As a general rule, matters outside the pleadings may not be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) unless the motion is converted to one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).When a document is referred to in the pleadings and is integral to the claims, it may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.Doe v. Ohio State Univ.,219 F.Supp.3d 645, 652-53(S.D. Ohio2016);Blanch v. Trans Union, LLC, 333 F.Supp.3d 789, 791-92(M.D. Tenn.2018).
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he moving party has the burden of proving that no claim exists.”Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield,552 F.3d 430, 433(6th Cir.2008).That is not to say that the movant has some evidentiary burden; as should be clear from the discussion above, evidence (as opposed to allegations as construed in light of any allowable matters outside the pleadings) is not involved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.The movant's burden, rather, is a burden of explanation; since the movant is the one seeking dismissal, it is the one that bears the burden of explaining-with whatever degree of thoroughness is required under the circumstances-why dismissal is appropriate for failure to state a claim.
In its Motion, Defendant brings multiple arguments for why Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed.Defendant's first argument is that “Plaintiff's claims are barred by Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations.”[6](Doc. No. 118at 4).Defendant states that Plaintiff's causes of action accrued on June 29, 2018, the date on which he was arrested or “at the latest, on December 3, 2018 - the date of Plaintiff's guilty plea to the charge resulting from said arrest.”(Id. at 5)(emphasis in original).Defendant argues that causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the same limitations period as Tennessee personal injury actions, which is one year.Additionally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's state-law claim brought pursuant to the Tennessee Government Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”) is also subject to a one-year limitations period.[7] As Plaintiff did not file this action until February 1, 2021, his claims would be time-barred if they accrued on either June 29, 2018, December 3, 2018, or any date before February 1, 2020.
In response, Plaintiff argues that “when the underlying conduct is the fact that Defendant counties lacked jurisdiction to proceed because there were no proper charging instruments that commenced the criminal proceedings, then a statute of limitations defense does not apply.”(Doc No. 132at 13)(citingState v. Ferrante, 269 S.W.3d 908(Tenn.2008)).This statement is very problematic from the get-go; it suggests that the absence of jurisdiction can constitute “conduct, ”(which is non-sensical).Overlooking that, the Court construes Plaintiff here to mean that (i) his claims in this Court are based on Defendant prosecuting him in the underlying case despite the absence of jurisdiction resulting from the fact that there was no proper charging instrument against him; and (ii)Ferrante indicates that a statute-of-limitations defense does not apply to such claims.If the Court's construction is correct-and the Court strongly believes that it is-Plaintiff's reliance on Ferrante() is so completely unjustified that the Court strongly suggests that counsel ensure that he never again make such a baseless citation in a brief filed with a court.Ferrante has nothing...
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