Acevedo-Concepción v. Irizarry-Méndez
| Decision Date | 25 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG) |
| Parties | ACEVEDO-CONCEPCIÓN, et al, Plaintiffs, v. IRIZARRY-MÉNDEZ, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Garcia-Gregory, D.J.
Pending before the Court is the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 55). Plaintiffs timely opposed. (Docket No. 61). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS judgment independent of Defendant's motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(2).1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, in pertinent part, that a court may grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, andadmissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000).
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
In order for a factual controversy to prevent summary judgment, the contested facts must be "material" and the dispute must be "genuine." "Material" means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under governing law. The issue is "genuine" when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). It is well settled that "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252. It is therefore necessary that "a party opposing summary judgment must present definite,competent evidence to rebut the motion." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).
In making this assessment, the court "must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging in all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). The court may safely ignore "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).
The uncontested facts, as set forth in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and admitted by Plaintiffs, read as follows:
1. Plaintiffs were appointed as career employees of the Family Department between July 1, 2008 and September 4, 2008.
2. On March 9, 2009 former Governor Luis A. Fortuño Burset signed into Law Act 7 of March 9, 2009 (Act 7).
3. Act 7 empowered government agencies, including the Family Department to dismiss thousands of government employees such as plaintiffs.
4. On or about May 29, 2009 co-defendant Irizarry handed letters to plaintiffs removing them from their position within the Family Department.
5. Plaintiffs held career positions within the Family Department until July 10, 2009.
6. None of the plaintiffs had worked within the Family Department for more than one (1) year and ten (10) days.
7. The dismissal of plaintiffs was authorized by Act 7.
8. Section 37.04 of Act 7 details the procedures and rights plaintiffs had regarding their layoffs.
9. JREF means the Fiscal Restructuring and Stabilization Board created pursuant to Section 37.04(b)(5) of Act 7, which was created to achieve the objectives of Chapter 3 of Act 7, and which was entrusted with taking all the necessary actions for compliance with the same.
10. Pursuant to Section 37.04(b) 3 of Act 7 the layoff of employees with a permanent or career appointment were to be implemented by exclusive observance of the seniority criteria, so that those who have less seniority shall be the first ones to be laid off.11. The JREF was created by Section 37.04(b)(5) of Act 7 and included the President of the GDB (Government Developmental Bank), who directed the Board, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of the Department of Economic Development and Commerce of Puerto Rico, the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico and the Executive Director of OMB (Office of Management and Budget).
12. The JREF had the powers necessary and convenient to undertake the tasks entrusted to it by Act 7, including but not limited to conduct or direct the agencies or departments that are in its charge, to conduct the needed studies; require of the agencies the information needed to perform its tasks.
13. The JREF was tasked with the responsibility of determining the total number of employees to be laid off.
14. Pursuant to Act 7 the agencies had to identify and certify the seniority of each of its employees to the JREF within a term not greater than fifteen (15) calendar days after the beginning of Phase II. In that same term the agencies had to certify in writing and individually, the date of seniority as it appears in their records to affected employees.
15. The affected employee had thirty (30) calendar days as of the day of notification, to present in writing to the agencydocumentary evidence issued by competent authority or government entity which refuted the certified seniority.
16. If the employee did not refute the seniority determination, said seniority was conclusive for all purposes pertaining to Chapter III of Act 7.
17. If the affected employee disputed the seniority, the agency was not able to make a final determination without first granting a hearing to the employee.
18. If affected by the determination of the agency, the employee could request review by CASARH (Spanish acronym for Appeals Commission of the Public Service Human Resources Administration System) of the final determination made by the agency solely as to his/her seniority, pursuant to the provisions of Article 13, section 13.14 of Act No. 184 of August 3, 2004, and its regulations.
19. The layoffs implemented under Phase II of Act 7 started July 1, 2009 and the JREF established the order in which the layoffs would be implemented.
20. A criterion of 13.6 years of service was established by the JREF as the cutoff date to lay off employees pursuant to Phase II of Act 7.
In their complaint, plaintiffs named as co-defendants Yanitsia Irizarry-Mendez, in her personal and official capacity as the then-Secretary of the Family Department; and Esteban Pérez Ubieta, in his personal and official capacity as the then-Administrator of the Family Department. Plaintiffs pressed claims of political discrimination, and charged Defendants with violating their rights to due process under the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs also brought claims under Puerto Rico law. Plaintiffs sought money damages, along with an injunction ordering Defendants to reinstate Plaintiffs to their jobs. (Docket No. 1). Defendants moved to dismiss.
On December 29, 2011, the Court dismissed with prejudice all of Plaintiffs' claims except their procedural due process claim against Defendants in their official capacity. In doing so, the Court found that Plaintiffs due process claim was plausible because, in essence, Defendants did not follow the layoff procedure contemplated by Act 7 before terminating the employees.2 The Court also determined that sovereign immunitybarred Plaintiffs' claims for monetary compensation against Defendants in their official capacity but not Plaintiffs' claims for "prospective injunctive and declaratory relief on the basis of federal law." (Docket No. 26).
Now, Defendants argue that the motion to dismiss left no surviving claims against the Defendants because the complaint did not plausibly establish a causal connection between Defendants and the alleged unconstitutional action. (Docket No. 55). Defendants, however, misconstrue the language the Court used to dismiss the claims against Defendants in their personal capacity by trying to apply the same reasoning to the claims against Defendants in their official capacity. This argument disregards the fact that those are two different claims with two different standards. That the Court dismissed the personal capacity claim has no bearing on the official capacity claim.
In order to sustain an official-capacity claim against a government official for enforcing a state law in an unconstitutional manner, the complaint must allege, merely, that the official had "some connection with the enforcement of the act." Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908). This standard is met here. Simply put, Defendants signed the Plaintiffs'dismissal letters, as authorized by Act 7. Though this action, taken alone, was not enough to establish the type of involvement required to impose personal liability, the Court finds it is more than enough to show they had "some connection" with the enforcement of the act. Thus, Plaintiffs' official-capacity suit against Defendants survived the Motion to Dismiss.
Even though Defendants no longer hold their positions as Secretary and Administrator of the Family Department the suit can continue against them pursuant to Rule 25(c) which states "if an interest is transferred, the action may be continued by or against the original party unless the court, on motion, orders the transferee to be substituted in the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(c). Rule 25(c) requires no action after a transfer of interest; the judgment will bind the successor of the interest even if he is not named. See, e.g., In re Bernal, 207 F.3d 595, 598 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, the claim can continue against current Defendants and it will be binding upon the current officials of the Family Department.
Defendants next argue that they are...
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