Acevedo-Milán v. Home Etc. Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 18-1526 (GAG) |
| Parties | AIXA ACEVEDO-MILÁN, Plaintiff, v. HOME ETC. INCORPORADO D/B/A TODAY'S SATELLITE TELEVISION, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Plaintiff Ms. Aixa Acevedo-Milán ("Ms. Acevedo-Milán") brings this action against Home Etc. Incorporado d/b/a Today's Satellite Television ("TST"), MCR Enterprises, LLC ("MCR"), Mr. Randolph T. Cravey, Ms. Ivelisse Pagán-Matos, Ms. Sheila González-Chaparro (collectively, "Defendants") alleging gender and pregnancy discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). (Docket No. 1). Plaintiff argues pregnancy discrimination in the modalities of disparate treatment and hostile work environment and claims retaliation and constructive discharge under Title VII, 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-3 (a). Id. Additionally, Ms. Acevedo-Milán contends that Defendants failed to provide certain employment benefits, pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. Id. Finally, Plaintiff invokes the Court's supplemental jurisdiction to bring claims under Puerto Rico Law 100 of June 30, 1959 ("Law 100"), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 146 et seq.; Puerto Rico Law 80 of May 30, 1976 ("Law 80"), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§185a et seq.; Puerto Rico Law 115 of December 20, 1991 ("Law 115"), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 194a; Article 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 5141-5143 ("Article 1802 and 1803"), and Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's Constitution. P.R. CONST. Art. II, §§ 1; 8; 16. (Docket No. 1).
Essentially, Ms. Acevedo-Milán alleges that she was promoted, demoted two months later - shortly after announcing her pregnancy- and then forced to resign. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiff further argues that she experienced a hostile work environment, which allegedly caused her a miscarriage. Id. The latter incident occurred two days after she participated in a "humiliating" meeting with her supervisors. Id. Defendants move for summary judgment and posit that TST entered into a process of business restructuring as a result of a decrease in the company's retail sales and that said process coincided with Plaintiff's pregnancy and employment change. (Docket No. 88). Defendants put forward that they never discriminated against Ms. Acevedo-Milán. Id. at 9. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that the reorganization served as a "pretext" to hide the discriminatory nature of the adverse employment actions taken against her. (Docket No. 106). Ms. Acevedo-Milán avers that material issues of facts preclude summary disposition of this case. Id. at 6. Defendants filed a reply and Plaintiff a sur-reply thereafter. (Docket Nos. 115; 123)
Also pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion in limine, seeking to exclude testimony regarding Ms. Acevedo-Milán's miscarriage. (Docket No. 125). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition stating that her treating physician will testify as a "percipient witness," not as an expert, and thus, his testimony should not be excluded. (Docket No. 130). Defendants replied thereafter (Docket No. 132-1).
After carefully reviewing the parties' submissions, notably the deposition testimonies on the record, and pertinent applicable law, the Court hereby DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket No. 88. Furthermore, the Court DENIESDefendants' Motion in Limine at Docket No. 125, yet constrains the scope of Plaintiff's announced witness.
Defendants proposed a statement of 139 uncontested facts to establish that summary judgment should be granted in their favor. (Docket No. 87). Plaintiff denied and qualified several of these facts and further proposed a statement of 173 additional uncontested facts narrating her version of the case. (Docket No. 105). Defendants replied to each additional fact and addressed numerous of Plaintiff's denials and qualifications. (Docket Nos. 115; 115-1).
Although, the primary purpose of Local Rule 56(b), L. CV. R. 56(b), "is to relieve the district court of any responsibility to ferret through the record to discern whether any material fact is genuinely in dispute," CMI Capital Mkt. Inv., LLC v. González-Toro, 520 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2008), a court "must responsibly review the record, especially the evidence upon which the statement of uncontested facts is based on, to adequately evaluate a motion for summary judgment." See Reyes Caballero v. Oriental Bank, Civil No. 16-2952 (GAG), 2019 WL 6330812 at *2 (D.P.R. 2019); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) ().
Bearing this in mind, the Court holds that Plaintiff fails to properly contest most of Defendant's proposed facts. (Docket No. 105). As a result, several of these facts have been deemed as unopposed. Similarly, as to Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts, the Court also finds that certain facts present improper or conclusory assertions that cannot be considered at the summary judgment stage. (Docket No. 105). Defendants, on their part, also fail to properly contest many facts contained in Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts and thus, various facts will also be consideredas unopposed. (Docket No. 115-1). However, as to both parties, the Court shall highlight those facts that have been appropriately qualified or denied.
As a whole, the Court rules that Ms. Acevedo-Milán has presented a version of the case, supported on witness testimony and documents, that establishes genuine issues of material fact as to several claims that must left for a reasonable jury to decide. (Docket No. 105). In spite of overall non-compliance with Local Rule 56(b), "the Court firmly believes in access to justice, the lack of which is a serious problem in Puerto Rico, and feels uncomfortable completely disregarding" certain additional facts that tell the story of how Plaintiff allegedly suffered pregnancy discrimination. Natal Pérez v. Oriental Bank & Tr., 291 F. Supp. 3d 215, 221 (D.P.R. 2018). "Balancing its interests in efficiency and access to justice," the Court will consider and reference directly parts of Ms. Acevedo-Milán's deposition testimony, as well as that of co-workers Ms. Michelle Rivera-Martínez, Ms. Giselle Rivera-Cotty, and Mr. Orlando Sanoguet-Valentín in which they recount alleged discriminatory episodes. Id. These access to justice considerations, along with Rule 56 requirements, compel the Court to display a chronological timeline that "construe the evidence in the light most flattering to the nonmovants [Ms. Acevedo-Milán] and indulge all reasonable inferences in [her] favor." Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2006).
The subsequent factual background includes a factual background summary of the case, specifically events that befell before Plaintiff announced her pregnancy, and then the disputed version of the facts after Ms. Acevedo-Milán announced that she was pregnant.
Defendant TST is an authorized retailer of Dish Puerto Rico that sells television programming services and installs programming services for its customers on the island. (DocketNos. 87 ¶¶ 1, 2; 105 ¶¶ 1,2).1 At the time of the events, TST's upper-management was composed of Defendants Mr. Randolph T. Cravey, as Chief Executive Officer and President ("CEO Cravey"); Ms. Ivelisse Pagán-Matos, as the General Manager ("GM Pagán-Matos"), and Ms. Sheila González-Chaparro, as the Human Resources Manager ("HR González-Chaparro"). (Docket Nos. 87 ¶¶ 9, 10, 12, 13; 105 ¶¶ 10, 12, 13). Since 2016, TST's upper-management met on a monthly basis, without the presence of other employees, to discuss business operations. (Docket Nos. 87 ¶¶ 14, 16, 17; 105 ¶¶ 14, 16, 17). TST had in place a non-discrimination policy that prohibits unequal treatment based on pregnancy, among other protected categories. (Docket No. 87 ¶ 18; 105 ¶ 18).
During 2015, TST's retail sales in Puerto Rico averaged 455 sales per month. (Docket Nos. 87 ¶ 19; 105 ¶ 19). In early 2016, TST monthly retail sales dropped and fluctuated from 228 to 287 sales. (Docket No. 87 ¶¶ 20-23; 105 ¶¶ 20-23). By late 2016, TST retail sales dropped again to 164 sales in October, 134 sales in November and 156 sales in December. Id. Defendants advance that due to the decline in retail sales during the final months of 2016, CEO Cravey decided to restructure TST's Sales and Marketing Department. (Docket No. 87 ¶ 26). This restructuring was implemented between January and February 2017. (Docket No. 87 ¶ 27).
According to the flow charts submitted to the record, by October 31, 2016, aside from the company's stockholders, CEO Cravey (who himself was a stockholder) held the highest company position, followed by GM Pagán-Mátos. (Docket No. 87-1 at 27). At the time, a "Manager" led the Sales and Marketing and Financial Departments. Id. The "Sales and Marketing Manager" position was vacant at the time. Id. In terms of organizational authority, underneath "Managers" were"Directors" and/or "Supervisors." (Docket No. 87-1 at 27). In late 2016, Plaintiff held the position of "Marketing Director" and supervised the areas of "Independent Sales," "Call Center," and "Order Processing." Id. By January 13, 2017, the Sales and Marketing Department was led by a "Sales Manager" and "Marketing Director." (Docket No. 87-1 at 28). In the early 2017 organizational flow chart, there is no longer a reference to a "Sales Marketing Manager" and the "Order Processing" group or department was no longer within the Marketing Director's purview but had its own "Order Processing Supervisor." Id. In early January 2017, Plaintiff still held the position of "Marketing Director." Id. This structure remained the same in the...
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