Acevedo-Padilla v. Novartis Ex Lax, Inc.

• Citation: 740 F.Supp.2d 293
• Decision Date: 30 September 2010
• Docket Number: Civil No. 08-1185 (SEC)
• Parties: Hernan ACEVEDO-PADILLA et al., Plaintiffs v. NOVARTIS EX LAX, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

740 F.Supp.2d 293

Hernan ACEVEDO-PADILLA et al., Plaintiffs

v.NOVARTIS EX LAX, INC., Defendant.

Civil No. 08-1185 (SEC).

United States District Court,

D. Puerto Rico.

Sept. 30, 2010.

Vilma M. Dapena-Rodriguez, Vilma Maria Dapena Law Office, Bayamon, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Jaime Luis Sanabria-Montanez, Enrique R. Padro, Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, P.S.C., San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION and ORDER

SALVADOR E. CASELLAS, Senior District Judge.

Pending before this Court is Defendant Ex Lax, Inc.'s ("Defendant" or "Ex Lax") motion for summary judgment. Docket # 29. Plaintiffs Hernan Acevedo-Padilla ("Acevedo"), Nitza I. Medina-Martinez, and their conjugal partnership (collectively "Plaintiffs") opposed (Docket # 64), Defendant replied (Docket # 89), and Plaintiffs sur-replied (Docket # 101). After reviewing the filings, and the applicable law, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.

Procedural Background

On February 12, 2008, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., Puerto Rico Law No. 80, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185(a), Law No. 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 et seq., and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 & 5142. According to Plaintiffs, Acevedo was subjected to harassment, and eventually dismissed because of his age, and replaced by a younger employee with similar job qualifications. Defendant filed its answer (Docket # 3), and discovery then ensued.

On March 25, 2009, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of age based discrimination. Docket # 29. Specifically, Ex-Lax argues that Acevedo was dismissed because he did not meet the legitimate work expectations, and not because of his age. Defendant further contends that Acevedo has not shown that the proffered reason for his dismissal is a mere pretext for discrimination. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs fail to set forth a harassment claim under the ADEA. As such, Ex-Lax contends that summary judgment is warranted.

In opposition, Plaintiffs aver that Acevedo met his employer's legitimate work expectations. They further contend that Ex-Lax's proffered reasons for Acevedo's dismissal is a pretext. Specifically, they point to Carlos Ceinos ("Ceinos"), Ex-Lax's Site Leader's, alleged derogatory comments about employees in Acevedo's age range. Moreover, they argue that Acevedo received satisfactory reviews, performance bonuses and salary increases. According to Plaintiffs, Ceinos' remarks and conduct show that Acevedo's subsequent dismissal was motivated by discriminatory animus.

Standard of Review

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) provides that: "A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part [of the claims asserted against him/her]." The Court may grant the movant's motion for summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Ramírez Rodríguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 425 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir.2005). At this stage, the court examines the record in the "light most favorable to the nonmovant," and indulges all "reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994).

Once the movant has averred that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least one fact in issue that is both genuine and material. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990) (citations omitted). "A factual issue is 'genuine' if 'it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party' and, therefore, requires the finder of fact to make 'a choice between the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.' " DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 116 (1st Cir.2005) ( quoting, Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (1st Cir.1990)). By like token, 'material' "means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to the nonmovant." Rojas-Ithier v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo, 394 F.3d 40, 42-43 (1st Cir.2005) (citations omitted). Therefore, there is a trial-worthy issue when the "evidence is such that there is a factual controversy pertaining to an issue that may affect the outcome of the litigation under the governing law, and the evidence is sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the issue in favor of either side." Id. (citations omitted).

In order to defeat summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation. See, Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2005) ( citing, Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990)). Nor will "effusive rhetoric" and "optimistic surmise" suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir.1997). Once the party moving for summary judgment has established an absence of material facts in dispute, and that he or she is entitled to judgement as a matter of law, the 'party opposing summary judgement must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.' Méndez-Laboy v. Abbott Lab., 424 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir.2005) ( quoting, Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994)). "The nonmovant must produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form sufficient to limn a trialworthy issue.... Failure to do so allows the summary judgment engine to operate at fullthrottle." Id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1991) (warning that "the decision to sit idly by and allow the summary judgment proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence."); Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8, ( quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989)) (holding that "[t]he evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve").

Applicable Law and Analysis

Before setting forth the facts found by this Court to be undisputed and relevant to the matter at hand, we must first address several compliance issues presented to the Court when reviewing Defendant's and Plaintiffs' statements of facts.

Because the instant motions are for summary judgment, the parties must comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56, and file a separate, short and concise statement of facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, and supported by record citations as required in Local Rule 56(e). See Local Rule 56(b). In turn, when confronted with a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must:

[s]ubmit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts. The opposing statement shall admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts. Unless a fact is admitted, the opposing statement shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as required by this rule.

Local Rule 56(c). If the opposing party fails to do so, "summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered." Rule 56(e)(2).

Local Rule 56(e) provides that "[t]he court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment." Moreover, "the court shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statements of facts." Id. These rules "are meant to ease the district court's operose task and to prevent parties from unfairly shifting the burdens of litigation to the court." Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2007). The First Circuit has repeatedly held that when the parties ignore the Local Rules, they do so at their peril. See Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.2000). Local Rule 56(c) also requires that, if the nonmoving party includes any additional facts, such facts must be in a separate section, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs, and supported by a specific record citation.

When denying or qualifying Ex-Lax's Statement of Uncontested Facts ("Ex-Lax's SUF"), Plaintiffs included additional facts that did not specifically correlate to Ex-Lax's proposed facts. More specifically, Plaintiffs failed to note that a party's denial or qualification of a proposed fact must be strictly limited to the issue therein raised. Any additional information shall be included in a separate section in order to ease the Court's task. In fact, a substantial part of Plaintiffs' additional facts are later included in a separate section of additional facts. As a result, Plaintiffs have filed hundreds of pages of repetitive arguments, which is precisely what Rule 56 seeks to avoid, forcing the opposing party and the Court to revise numerous pages of sometimes repetitive and irrelevant information. Accordingly, any additional facts provided by Plaintiff when denying or qualifying Ex-Lax's SUFwill be disregarded by this Court. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff's additional facts at Docket # 57, pp. 102-120 are deemed admitted when supported by the record, and not properly controverted by Ex-Lax. Ex-Lax also ran afoul of Local Rule 56 when citing numerous pages of their reply when opposing Plaintiffs' facts, instead of providing...