Acevedo v. Nassau County, New York, 73 C 305.

Decision Date30 January 1974
Docket NumberNo. 73 C 305.,73 C 305.
Citation369 F. Supp. 1384
PartiesAbdon ACEVEDO et al., Plaintiffs, v. NASSAU COUNTY, NEW YORK, its officials, employees and agents, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Richard F. Bellman, and Lois D. Thompson, Suburban Action Institute, Tarrytown, N. Y., for plaintiffs.

Joseph Jaspan, County Atty. of Nassau County, for Nassau County defendants.

John F. O'Shaughnessy, Town Atty., Hempstead, N. Y., by Albert Leone, for Town of Hempstead.

Edward J. Boyd, V, Acting U. S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., by Cyril Hyman, New York City, for defendant General Services Administration.

COSTANTINO, District Judge.

This suit is instituted pursuant to the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq.), the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.), and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) and (4) (1971).

The action is being maintained on behalf of the class of all Blacks or Spanish-speaking persons residing or seeking to reside in the County of Nassau who are eligible for low-income housing as defined in state or federal statutes and regulations. Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.

At issue is the future of approximately 685 acres of land located in Hempstead Township, Nassau County, New York. The tract of land, commonly known as Mitchel Field, was formerly a United States Air Force base and comprised 1,125.7 acres. In 1961 after the Air Force had terminated operations at the base the land was declared surplus to the needs of the Federal Government. There followed a series of sales by which various governmental agencies acquired parcels at the Field. The plaintiffs question the propriety of the proposed development of the parcels acquired by Nassau County (approximately 630 acres) and the General Services Administration (approximately 55 acres).

Except for 66.9 acres reserved for park lands, the County purchased its parcels for full value and holds them free of any restrictive covenants. It now proposes the following land uses for its holdings:

(1) an educational, cultural and civic center;
(2) commercial and light industrial buildings;
(3) recreational facilities;
(4) a convention center;
(5) a natural reserve (Hempstead Plains);
(6) a bus depot; and
(7) senior citizen housing.

The General Services Administration has publicized its desire to build a federal office building on its land.

It must be conceded that save for 250 units of senior citizen housing, the officials of Nassau County are avowedly opposed to the construction of any form of housing at Mitchel Field. The plaintiffs contend that the County's failure to provide for or plan for low-income housing at Mitchel Field is motivated by racial bias, an intent to cause, contribute to or perpetuate patterns of residential racial segregation; and that in any event the County's actions with respect to low-income housing at Mitchel Field will have the effect of perpetuating existing racial segregation in the County. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355 F.Supp. 1245 (N.D.Ohio 1973); Banks v. Perk, 341 F.Supp. 1175 (N.D.Ohio 1972); Crow v. Brown, 332 F.Supp. 382 (N.D.Ga.1971); Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F.Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1972). Furthermore, the plaintiffs assert that the County's proposed construction at Mitchel Field of 250 units of senior citizen housing, which will be almost exclusively occupied by whites, in light of its adamant refusal to include low-income housing there, which would be almost exclusively occupied by Blacks, is racially discriminatory—a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). Finally, plaintiffs charge that construction of a federal office building at Mitchel Field will constitute a violation of Executive Order 11512, 35 Fed.Reg. 3979 (March 3, 1970), and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.).

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to insure that low-income housing on a non-discriminatory basis will be constructed at Mitchel Field.1 Specifically they request an order requiring that:

(1) the County comprehensively plan for the development of Mitchel Field to include a significant amount of low and moderate income housing;
(2) the Town of Hempstead rezone land at Mitchel Field and promptly take whatever other steps are necessary in order to enable the housing uses proposed in said plan;
(3) the County and Town and whomever in addition to the County and Town may accept responsibility for development of housing proposed in said comprehensive plan, develop housing which is available to all persons regardless of race, national origin, ethnic background and economic status; and
(4) the defendants permit and encourage meaningful participation of plaintiffs, their attorneys and urban planners retained by them in the drafting and consideration of said comprehensive plan, and that defendants submit said comprehensive plan to this court, for approval, within 90 days from the date of entry of this court's order herein.

Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact at 75. With regard to defendant General Services Administration the plaintiffs request that the court:

Declare that GSA has violated the federal site selection laws and regulations by submitting a prospectus for a federal office building to OMB prior to ascertaining the availability of low and moderate income housing in the area and embarking on any and all necessary affirmative acts with regard to such housing;

and further that:

GSA should be enjoined from taking any further action towards the design or construction of a federal office building at Mitchel Field until the provisions of Executive Order 11512 have been met and adequate low income housing on a nondiscriminatory basis has been made available.

Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact at 78-79.

The threshold issue to be decided by the court is whether the alleged activities of Nassau County and the General Services Administration relating to their holdings at Mitchel Field result in racially discriminatory treatment. It is well settled that:

Any municipal conduct which has the purpose or effect of discriminating against Blacks or perpetuating racial concentration or segregation in housing is violative of the civil rights of Blacks and a denial of equal protection, absent a showing by the municipality of a supervening and compelling necessity. . . . Given a prima facie showing of discriminatory effect, the municipality must come forward with a supervening necessity or compelling interest to overcome a finding of discrimination.

Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, supra 355 F.Supp. at 1264. Similarly, it has been held that:

Since this nation is committed to a policy of balanced and dispersed public housing, low-income Blacks can no more be confined to a concentrated area than that they can be required to send their children to segregated schools. . . . Moreover, deprivation of equal housing rights caused to some extent by the neglect or thoughtlessness of local officials constitutes an equal protection violation.

Banks v. Perk, supra 341 F.Supp. at 1179.

Consequently, if a prima facie showing of racially discriminatory treatment is made the defendants will be required to justify their actions by establishing a legitimate and compelling governmental interest.

Proof of racial discrimination may be established either by proof of purpose or effect, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967); good faith is not a defense, Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 89 S. Ct. 557, 21 L.Ed.2d 616 (1969), and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). Official action which may appear neutral on its face, but has the inevitable effect of either tying present rights to the discriminatory patterns of the past or placing a special burden upon Blacks is unlawful. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 89 S.Ct. 1720, 23 L.Ed.2d 309 (1969); United States v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145, 85 S. Ct. 817, 13 L.Ed.2d 709 (1965). In Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F.Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), Judge Curtin appropriately described the court's task as follows:

Judicial inquiry into the purpose or effect of governmental action is not limited to the moment that that action occurs. Not only must the "immediate objective" of governmental action be considered, but the "historical context" and "ultimate effect" of such action must be considered as well. . . . The inquiry must further assess the "reality" of the "law's impact" and consider the "background" against which state action operates to determine that reality. . . . Therefore, relevant to this inquiry are either past or prospective governmental actions which form a part of the background.

Id. at 694.

Nassau County is situated on Long Island and is bordered by the Borough of Queens, City of New York on the West and the County of Suffolk on the East. The County is politically subdivided into three townships, North Hempstead, Oyster Bay and Hempstead. Within the townships there are approximately 125 incorporated and unincorporated villages and two cities, the City of Glen Cove and the City of Long Beach.

In close proximity to New York City, Nassau County has experienced a great influx of people. In 1970 its population had grown to 1,428,838, and was near saturation. U.S. Census '70, Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, at 4 (October, 1971) hereinafter referred to as Bi-County Report.

Because of its suburban character the County has become an attractive place to live. Most of its residents live in privately-owned single family housing. The County...

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  • Village of Bellwood v. Dwayne Realty
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • December 28, 1979
    ...It is a form of race discrimination which may be established either by proof of purpose or of effect. Acevedo v. Nassau County, New York, 369 F.Supp. 1384, 1387 (E.D.N.Y.1974). Despite this rule, proof by effect is impossible on the facts at bar; the evidence does not show that there was an......

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