Acker v. Gen. Motors LLC, 4:15-CV-706-A
| Decision Date | 01 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4:15-CV-706-A,4:15-CV-706-A |
| Parties | LONNY ACKER, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
ORIGINAL
Now before the court is the motion for summary judgment filed in the above-captioned action by defendant, General Motors, LLC. Plaintiff, Lonny Acker, filed a response and defendant filed a reply. Having considered all of the parties' filings, the summary judgment record, and the applicable authorities, the court concludes that the motion should be granted.
Plaintiff asserts claims for FMLA interference, Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA") disability discrimination, Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA") disability discrimination, and retaliation under the FMLA, ADAAA, and TCHRA, against defendant, and requests punitive damages.
Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment as to all of plaintiff's claims. In summary form, the arguments of defendant in the motion for summary judgment are as follows:
(1) Plaintiff's FMLA interference claim fails because none of plaintiff's claims constitute interference with a right under the FMLA. Furthermore, even if plaintiff has established that he was denied a substantive right under the FMLA, he was not prejudiced.
(2) Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims under the ADAAA and TCHRA fail as a matter of law because, plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of disability discrimination.
(3) Plaintiff's retaliation claims should fail as a matter of law because plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of retaliation.
the Summary Judgment Record
Plaintiff has been employed as an electrician by defendant since 2000. Doc. 32 at App. 6; Doc. 38 at App. 41. Plaintiff suffers from acute iron-deficiency anemia and due to that condition, is at times unable to perform his job. Doc. 32 at App.10-13; Doc. 38 at App. 12. As a part of defendant's policy to take Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") leave, plaintiff is required to notify defendant that he requests FMLA leave by calling defendant's absence call-in line and then calling Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. ("Sedgwick")1 at what is referred to as the "benefits and services line." Doc. 32 at App. 74-75. Sedgwick then makes a recommendation to defendant regarding the FMLA leave, and defendant may adopt such finding. Doc. 32 at App. 74-75. Employees are encouraged to notify defendant that they will be absent or tardy as far in advance as possible. Doc. 32 at App. 51-58. When advance notice is not possible, employees are required to call in to report an absence or tardy at least thirty minutes prior to the start of their shift. Doc. 32 at App. 51-58.
More specifically, employees calling in under the FMLA are required to notify defendant's absence call-in line with a request for leave at least 30 minutes prior to the start of their shift. Doc. 32 at App. 75. Employees are also required to notify defendant's benefits and services center of their request for FMLA leave by the end of their normally scheduled work shift.Doc. 32 at App. 75. Plaintiff admits that he is familiar with this process. Doc. 32 at App. 7-9. A leave request applies to the day the shift ends. Doc. 32 at 75.
On November 12, 2014, plaintiff made a request for FMLA leave for leave on November 12, 2014 through November 14, 2014. Doc. 38 at App. 24. Plaintiff also took FMLA leave on November 22, 2014 and November 23, 2014, and December 6, 2014 through December 8, 2014. Doc. 32 at 75-76.
On December 9, 2014, defendant was put on unpaid disciplinary leave for two weeks because his leave for November 12, 2014 through November 14, 2014 was not approved. Doc. 32 at App. 12, 61; Doc. 38 at App. 85. While plaintiff was on disciplinary leave, Sedgwick approved plaintiff's November 12, 2014 and November 13, 2014 absences for FMLA leave and defendant rescinded the disciplinary layoff. Doc. 32 at App. 12, 61; Doc. 38 at App. 85. However, defendant discovered that plaintiff did not timely call in to request FMLA leave as to his November 14, 2014 absence. Doc. 32 at App. 61-62. Defendant issued a disciplinary layoff for the November 14, 2014 absence but allowed the time already served on disciplinary layoff to count as disciplinary layoff for the absence. Doc. 32 at App. 61-62; Doc. 28 at 37-38.
As to plaintiff's November 22, 2014 absence, plaintiff did not timely call the absence call-in line to report his absence thirty minutes prior to the start of his shift. Doc. 32 at 66. In addition, he did not call defendant's benefits and services center before his shift ended. Doc. 32 at 66. For the November 22, 2014 and November 23, 20142 absences, plaintiff was issued an unpaid two week disciplinary layoff. Doc. 32 at App. 63.
As to plaintiff's December 6, 2014 through December 8, 2014 leave, plaintiff's December 7, 2014 leave was approved. Doc. 32 at 67. Plaintiff's December 6, 2014 and December 8, 2014 leave were not approved because plaintiff failed to timely contact defendant's benefits and services center, though he did timely contact the absence call-in line. Doc. 32 at 67. Defendant did not discipline plaintiff for his absence on December 6, 2014, and instead gave him the opportunity to correct his attendance. Doc. 32 at App. 76-77. Plaintiff was given a thirty day unpaid disciplinary suspension for his absence on December 8, 2014.
Since returning to work from his thirty day unpaid disciplinary suspension plaintiff has taken over thirty days ofFMLA leave and called both the absence call-in line and defendant's benefits and services center to report such leave. Doc. 32 at App. 16-17.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court shall grant summary judgment on a claim or defense if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of pointing out to the court that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 325 (1986). The movant can discharge this burden by pointing out the absence of evidence supporting one or more essential elements of the nonmoving party's claim, "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323. Once the movant has carried its burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party must identify evidence in the record that creates a genuine dispute as to each of the challenged elements of its case. Id. at 324; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (). If the evidence identified could not lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party as to each essential element of the nonmoving party's case, there is no genuine dispute for trial and summary judgment is appropriate. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 597 (1986).
The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is the same as the standard for rendering judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597; see also Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) ().
The FMLA entitles employees to up to 12 workweeks of leave during a year for various reasons including "a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functionsof the position of such employee." 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D). The FMLA provides a cause of action to an employee against an employer for interfering with any right provided by the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615 & 2617(a)(2). To prevail on an interference claim, an employee must prove that his employer interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of FMLA rights. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002).
It is not entirely clear what conduct plaintiff asserts interfered with his FMLA rights. It appears that plaintiff alleges that defendant interfered with his FMLA rights by wrongfully denying qualifying FMLA leave. Defendant alleges that on the days plaintiff was denied FMLA leave, plaintiff did not timely or correctly provide notice of the need to take FMLA leave in accordance with defendant's policy. The summary judgment evidence indicates that on the dates plaintiff was denied FMLA leave, plaintiff either did not call the absence call-in line and/or defendant's benefits and services center or failed to report his claim before the deadline required by defendant's FMLA leave policy.
An employee may be denied leave for failing to abide with an employer's "usual and customary notice and proceduralrequirements for requesting leave." 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(d). Courts have routinely held that "an employer generally does not violate the FMLA if it terminates an employee for failing to comply with a policy of requiring notice of absences, even if the absences that the employee failed to report were protected by the FMLA." Goff v. Signing River Health Sys., 6 F. Supp. 3d 704, 711 (S.D. Miss. 2014); see also Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 2011). Courts have also routinely found that the...
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