Ackerberg v. Muskegon Osteopathic Hospital

• Decision Date: 18 May 1962
• Docket Number: J,No. 74,74
• Citation: 366 Mich. 596,115 N.W.2d 290
• Parties: Walter ACKERBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUSKEGON OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL, a corporation licensed to do business in the State of Michigan, Defendant and Appellee. an. Term.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 290

115 N.W.2d 290

366 Mich. 596

Walter ACKERBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUSKEGON OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL, a corporation licensed to do business in the State of Michigan, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 74, Jan. Term.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

May 18, 1962.

Edward C. Wilson, John S. White, Muskegon, for plaintiff and appellant.

Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan, Grand Rapids, (Edward D. Wells, Grand Rapids, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

KAVANAGH, Justice.

Plaintiff sued defendant hospital for damages growing out of certain injuries he received on October 23, 1958, as a result of falling from a platform located in front of the emergency entrance to defendant hospital.

The case was tried by a jury and a directed verdict was entered against plaintiff by the trial judge at the close of plaintiff's proofs.

The question on appeal is, should the court have granted a motion for a directed verdict against plaintiff of no cause of action at the conclusion of plaintiff's case?

Plaintiff had been in the emergency room of defendant hospital securing medical attention for his small daughter, who had fallen in her home and cut her head on an ash tray. Plaintiff, accompanied by his wife and a Mr. Weaver, drove the child to defendant hospital. They entered through the emergency entrance and were directed to the emergency room. Plaintiff, his wife and daughter entered the room. He testified that as a result of a strong odor in this room and the injury to the child, after 4 or 5 minutes he became nauseated and a little dizzy. Feeling the need for fresh air, plaintiff walked out through the emergency entrance on to the rear platform. Plaintiff alleged that because of his dizzy condition he fell sideways from the rear platform. This platform is approximately 16 feet long and extends approximately 5 feet out from the rear wall of the hospital. The height of the platform is variously stated in the record as from 23 to 36 inches. Plaintiff landed on the pavement and sustained a fractured skull and other injuries.

Plaintiff claims his injuries resulted from the failure of defendant hospital to construct a guard railing, chain or other form of protection on the platform.

The trial court, in granting the motion for directed verdict, based his opinion on the belief that no testimony or exhibits, which were pictures of the platform and ramp, showed any duty on the part of the hospital to put a guard rail or other type of protection around the platform. The trial judge stated, since the plaintiff failed to show such a duty or a breach thereof on the part of defendant, no negligence existed. The trial judge also felt that plaintiff knew the condition of the ramp and platform, having used it on entering the hospital. The court believed the plaintiff had not exercised reasonable care in leaving the anteroom and going out on the platform when he was dizzy and light-headed. The court concluded the proofs in and of themselves showed contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff.

Defendant admits in the record that plaintiff was a business invitee and that the hospital owed a duty to its invitees to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition and to exercise due care to prevent the existence of a situation known to it, or which should have been known to it, that might result in injury to a business invitee.

Where the trial judge grants defendant's motion for a directed verdict a the conclusion of plaintiff's proofs, we view the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff. White v. Herpolsheimer Co., 327 Mich. 462, 42 N.W.2d 240, 26 A.L.R.2d 667; Goldsmith v. Cody, 351 Mich. 380, 88 N.W.2d 268; Nash v. Lewis, 352 Mich. 488, 90 N.W.2d 480.

2 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Negligence, under title of 'business visitors,' § 343, sets forth the following standard of care which we believe is applicable here:

'A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he (a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them.'

The most satisfactory statement of the rule for such a case, and the one easiest to comprehend and apply, is that given by the Supreme Court in Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, p. 418, 12 S.Ct. 679, 36 L.Ed. 485, arising out of a controversy in this jurisdiction, where it is stated:

'When a given state of facts is such that reasonable men may fairly differ upon the question as to whether there was negligence or not, the determination of the matter is for the jury. It is only where the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them that the question of negligence is ever considered as one of law for the court.'

In Detroit & Milwaukee Railroad Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99,...