Ackerly v. Ley
Citation | 420 F.2d 1336 |
Decision Date | 19 December 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 22665.,22665. |
Parties | Robert L. ACKERLY, Appellant, v. Herbert L. LEY, Jr. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Leonard Schaitman, Atty., Department of Justice, with whom Messrs. Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty., and Morton Hollander, Atty., Department of Justice, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before McGOWAN, LEVENTHAL and ROBB, Circuit Judges.
Appellant's complaint in the District Court sought equitable relief, in the form of compelled disclosure of documents, against appellee Commissioner of Food and Drugs in the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The District Court, on cross-motions for summary judgment, held for the Commissioner. Upon appeal from this judgment, it appears that subsequent events have rendered the litigation moot as to some of the documents sought. As to the remainder, which were inspected in camera by the District Court, we find the District Court's characterization of what that inspection revealed inadequate to admit of meaningful appellate review in terms of the relevant statutory standards. We thus vacate the judgment appealed from and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.
The controversy before us involves the so-called Freedom of Information Act which was enacted by Congress, effective June 5, 1967. 5 U.S.C. § 552. Appellant is an attorney representing manufacturers and distributors of chemical products designed for household use. The Commissioner gave notice in the Federal Register of February 16, 1968, of a proposal on his part to bar from interstate commerce, as a "banned hazardous substance" within the purview of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (15 U.S.C. § 1261 et seq.), carbon tetrachloride and mixtures containing it. 33 Fed.Reg. 3076. The notice recited that this proposed restriction was founded upon "information gathered from investigations and other sources" which suggested that "the degree or nature of the hazard involved" was such as to make no other course acceptable. Comments upon the proposal from all interested persons were invited to be submitted by March 16, 1968.
Appellant, by a letter dated March 6, 1968, sought permission "to review and inspect and/or copy all of the records" in the possession of the Commissioner "which relate in any way to the degree or nature of the hazard" referred to in the Commissioner's proposal. In a reply of the same date, the Agency's Information Center Officer gave appellant a list of those materials relied upon by the Commissioner which had already been published. He refused the request otherwise as "too broad." "Also," he added, "this would, of necessity, include internal communications, which are exempt from disclosure under (the Freedom of Information Act)." The next day appellant appealed this decision to the Agency's Information Review Officer, who eventually supplied appellant with three memoranda from the Agency records1 but denied access to all remaining records on the ground that they were "internal documents, such as the briefing memorandum to the Commissioner before the proposal was published, memoranda of telephone conversations, investigative reports, and material submitted to (the Agency) in confidence." These records, it was said, were "not subject to disclosure."
Appellant filed his complaint in the District Court on April 17, 1968.2 On May 24, the Commissioner issued a final order implementing his proposal. That order was, however, stayed on July 27, 1968, and an evidentiary hearing by the Agency was scheduled on the merits of the order. This action was, as contemplated by the statute, in response to appellant's filing on June 20 of a formal objection to the order and his request for a public hearing, in which appellant entered an appearance for his clients.
An affidavit filed in the District Court by the Agency identified the items in its file as consisting, in addition to the three memoranda given to appellant on April 3, of the following:
On November 25, 1968, in ruling for the Commissioner on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court had only this to say:
The Court took the matter under advisement in order to inspect in camera the documents which the Government refused to produce. The inspection reveals that the documents which the Government refused to produce consist of internal memoranda based upon medical records which were secured by the Government in a confidential capacity, bolstered by reference to published medical studies and reports which are equally available to the plaintiffs upon diligent research by them.
While this appeal was pending, the Commissioner, on May 8, 1969, moved (1) to dismiss as moot so much of it as related to what he denominated as "the factual information" sought by appellant, and (2) to affirm summarily with respect to the remaining items as presenting no substantial issue. This court ordered the motion to be heard simultaneously with the appeal on the merits.
We deal first with the motion. The claim of mootness derives from the circumstance that the public hearing on the Commissioner's banning order was scheduled to begin before an independent trial examiner on May 12, 1969. A pre-hearing conference was held on April 14 and 22, 1969, at which the Commissioner made a further disclosure to appellant of records previously characterized by him as "internal" and therefore not available. These are identified, in the concluding clause of subparagraph g of the affidavit quoted above, as "medical records relating to the death" which was the subject of the investigation and report referred to earlier in that subparagraph. The Commissioner thus appears to have relinquished the support given it by the District Court in this one respect, since these records were presumably among the documents inspected by it in camera and concluded by it to be "* * internal memoranda based upon medical records * * *" exempted from disclosure by the Freedom of Information Act.3 Just how they differ from the other documents with which they are lumped in subparagraph g of the affidavit is not apparent from the record before us. In any event, we think the lawsuit has lost its substance as to this item, since the only specific relief appellant seeks is compelled disclosure and that has been rendered moot by the disclosure in this instance which has now actually been made.4
Again, however (see note 1 supra), we confess to a considerable lack of enthusiasm for the caliber of the Commissioner's performance in this seemingly erratic discharge of his responsibilities under the Freedom of Information Act. The records in question, which appellant sought in order to prepare his comments on the Commissioner's proposal in its preliminary stage, were made available to him at long last in connection with the evidentiary hearing which it was the purpose of Congress, in the two-stage rule making prescribed by it, to render possibly unnecessary by common consent. This hardly comports with the vigorous defense of the two-stage device which the Agency pressed — successfully — upon this court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Gardner, note 1 supra. It is certainly not the kind of administrative performance envisaged by Congress in the Freedom of Information Act.5
He asserts that this specific exemption was intended by Congress to embody the familiar doctrine that the Executive branch is privileged not to disclose "intra-governmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions are formulated" — language which we approved in our affirmance of the District Court in V. E. B. Carl Zeiss Jena v. Clark, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 10, 384 F.2d 979 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952, 88 S.Ct. 334, 19 L.Ed.2d 361.6 See also Boeing Airplane v. Coggeshall, 108 U.S. App.D.C. 106, 280 F.2d 654 (1960); Machin v. Zuckert, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 335, 316 F.2d 336 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896, 84 S.Ct. 172, 11 L.Ed.2d 124 (1963); and Freeman v. Seligson, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 56, 405 F.2d 1326 (1968).
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