Ackermann v. Doyle

• Decision Date: 20 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. CV 98-4664(ADS).,CV 98-4664(ADS).
• Citation: 43 F.Supp.2d 265
• Parties: John R. ACKERMANN, Plaintiff, v. Robert W. DOYLE, Supreme Court Justice, in his official capacity, and Mary M. Werner, District Administrative Judge, in her official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

43 F.Supp.2d 265

John R. ACKERMANN, Plaintiff, v.Robert W. DOYLE, Supreme Court Justice, in his official capacity, and Mary M. Werner, District Administrative Judge, in her official capacity, Defendants.

No. CV 98-4664(ADS).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

April 20, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John R. Ackermann, New Bern, NC, pro se.

Office of the New York State Attorney General, Mineola, NY, by Dorothy Oehler Nese, Assistant Attorney General, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SPATT, District Judge.

This lawsuit arises out of the pro se plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the defendants' handling of his case in the New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County.That case — which the plaintiff describes as a "negligence" lawsuit — stemmed from allegations that the Town of Riverhead illegally seized and destroyed the plaintiff's personal property, namely, a bronze storage box which the plaintiff characterizes as a family heirloom valued at several thousands of dollars.At issue is the defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.The parties appeared before the Court for oral argument on April 16, 1999.This written opinion follows.

I.BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from the Complaint, and from several of the exhibits attached to the defendants' moving papers, including Decisions, Orders and filings in the plaintiff's related state and federal cases.

Initially, the Court notes that during oral argument, the plaintiff objected to the Court's consideration of these exhibits on the ground that they were outside the scope of a motion to dismiss.However, when considering a motion to dismiss the complaint, the district court may consider the allegations in the complaint and "all papers and exhibits appended to the complaint, as well as any matters of which judicial notice may be taken."Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,72 F.3d 1085, 1092(2d Cir.1995)(emphasis added).Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned."In the Court's view, the Decisions, Orders and filings in the plaintiff's related state and federal cases are capable of determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.It also is entirely proper for this Court to take judicial notice of the actions taken in the related state and federal court actions "`to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.'"Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc.,969 F.2d 1384, 1388(2d Cir.1992).

A.The New York State Lawsuit(the "State Case")

In or about March 1993, the plaintiff, John R. Ackerman("Ackerman" or the "plaintiff") filed a pro se lawsuit in the New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County, raising a "negligence" claim against the Town of Riverhead.According to the Complaint filed in the State Case, the "negligence" claim arose from an incident in June 1987, when a Town of Riverhead Police Officer"entered the plaintiff's domicile ... and, without benefit of a search warrant, or permission or knowledge of this plaintiff, unlawfully and negligently seized the plaintiff's personal property, namely, [a] metal storage box ..."The Complaint in the State Case further alleges that in 1990, the Town of Riverhead destroyed the box, and that the plaintiff"had no knowledge that the metal storage box .. had been in [the Town's] custody" and destroyed until July 1992, when he was informed of what had transpired by the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office.

According to the plaintiff, "[h]aving complied with applicable statutes and rules of the court, and having paid all court fees, this case was certified for trial on March 7, 1995 by the Hon. W. Bromley Hall, Justice of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, New York."

However, on April 10, 1996, the defendantHonorable Robert W. Doyle"marked this plaintiff's case off the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, New York, trial calendar solely because said plaintiff failed to appear for calendar call on that date."According to the plaintiff, his "failure to appear was solely and only the result of the failure of the State Supreme Court, Suffolk County, New York to notify the plaintiff herein of the calendar call."

On May 1, 1996, the plaintiff states that he filed a motion to restore his State Case to the trial calendar, which Justice Doyle denied in a Decision and Order dated August 14, 1996, on the ground that the plaintiff's motion papers did not "apprise the court of the basis of the instant action []or ... satisfactorily demonstrate its merit."The plaintiff moved for reconsideration on September 12, 1996, which Justice Doyle denied on December 2, 1996.

On January 15, 1997, the plaintiff alleges that he submitted another motion to restore his case to the trial calendar, which Justice Doyle denied on April 10, 1997.

The plaintiff appealed from Justice Doyle's April 10, 1997 Decision to the Appellate Division, Second Department.On December 15, 1997, the "Court refused to hear such appeal on the grounds that plaintiff's motion to restore his case to the trial calendar, dated January 15, 1997, was in effect a motion to reargue which is not appealable."The Court takes judicial notice of the Second Department's decision, which is attached as an exhibit to the defendant's moving papers.The Second Department dismissed the plaintiff's appeal on the ground that "no appeal lies from an order denying reargument."Apparently, the plaintiff did not appeal any of Justice Doyle's other decisions in the case, including the original Order dated August 14, 1996, which denied his motion to vacate the dismissal and restore the case to the calendar.

B.The Prior Federal Lawsuit (the "Federal Case")

The pro se plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against the Town of Riverhead in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in January 1993, approximately two months before initiating the State Court lawsuit.The Federal Case, Docket Number CV 93-246, was assigned to United States District JudgeLeonard D. Wexler.

The Federal Case, like the State Case, arose from the June 1987 search of the plaintiff's home and seizure of the storage box.Specifically, the Complaint stated that the "defendantTown of Riverhead violated his ... civil rights in that agents of said defendant unlawfully seized, retained and destroyed a metal storage box which was a family heirloom and the lawful property of the plaintiff."The Complaint in the Federal Case raised a single cause of action for a Judgment declaring that "the defendantTown of Riverhead unlawfully seized and destroyed this plaintiff's personal property in violation of his civil rights," and sought an Order directing the Town of Riverhead to "compensate the plaintiff for the costs and disbursements of this action."

On May 5, 1993, the plaintiff entered into a Stipulation of Discontinuance with Prejudice, which Judge Wexler "So Ordered."Two days later, on May 7, 1993, the plaintiff signed a release which stated, in relevant part, that in exchange for consideration of $1,500, the plaintiff:

hereby acknowledge[s], releases and discharges [the]Town of Riverhead[and its] heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns from all actions, causes of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, reckonings, bonds, bills, specialties, covenants, contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, variances, trespasses, damages, judgments, extents, executions, claims and demands whatsoever, in law, admiralty or equity, which against the RELEASEE the RELEASOR, RELEASOR'S heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns ever had, now have or hereafter can, shall or may, have for, upon, or by reasons any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of this RELEASE.

This release applies only to case number CV 93-246, i.e., John R. Ackerman v. Town of Riverhead, pending in the United States District Court, Eastern District of New York.

C.The Instant Lawsuit

The Complaint in the instant case raises claims against Justices Doyle and Werner based on their treatment of the plaintiff's State Case.

With regard to Justice Doyle, the Complaint states that "DefendantRobert W. Doyle's refusal to restore this plaintiff's case to the trial calendar not only violates the plaintiff's 14th Amendment Constitutional Right to due process but such refusal constitutes a groundless, arbitrary and capricious decision in that said decision is based on a discriminatory standard which is little more than a ruse designed to deprive this plaintiff, a lay person, of his right to trial."As the plaintiff explains, "When all is said and done, this plaintiff finds that he has not only been raped by the Town of Riverhead in the loss of a treasured possession, but has also been raped by the defendant, Robert W. Doyle, who has seen fit to mete out justice as a political despot."

With respect to the defendantHon. Mary M. Werner, the then District Administrative Judge, the plaintiff maintains that she"failed to provide necessary supervision and management of judicial officers under her jurisdiction by virtue of the allegations cited" in the Complaint.

Although Ackerman does not assert a vehicle under which he raises his constitutional claims, in construing the complaint broadly, as the Court must for a pro se litigant (seeAlexandre v. Cortes,140 F.3d 406, 408(2d Cir.1998)), the Complaint can be viewed as one brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for deprivation of due process.The plaintiff's Complaint seeks the following: (1) an "injunction which precludes defenda...