Ackerson v. Erwin M. Jennings Co. Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1928
• Citation: 140 A. 760,107 Conn. 393
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ACKERSON v. ERWIN M. JENNINGS CO. INC. HUNT v. ERWIN M. JENNINGS CO. INC.

140 A. 760

107 Conn. 393

ACKERSON v. ERWIN M. JENNINGS CO. INC.

HUNT v. ERWIN M. JENNINGS CO. INC.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 28, 1928

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Isaac Wolfe, Judge.

Actions by Anna M. Ackerson, administratrix of the estate of one Ackerson, deceased, and by William Edward Hunt, respectively against the Erwin M. Jennings Company, Inc., for personal injuries to decedent, causing his death, and to plaintiff Hunt, because of negligence of defendant's servant, tried together to the jury, which returned verdicts for defendant by direction of the court. From judgments denying motions to set aside the verdicts, plaintiffs appeal. Error, judgment set aside, and new trial ordered.

Justus J. Fennel, Maurice J. Buckley, John A. Walsh, and George Dimenstein, all of Stamford, for appellants.

Philip Reich and Samuel Reich, both of Bridgeport, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.

HINMAN, J.

While Ackerson and Hunt were riding as passengers in an automobile owned by the defendant and driven by one Root, the car left the road and collided with two poles, as a result of which Ackerson was killed and Hunt seriously injured. No question is made that there was sufficient evidence as to the negligence of Root to go to the jury, but the trial court held that plaintiffs had failed to show that Root, in driving the car at the time of the accident, was in the service of the defendant and engaged in performing its business, and, on that ground, directed verdicts for the defendant. Error in so doing and in refusing to set aside the verdicts are the assignments pursued on these appeals.

It is only when the evidence is so clear for one side or the other that reasonable men cannot differ as to the verdict which ought to be rendered that the trial court may require the jury to return that verdict. They are then directed to decide the issues in a certain way because these could not reasonably be decided in any other way. Fay v. Hartford &amp Springfield Street Ry. Co., 81 Conn. 578, 579, 71 A. 734. A verdict is not to be directed unless there is no other conclusion of fact, decisive of the issues, which can be reached, logically and reasonably, from the evidence before the jury, than that which is in accordance with the verdict directed. Gerardi v. Driscoll, 88 Conn. 16, 89 A. 892; Way v. Connecticut Co., 90 Conn. 139, 95 A. 927. Upon appeal from a directed verdict this court must assume the truth of the appellant's testimony, although it be contradicted, if the jury could reasonably have found the fact or facts which such evidence tended to prove. Pothier v. Reid Air Spring Co., 103 Conn. 380, 388, 130 A. 383.

The jury might reasonably have found, from the evidence, these facts: The defendant is in the business of selling, repairing, and rendering service for automobiles, having its main establishment in Bridgeport, and branches in several other Connecticut cities, including one in Stamford. At and before the time in question one Wilcox was general manager of the Stamford branch, and, as such, had direct supervision of the conduct of the business of that branch, including the sale and service of cars, and general control of defendant's employees connected therewith. Root was service manager at the Stamford branch, having charge of all repair work, the stockroom, and the servicing of cars, and had direct supervision of the men employed in that department, including Ackerson and Hunt, both of whom were automobile mechanics. The other departments were the showroom and the sales department. Root's immediate superior, from whom he took orders, was Wilcox.

On December 24, 1926, each of the employees of the Stamford branch received an invitation, written on the stationery of the defendant company and signed by Wilcox, reading:

" You are cordially invited to be my guest at a dinner to be held on the evening of January 8, 1927, as a token of my appreciation of your services rendered for the company and myself."

No place or hour was stated, but by subsequent arrangement all of the employees, except two young ladies employed in the office, and one man, who washed cars, met at the office on the evening in question and they were transported, in two cars belonging to the defendant and driven by Wilcox and Root, respectively, to an inn, some distance away, where the dinner was held.

Root testified that Wilcox asked him if any of the men had transportation and, being informed that none of them had said, " We will have to furnish transportation then," and told him to take a car and transport the men employed in his department and he (Wilcox) would take the others. Wilcox's version of this...