Acolyte Elec. Corp. v. City of New York

Decision Date09 December 1986
Docket NumberMisc. No. 86-0329.
Citation69 BR 155
PartiesACOLYTE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al, Defendants.
CourtU.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of New York

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Pinks, Brooks Stern & Arbeit, Steven G. Pinks, Hauppauge, N.Y., for debtor.

McGoey & Martirano, New Rochelle, N.Y., special counsel to debtor.

Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Corp. Counsel, City of New York, Fred B. Ringel, Asst. Corp. Counsel, New York City, for defendants.

MARVIN A. HOLLAND, Bankruptcy Judge:

This report responds to two orders issued by the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein which deal with the motion of the defendants a) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) to withdraw the reference and, in effect, remove this adversary proceeding to the district court; and b) for abstention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334.

The first such order, dated August 8, 1986, refers to the undersigned for a determination of the following:

(a) Is the instant action a core proceeding, to wit, one in which the Bankruptcy Judge may hear and enter final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), or, in the alternative, is the proceeding a noncore proceeding, to wit, one in which the Bankruptcy Judge may only submit proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law to the District Court?
(b) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334, is the within action one in which the court must mandatorily abstain or is the matter one in which the court may under its own discretion abstain?
(c) In the event discretionary abstention is applicable, will the Bankruptcy Court abstain from hearing the within proceeding?

The second order, dated August 11, 1986, refers to the undersigned for recommendation of the following:

(a) Is the bankruptcy court constitutionally and statutorily empowered to conduct a jury trial in this proceeding in accordance with the City's demand therefore made on July 28, 1986?

Appendix 1 contains a copy of each of these orders.

THE FACTS
The Parties

Plaintiff/Debtor, Acolyte Electric Corporation ("Acolyte"), a New York corporation, maintains its principal place of business in Long Island City. During the period encompassed by the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants, Ameruso and Lipke, served as Commissioners of the New York City's Departments of Transportation and General Services, respectively.

The Pending State Court Action

On February 14, 1986, Acolyte commenced an action in the Supreme Court of New York County against the defendants herein for money damages for breach of contract.

The Bankruptcy Court Proceedings

On April 18, 1986, Acolyte filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and was thereafter continued in the management and control of its business and properties as a debtor-in-possession pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1107.

On June 9, 1986, the debtor-in-possession filed this adversary proceeding with the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of New York. A summons, pretrial notice and complaint were then duly served on the defendants. Copy of the complaint is included as Appendix 2.*

The plaintiff alleges that on or around June 13, 1983 it contracted with the defendants to furnish labor, materials, tools and any equipment needed for the maintenance of illuminated traffic signals in the boroughs of The Bronx and Queens. Acolyte claims that although it performed all of the services required under this contract in a competent and workmanlike manner and fully complied with all of its provisions, the defendants "willfully, wrongfully, arbitrarily and capriciously" breached the contract and refused to fully compensate the plaintiff for the services rendered pursuant to the contract. Acolyte alleges numerous fruitless demands for its monies, and compliance with all statutory prerequisites to a suit against the municipality.

In its second cause of action, Acolyte contends that the defendants made certain unilateral changes in the contract requiring Acolyte to perform services not originally agreed upon. Acolyte claims that although it did indeed perform this additional work, it has not been duly compensated.

In its third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges a provision in the contract subjecting it to liability under a liquidated damage clause in the event of a failure to report to a specified job site upon notification that illuminated traffic control devices were in need of maintenance or repair. Acolyte contends that its entering into this contract was conditioned upon the following: (1) that the defendants would make available the materials needed to repair or replace the traffic control devices; (2) that such materials, as well as other important equipment, would be kept in good working condition by defendants; (3) that the telephone lines and computers be maintained in good working condition; (4) that the City's Inspector, and other official agencies, would properly report that illuminated traffic control devices, controllers, detectors, sensors, or their supports, have been damaged or defective or out of time; (5) that plaintiff would be notified of such problems at the time the call was received; (6) that temporary repairs by Acolyte would stop the time in which liquidated damages would be assessed; and that (7) defendants, as well as other City contractors, would properly perform work under their contracts and not interfere with plaintiff's performance of its contractual obligations.

Acolyte alleges that when it received notifications that traffic control devices had problems and needed repair, the defendant failed to provide it with the materials necessary to make such repairs for a lengthy period of time. In addition, it is alleged that the equipment which was made available to Acolyte was not in good working condition, and that any calls made to Acolyte were not properly recorded, screened or investigated. As a result of the foregoing, Acolyte contends that it was "wrongfully hindered, delayed and interfered with" in the performance of its work under the contract as a result of the defendants' failure to perform their contractual obligations.

Acolyte's fourth to eleventh causes of action are similar to the first three in claiming damages sustained from the defendants' alleged breach of contract and interference with its ability to timely perform under the contract. In its twelfth cause of action, the plaintiff claims that on September 24, 1985 it entered into a contract with the defendants in which it agreed to furnish and install labor and materials necessary and required in maintaining the street lighting system for the illumination of roads, parks and public places in the borough of Brooklyn. It is further alleged that although the plaintiff fully performed the duties required under the contract, the defendants wrongfully deducted $4,062.50 from the amount due plaintiff pursuant to a liquidated damages clause.

The defendants rebut Acolyte's complaint by asserting numerous affirmative defenses which state in substance that since Acolyte failed to comply with various provisions of the contract governing the procedure by which it was to notify the defendants of the claims set forth in the complaint, this action cannot be maintained. In addition, the defendants also contend that the complaint fails to state grounds upon which relief can be granted, and that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action.

On July 21, 1986, the defendants made a motion in the United States District Court of the Eastern District before the Honorable Jack Weinstein seeking an Order withdrawing the reference of this matter to the Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) and for an Order requesting that the District Court enter its Order of Abstention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c). The defendants also requested an Order staying the proceedings before the Bankruptcy Court until a determination of this District Court motion could be made.

On July 28, 1986, the defendants filed a demand for a jury trial in this matter.

Judge Weinstein granted plaintiff's motion to the extent that the issues present were referred to this court as set forth above.

DISCUSSION
Historical Overview

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 conferred bankruptcy jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 as follows:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts.
(d) Subsection (b) or (c) of this section does not prevent a district court or a bankruptcy court, in the interest of justice, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11. Such abstention, or a decision not to abstain, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
(e) The bankruptcy court in which a case under title 11 is commenced shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor, as of the commencement of such case.

The 1978 Act set forth the creation and composition of the bankruptcy court in 28 U.S.C. § 151 which stated:

(a) There shall be in each judicial district, as an adjunct to the district court for such district, a bankruptcy court which shall be a court of record known as the United States Bankruptcy Court for the district.
(b) Each bankruptcy court shall consist of the bankruptcy judge or judges for the district in regular active service. Justices or judges designated and assigned shall be competent to
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  • In re GF Corp., Bankruptcy No. 490-00621
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Ohio
    • March 7, 1991
    ...bankruptcy estate. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 71, 102 S.Ct. at 2871. In United Sec., Judge Cole, quoting from Acolyte Elec. Corp. v. City of New York, 69 B.R. 155, 175 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1986), summarized this point as follows: If the reasoning of the cases which broadly construe "core proceeding" ......

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