Acorn Auto Driving School, Inc. v. Board of Ed. of Leyden High School Dist. No. 212

• Decision Date: 01 February 1963
• Docket Number: No. 37409,37409
• Citation: 27 Ill.2d 93,187 N.E.2d 722
• Parties: ACORN AUTO DRIVING SCHOOL, INC., et al., Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF LEYDEN HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 212 et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 722

187 N.E.2d 722

27 Ill.2d 93

ACORN AUTO DRIVING SCHOOL, INC., et al., Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF LEYDEN HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 212 et

al., Appellees.

No. 37409.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 1, 1963.

Harry R. Booth, Chicago, for appellants.

Norman, Engelhardt, Zimmerman, Franke & Lauritzen, Osborn & Hershman, Richard J. Fitzgerald, Chicago (William R. Engelhardt, Jack W. Osborn, Ben Copple and Richard J. Fitzgerald, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

UNDERWOOD, Justice.

Plaintiffs, Acorn Auto Driving School, Inc., and Sam Davis, filed their complaint for an injunction permanently restraining the three defendant boards of education from continuing to provide driver training instruction or classes of any kind to persons over the age of 21. A motion to dismiss the complaint as amended was sustained, and plaintiffs electing to stand on the complaint as amended have appealed directly to this court since the validity of a statute is involved.

Plaintiff Davis is a substantial stockholder in and president of Acorn, an Illinois corporation licensed by the Secretary of State as a commercial driver training school under the statutory provisions therefor. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 95 1/2, par. 6-112 et seq.) He is also a licensed chauffeur in Illinois. The suit is brought on behalf of all other commercial driving schools in the Chicago metropolitan area who are allegedly suffering wrongful injury and damage due to the allegedly unlawful competition of the defendant school boards who have been since September, 1960, offering driver training instruction and classes to persons over 21. Each of the defendants is a high school district under the School Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 122). The complaint charges the conduct of such adult driver training classes by defendants is essentially a business or commercial activity, and the fees charged by defendants are considerably higher than the fees charged for other adult classes. Further, the defendants are alleged to have spent substantial sums of money to advertise these classes, and that defendant Thornton district offers to provide such instruction to persons living outside its district. The complaint charges this activity to be in violation of the provisions of the Driver Education Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 122, par. 27-24.1 et seq.); that plaintiffs and others similarly situated are suffering irreparable loss from such unlawful competition, and that such losses are destructive of their property rights in violation of the due- process clause of the Illinois constitution; that any rules or regulations issued by the Superintendent of Public Instruction conferring authority on defendants to provide driver education to persons over 21 are null and void; and that the provisions of any statute, including section 10-22.20 of the School Code of 1961 purporting to confer authority on defendants to furnish adult or driver education classes to persons over 21, are null and void and in violation of 'the due process provisions and equal protection clauses of The Constitution of the State of Illinois and that of the United States.' The complaint prays for injunctive relief and an adjudication that such operations by defendants are illegal and in violation of the laws of Illinois and 'the property rights of the plaintiffs and their rights of due process under the Constitution of the State of Illinois.'

The motion to dismiss filed by defendants which admits all facts properly pleaded in the complaint (Please v. Kendall, 391 Ill. 193, 63 N.E.2d 2; Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 110, par. 45) alleged that sections 10-22.20 and 27-24.2 of the School Code grant the power to defendants to conduct the driver training classes for adults and do not restrict such classes to persons between the ages of 15 and 21. The motion further alleges that the complaint charges no violation of the rules and regulations of the Superintendent of Public Instruction promulgated under section 27-24.8 of the School Code, and that since the State of Illinois reimburses defendants only for driver education for pupils between 15 and 21, plaintiffs have no standing as taxpayers to bring the suit.

The order of the circuit court of Cook County sustaining the motion to dismiss overruled plaintiffs' contention that section 10-22.20 of the School Code is unconstitutional and void in violation of article II, section 2, article III, article VIII, and article IX, section 3, of the Illinois constitution, S.H.A. or the due-process and equal protection clauses of the United States constitution, and found that section 10-22.20 is not uncertain, vague or indefinite or otherwise invalid as denying plaintiffs due process or unconstitutionally delegating legislative power to defendants in violation of article III of the Illinois constitution. The court further found section 10-22.20 confers authority on defendants to provide driver education to persons over 21, and that section 27-24.2 does not limit the power of defendants to provide the classes alleged by plaintiffs to be unlawful.

In 1927, the legislature provided that common school and high school districts were empowered 'To establish classes for the instruction of persons over twenty-one years of age, and to pay the necessary expenses of the same out of school funds of the district.' (Laws 1927, p. 817). This provision has been reenacted without substantial change at numerous legislative sessions since, until the present section 10-22.20 of the School Code of 1961 provides that such districts have the power: 'To establish classes for the instruction of persons over 21 years of age, and to pay the necessary expenses thereof out of school funds of the district. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section the board may make a tuition charge of the persons taking instruction in an amount not to exceed the cost of such program.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 122, par. 10-22.20.) The second sentence relating to a tuition charge was added in 1957. Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 122, par. 6-51.

The constitutionality of this section has never been passed on by this court, and plaintiff's contend that it is indefinite, vague and uncertain, constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, and violates the due-process clauses of the Illinois and Federal constitutions.

This court has held that a board of education, organized and existing under legislative enactment pursuant to section 1 of article VIII of the constitution of 1870, is a 'corporation or quasi corporation created nolens volens by the general law of the state to aid in the administration of the state government, and charged, as such, with duties purely governmental in character. * * * It is simply an agency of the state, having existence for the sole purpose of performing certain duties deemed necessary to the maintenance of an 'efficient system of free schools,' within the particular locality in its jurisdiction'. (Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 334, 335, 49 N.E. 536.) Section 10-2 of the School Code now provides that the directors of each district shall be a body politic and corporate; section 10-20, that the board has the duties enumerated in sections 10-20.1 through 10-20.19, and section 10-22, that the board shall have the powers specifically granted in section 10-22.1 through 10-22.34; nevertheless they have broad discretion in the use of those powers within the limits of the grant. Lindblad v. Board of Education, 221 Ill. 261, 271, 77 N.E. 450.

Plaintiffs contend that section 10-22.20 is indefinite, vague and uncertain, in that it fails to prescribe any specific standards by which anyone can determine what his rights are. They rely on the language of this court in People ex rel. Duffy v. Hurley, 402 Ill. 562, 85 N.E.2d 26, where, in considering certain legislation amending the City Civil Service Act, we said (p. 567, 85 N.E.2d p. 28): 'In our consideration of other statutes alleged to be illegal as unwarranted delegations of legislative power, we have held that an act, to be valid, must not be vague, indefinite and uncertain. As pointed out in Krebs v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 471, 56 N.E.2d 761, it must be complete when it leaves the legislature and be sufficiently explicit to advise everyone of what his rights are under the act and how he will be affected by its operation. Chicagoland Agencies v. Palmer, 364 Ill. 13, 2 N.E.2d 910. Statutes which are so incomplete, vague, indefinite and uncertain that men of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at their meaning and differ as to their application, have uniformly been declared unconstitutional as denying due process. Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N.E.2d 929, 104 A.L.R. 1435; Parks v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 360 Ill. 130, 195 N.E. 616. For a statute to be held valid the duty imposed by it must be prescribed in terms definite enough to serve as a guide to those who have the duty imposed upon them. Vallat v. Radium Dial Co., 360 Ill. 407, 196 N.E. 485, 99 A.L.R. 607.'

It is true that section 10-22.20, standing alone, cannot be said to prescribe a course of study for persons over 21 years of age, nor does it provide a formula for computing tuition charges, nor does it make the establishment of such classes mandatory. But it does grant the power to the board to establish such classes, pay for the expenses thereof, and determine what, if any, tuition shall be charged to the pupil. This section should not be considered by itself. It must be construed together with and in the light of all the other provisions of the School Code. (People ex rel. Knecht v. Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., 300 Ill. 218, 222, 133 N.E. 308; Moyer v. Board of Education, 391 Ill. 156, 162, 62 N.E.2d 802.) Plaintiffs argue that this construction would permit the school board to offer adult classes in every possible subject including college, university and professional courses, and to award professional or other...