Acosta-Mestre v. Hilton Intern. of Puerto Rico, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | ACOSTA-MESTRE,No. 97-2183,97-2183 |
| Citation | 156 F.3d 49 |
| Parties | , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,343 Antonio, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. HILTON INTERNATIONAL OF PUERTO RICO, INC., et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Carlos E. Rodriguez-Quesada, with whom Woods & Woods was on brief, for appellants.
Hector F. Oliveras, with whom Rafael A. Vila-Carrion and Pinto-Lugo & Rivera were on brief, for appellees.
Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL and CYR, Senior Circuit Judges.
This is a diversity action in which Antonio Acosta-Mestre ("Acosta") and his family sued Hilton International of Puerto Rico ("Hilton") and its insurer in the district court for negligence and products liability. While staying as a guest at the Caribe Hilton Hotel, Acosta was injured when a lounge chair, manufactured by Tropitone Furniture Company, Inc. ("Tropitone"), collapsed on his hand. Acosta raises several issues on appeal. He challenges the district court's denial of a motion to amend the complaint to add Tropitone as a defendant. Acosta also challenges the court's exclusion of testimony from his proffered expert witness and asserts that the court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Finally, Acosta contends that the district court erred in certain evidentiary rulings. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
On April 14, 1995, Acosta and his family were guests of the Caribe Hilton Hotel in San Juan, Puerto Rico. While sunbathing in the hotel's enclosed beach area, Acosta reached back to adjust his chaise lounge. The back of the chair suddenly collapsed, severing a portion of Acosta's left ring finger.
Acosta and his family sued the Caribe Hilton's parent company and its insurer in the federal district court for the District of Puerto Rico, invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The complaint alleged causes of action for negligence based upon improper maintenance of the chaise lounge, strict products liability based upon an alleged design defect, and strict products liability based upon a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and sought damages in the amount of $1.85 million.
Fifteen months after filing the complaint, Acosta requested leave to amend the complaint to add Tropitone, the chair's maker, as a defendant. The district court denied the motion in an unpublished memorandum order on the grounds that Acosta had failed to justify waiting for fifteen months before seeking to add the chair's manufacturer as a defendant, and that allowing such an amendment now would create unreasonable further delay.
Prior to trial, Hilton moved to exclude the testimony of Acosta's expert witness, Dr. Kenneth Soderstrom, a mechanical engineer who was to testify in support of Acosta's strict products liability claims. Hilton also filed a motion to strike Dr. Soderstrom as an expert witness on the ground that under Puerto Rico law Acosta could not recover against Hilton on any theory of strict products liability, rendering Dr. Soderstrom's testimony on the subject irrelevant. On the fourth day of trial, the district court granted the motion to exclude Dr. Soderstrom's testimony. It also granted Hilton's motion for judgment as a matter of law as to those claims, leaving only the negligence claim to be tried to a jury. 1
At trial, the district court ruled against Acosta on two evidentiary issues now appealed. First, the court excluded the testimony of Hilton's swimming and tennis director, Naomi Nobel. Second, the court excluded a "Notarial Act" offered in support of several photographs, taken by Acosta, of Hilton chaise lounges.
On the surviving negligence count, the jury found for defendants. The district court entered judgment and denied Acosta's motion for a new trial which was based, in part, on Acosta's discovery of purportedly "new" evidence. This appeal followed.
In denying Acosta's motion to amend the complaint to name Tropitone as an additional defendant, the district court reasoned that the motion to amend, which Acosta filed near the close of discovery and after three previous extensions of the discovery deadline had been granted, was tardy, and that Acosta lacked any sufficient excuse for delaying so long before moving to amend. We review the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint "for an abuse of discretion, and defer to the district court if any adequate reason for the denial is apparent on the record." Grant v. News Group Boston, Inc., 55 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1995).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a litigant may amend a pleading once as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is filed and subsequently by the parties' consent or "by leave of court." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). While "leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires," id., "the liberal amendment policy prescribed by Rule 15(a) does not mean that leave will be granted in all cases." 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487, at 611 (2d ed.1990). Among the adequate reasons for denying leave to amend are "undue delay" in filing the motion and "undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); see also Grant, 55 F.3d at 5. Here defendant did not consent to the motion, and we find no abuse of discretion in the court's conclusion that Acosta's request for leave to file a second amended complaint was preceded by undue delay.
Acosta filed the initial complaint on September 20, 1995, and an amended complaint on November 22, 1995. On December 17, 1996, fifteen months after the initial complaint had been filed, and over a year after the first amendment, Acosta filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint to add the chair's manufacturer, Tropitone, as a defendant. By that time, discovery was set to conclude in one month, on January 17, 1997. In addition, the court had approved the parties' proposed pre-trial order just a week before, on December 5, 1996.
Hence by the time of the motion for leave to amend, nearly all the case's pre-trial work was complete. According to the district court's undisputed estimate, allowing the motion would have resulted in at least an additional four months of discovery and would have delayed trial by at least an additional twelve months. These consequential delays put the ball in Acosta's court, for when "considerable time has elapsed between the filing of the complaint and the motion to amend, the movant has the burden of showing some 'valid reason for his neglect and delay.' " Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 933 (1st Cir.1983) (quoting Hayes v. New England Millwork Distribs., Inc., 602 F.2d 15, 19-20 (1st Cir.1979)). The district court could reasonably determine that Acosta failed to carry this burden.
On appeal, Acosta argues: (1) that mere delay is not reason enough to deny a motion for leave to amend; (2) that Hilton's "lack of action forced [Acosta] to wait before amending the complaint"; and (3) that it is only just to allow the addition of Tropitone, who Acosta argues is likely liable for his injuries.
The first point is contrary to Supreme Court and circuit precedent holding that, especially where allowing the amendment will cause further delay in the proceedings, "undue delay" in seeking the amendment may be a sufficient basis for denying leave to amend. Foman, 371 U.S. at 178, 83 S.Ct. 227. See Grant, 55 F.3d at 5 (); Stepanischen, 722 F.2d at 933 (); Hayes, 602 F.2d at 19 ().
Even if Acosta were correct that late filing of the proposed amendment was not per se a sufficient reason to deny a motion for leave to amend, the prejudice to Hilton resulting from a re-opening of discovery with additional costs, a significant postponement of trial, and a likely major alteration in trial strategy and tactics due to the presence of the manufacturer of the collapsing chair in addition to the hotel at which Acosta was a guest, fully support the district court's ruling. See, e.g., Grant, 55 F.3d at 6 ().
Acosta's second point, cursorily argued, seems to rest on the theory that Hilton itself may have intended to implead Tropitone as a third-party defendant. Even if this allegation were supported by the record--which it is not--we would reject Acosta's suggestion that a party can shift its responsibility for its own pleadings to its opponent. Acosta's counsel from the outset included claims based upon an alleged product design defect and an implied breach of warranty, indicating that he was aware, or should have been aware, when filing the initial complaint that the manufacturer of the chair was a potential defendant. If the chair was badly designed, as alleged, the manufacturer, not the hotel, was the more obvious defendant. Acosta betrayed actual knowledge of Tropitone's potential liability as early as June 14, 1996, when, in a motion to extend the discovery deadline, he asserted that Hilton would file a third-party complaint against Tropitone over an alleged defect in the chair. Armed with this knowledge, nothing prevented Acosta, the master of his complaint, from then moving to name Tropitone as a defendant--other than unwarranted reliance on his adversary.
Finally, Acosta's contention that he should, in fairness, now be allowed to amend the complaint in light of Tropitone's alleged...
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