Acosta v. Bradley
| Decision Date | 20 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 1:20-CV-2234 |
| Parties | ARIEL ACOSTA, Petitioner, v. ERIC BRADLEY, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
The petitioner, a federal prisoner, invites this court to review and revise the sentence credit calculation done by the Federal Bureau of Prisons in his case. Specifically, Acosta seeks credit against his federal sentence for some 17 months and 18 days he spent in custody serving a state sentence while being held in a federal facility awaiting the resolution of his federal case. (Doc. 1). Having conducted this review, we find no error in that calculation, which properly allocates time previously served by Acosta between his various state and federal sentences. Therefore, this petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied.
In this case, the interplay of state and federal sentences that forms the basis for this sentence credit calculation began on October 19, 2014, when it is alleged that Acosta participated in several robberies. (Doc. 7-1, at 7). On July 5, 2017, Acosta was convicted of two counts of robbery and a separate charge of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance relating to an August 20, 2016 incident in which it was alleged that Acosta was selling marijuana while awaiting the resolution of his state robbery charges. (Doc. 9-1). Acosta was sentenced that same day by the Bronx County Supreme Court to a two to four-year term of imprisonment on his state robbery charges and a 15-day term of imprisonment on his state drug possession charges. The state court ordered these sentences to run concurrently. ).
Following these state court convictions, on July 20, 2017, Acosta was transferred to the New York State Department of Corrections to serve state sentences. . Two weeks later, on August 9, 2017, Acosta was temporarily taken into the custody of the United States Marshals Service pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to face federal drug trafficking and firearms charges. . Acosta remained held by federal authorities while serving his state sentences until November 13, 2018, when he was sentenced by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to a 160-month term of imprisonment for Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine and Unlicensed Dealing in Firearms. . On January 24, 2019, Acosta was then returned to state custody with a detainer tocomplete the service of the state sentence. . Two weeks later, on February 7, 2019, Acosta was paroled from the New York Department of Corrections and was remanded to federal custody to serve his federal sentence. .
Once he was remanded to federal custody, the Bureau of Prisons computed Acosta's federal sentence credit, finding that his sentence commenced on February 7, 2019, the date he was paroled from the state, with a projected release date of June 18, 2030, with no additional jail time credit. . In reaching this sentence credit calculation, federal officials determined that the 17 months and 18 days at issue in this case were properly credited to Acosta's state sentence, and therefore could not also be credited against the federal term of imprisonment imposed upon Acosta.
Dissatisfied with this sentence calculation, Acosta filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1). In his habeas corpus petition, Acosta argues that he was entitled to credit for some 17 months and 18 days he spent in custody serving a state sentence while being held in a federal facility awaiting the resolution of his federal case. This petition has been briefed by the parties and is now ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be denied, since the Bureau of Prisons has accurately calculated the sentence credit that Acosta is entitled to receive on thefacts of this case in accordance with the law that governs such credits.
A. This Petition Fails on its Merits.
This petition invites this court to review a sentence credit calculation conducted by the Bureau of Prisons for an inmate who was serving both state and federal sentences. There are two component parts to the legal analysis we are called upon to perform in a case such as this where we examine a BOP sentence credit determination. It is well settled that: Binford v. United States, 436 F.3d 1252, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2006). As this Court has aptly observed: "Computing a federal sentence requires two separate determinations: first, when the sentence commences; and, second, to what extent the defendant in question may receive credit for any time already spent in custody." Chambers v. Holland, 920 F. Supp. 618, 621 (M.D. Pa. April 4, 1996) (quoting United States v. Smith, 812 F. Supp. 368, 370 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1993) (internal quotations omitted).
Each of these legal determinations, in turn, is made against the backdrop of a specific statutory and regulatory system for calculating credit for time served byfederal prisoners. A key component of this system involves the delegation of authority for initial sentence computations. By law:
The Attorney General is responsible for computing federal sentences for all offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987, United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992) and 18 U.S.C. § 3585, and has delegated that authority to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. 28 C.F.R. § 0.96 (1992). . . . [Thus], [t]he decision to grant or deny credit for time served prior to the date of sentencing vests initially in the BOP, not the sentencing judge.
Chambers, 920 F. Supp. at 621.
However, as the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992), in calculating credit for time served, the BOP is guided by statute; namely, 18 U.S.C. § 3585, which provides that:
18 U.S.C. § 3585.
This statute and case law construing the statute then guide us in addressing thetwo questions that lie at the heart of this habeas petition: first, when did Acosta's sentence commence; and, second, to what extent may Acosta receive credit for any time already spent in custody?
With respect to the first of these questions regarding when Acosta's sentence commenced, it is clear that "[a] sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). Therefore, as a general rule:
A federal sentence commences when the defendant is received by the Attorney General for service of his . . . sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). See alsoUnited States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1118-19 (3d Cir.1990). As a result, a federal sentence [typically] cannot begin to run earlier than on the date on which it is imposed. SeeUnited States v. Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir.1998).
Taylor v. Holt, 309 F. App'x 591, 592-93 (3d Cir. 2009). Applying this straightforward guidance in this case, the BOP correctly concluded that Acosta's sentence commenced when he was released on state parole and taken into federal custody.
Section 3585 and case law construing this statute also define for us the answer to the second question we must examine: to what extent may Acosta receive credit for any time already spent in custody against his federal sentence? In this regard, we begin with the proposition that Acosta may not receive "credit for time spent in state custody prior to sentencing in a federal case because 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) prohibitsthis double credit." Taylor, 309 F. App'x at 593 (citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337 ).
It is also clear beyond any dispute that a defendant like Acosta, who is serving a state sentence but is taken temporarily from state custody to federal court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, does not come into federal "custody" for purposes of calculating prison sentence credit under § 3585. Indeed, courts have repeatedly examined this question and consistently held that temporarily holding a prisoner on a writ does not equate to custody for purposes of calculating sentence credit. See, e.g., Rashid v. Quintana, No. 09-4079, 2010 WL 1141386 (3d Cir. March 25, 2010); Taylor, 309 F. App'x 591; United States v. Hayes, 535 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2008); D'Amario v. Zenk, 131 F. App'x 381 (3d Cir. 2005); Thomas v. Whalen, 962 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1992); Chambers, 920 F. Supp. 618; Miller v. United States, 826 F. Supp. 636 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 1993); United States v. Smith, 812 F. Supp. 368 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1993); United States v. Killion, 788 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Kan. March 26, 1992). Accordingly, these cases uniformly reject efforts by federal prisoners to secure jail-time credit for periods in which they were held temporarily in federal court on a federal writ while...
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