Acosta v. Local 101, Transp. Workers Union of Am. Afl-Cio

• Decision Date: 10 September 2018
• Docket Number: 18-cv-319-ARR-RML
• Citation: 339 F.Supp.3d 80
• Parties: R. Alexander ACOSTA, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL 101, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA AFL-CIO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

339 F.Supp.3d 80

R. Alexander ACOSTA, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff,

v.LOCAL 101, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA AFL-CIO, Defendant.

18-cv-319-ARR-RML

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed September 10, 2018

Seth D. Eichenholtz, United States Attorneys Office, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff.

Arthur Z. Schwartz, Advocates for Justice, Chartered Attorneys, New York, NY, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

ROSS, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, the Secretary of Labor, instituted this action under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("the LMRDA"). The lawsuit arises from a recent officer election conducted by Local 101, Transport Workers Union of America AFL-CIO ("Local 101"). Baron Marquis, a member of the union in good standing at the time of the election, was disqualified as a candidate for president after he failed to timely file a letter of acceptance¹ with Local 101 confirming his nomination and intent to run. He protested his disqualification to several internal union administrative bodies before filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor. Following an investigation, the Secretary of Labor brought this suit, alleging that the union's decision to disqualify Marquis was an unreasonable application of a facially reasonable election rule. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment with respect to whether the union's disqualification of Marquis was the result of a "reasonable qualification uniformly imposed," 29 U.S.C. § 481(e), or whether it impermissibly restricted the candidacy pool and denied members "democratic choice in selecting union officers," Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. and in Support of Pl.'s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. 7, ECF No. 18 ("Pl.'s Mem. of Law"). For the reasons that follow, Local 101's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and the Secretary of Labor's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts set forth an undisputed account of the events leading up to and immediately following the election by acclamation held by Local 101 on February 23, 2017.²

Defendant Local 101 is a local labor organization recognized by the LMRDA. See Stip. of Facts ¶ 5. At the time of the election, Local 101 represented "approximately 1600 active and retired members who were employed by three utility employers in Brooklyn and Queens." Id. ¶ 6. Pursuant to its bylaws, Local 101 conducts officer elections every three years for the purpose of electing a president, a vice president, a recording secretary, and a financial secretary-treasurer. The Official By-Laws of the Transport Workers Union Local 101, AFL-CIO , Article II: Officers Ex. A, ECF No. 16-3 ("Bylaws"). Constance Bradley was nearing the end of a three-year term as the union's president in early 2017 at the time that Local 101 was preparing to conduct the election in question. See Stip. of Facts ¶ 23.

I. The 2017 Election

After convening an election committee ("the committee") to develop governing rules for the 2017 election, Local 101 mailed a notice outlining the nomination and election process to all union members on January 10, 2017. Id. ¶ 8. The notice set out comprehensive instructions for members to follow if they were interested in running for one of the officer positions in the upcoming officer election, scheduled for March 23, 2017. Specifically, it provided that the "nomination period would run from February 6 through February 10, and that nominations could only be made by completing nominating petition forms provided by the union." Id. ¶ 9. The forms required candidates to collect the "original signatures of one hundred members in good standing" during the open nomination period, and to file their signed and completed petitions with the election committee by 6:00 p.m. on February 10, 2017. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. The notice stated that the committee would review all petitions and signatures to ensure compliance with the relevant rules, and would subsequently notify candidates of their eligibility to run by mailing them an "official [n]otice of [n]omination." Id. ¶¶ 23, 12. Further, it informed members that all candidates deemed eligible to run would be provided with a notice of acceptance form, which they would be instructed to sign and return "no later than noon on February 22, 2017." Id. ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks omitted); ¶¶ 24–25.

Only candidates who completed this final step—returning a signed letter formally accepting the nomination by the deadline—would be allowed to run in the election.³ See id. ¶ 29–31. If more than one candidate returned a signed letter of acceptance for a given position, Local 101 would organize a contested election in partnership with the American Arbitration Association. See Local 101 Transport Workers Union of America 2017 Notice of Nominations and Election, Official Election Rules 2 Ex. B, ECF No. 16-3 ("Official Election Rules"). For the 2017 election, ballots were to be mailed to all union members in good standing at their last known address on March 1, 2017. Id. Return ballots completed by voting members would be accepted until 5:00 p.m. on March 22, 2017, and votes were to be counted on March 23, 2017 at 9 a.m. by "representatives of the American Arbitration Association." Id. If, however, only one candidate was eligible for each position, Local 101 would not mail election ballots to members and would instead conduct an uncontested election, or election by acclamation. Id. In that case, the chairman of the election board was to "cast one ballot for all uncontested candidates who are deemed eligible to run for office," and subsequently declare the uncontested candidates the winners of the election. Id.⁴

Baron Marquis first indicated his intent to run in the 2017 election on February 3. Stip. of Facts. ¶ 15. He personally visited the union office to ask for the nomination petition forms so that he could begin collecting the signatures he needed to run. Id. Though the notice mailed to all union members indicated that the nomination period would not begin running until February 6, 2017, committee member Yolanda Daniels provided Marquis with the forms he requested on February 3. Id. ¶ 16. However, she asked that he wait until February 6 to begin collecting signatures. Id. At the same time that she gave him the petition forms, Daniels erroneously handed Marquis the "[n]otice of [n]omination form, which was to be mailed to the candidates after the [c]ommittee reviewed the adequacy of the candidates' nominating petitions and determined the candidate's eligibility based on the number of eligible signatures collected on the petition." Id. ¶ 17 (emphasis added). Daniels and Marquis both signed the nomination form on February 3, before Marquis had collected any signatures supporting his candidacy. Id. ¶ 18.

On February 10, Marquis returned his petition—now complete with the requisite number of member signatures—to the union office. Id. ¶ 19. Upon receipt of his signed petition, Celeste Streeter, chair of the election committee, notified Marquis that the prior notice of nomination form that he had signed on February 3 had been completed in error, and that he would be receiving a new nomination form—along with the required letter of acceptance form—in the mail after the committee determined that his signatures were in proper form and that he was a qualified candidate. Id. ¶ 20. Apparently aware that the committee required all candidates to return a signed letter of acceptance form before their names could be placed on the ballot, Marquis requested "to sign the [l]etter of [a]cceptance when turning in his petition, but was told that he would have to sign the copy sent to him by [c]ertified [m]ail after his signatures were submitted and he was found qualified to run." Id. ¶ 33.

The committee met on February 13 to review all applications received. Id. ¶ 21. During that meeting, the committee determined that Marquis was eligible to run in the election. Though he had disregarded Daniels's request that he wait until February 6 to begin collecting signatures, see id. ¶ 16, "[t]he [c]ommittee did not discount [the two] signatures gathered before February 6, 2017."⁵ Id. ¶ 22. During the same February 13 meeting, the committee also reviewed the petition and signatures submitted by Constance Bradley, the incumbent president, and "determined that she was eligible to run for office." Id. ¶ 23. The following day, the committee mailed Marquis a new notice of nomination form (replacing the one previously provided in error by Daniels), which "inform[ed] him that he was nominated to run for the office of [p]resident in the election." Id. ¶ 23. In the same mailing, the committee included a blank letter of acceptance form, along with "instructions to sign and return the form to the [e]lection [c]ommittee by noon on February 22, 2017." Id. ¶ 24. The notice of nomination form stated clearly that all candidates must return the "enclosed form"—referring to the blank letter of acceptance—"by noon, February 22, 2017," and warned candidates not to mail the form back, as it needed to be in the office—not postmarked—by that date and time. Notice of Nomination Ex. D, ECF No. 15-2. Marquis received the forms in the mail on February 17. Stip. of Facts ¶ 26.

Incumbent candidates, including Constance Bradley, received their notice of nomination and letter of acceptance forms by hand, rather than mail, on February 16, before a general membership meeting. Id. ¶ 27. Bradley submitted her signed letter of acceptance in person the following day, February 17—several days before the February 22 deadline. Id. ¶ 28. Marquis, the only challenger who had submitted a nomination petition for any officer position, did not return the letter of acceptance form until Saturday, February 25—three days after the deadline. Id. ¶ 32. At that time, the union office was not open, so Marquis slid his letter under the...