Acosta v. Paragon Contractors Corp.
Decision Date | 13 March 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 17-4025,17-4025 |
Citation | 884 F.3d 1225 |
Parties | R. Alexander ACOSTA, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PARAGON CONTRACTORS CORPORATION; Brian Jessop, individually, Defendants-Appellants, and James Jessop, individually, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Rick J. Sutherland (M. Christopher Moon, with him on the briefs), of Jackson Lewis PLLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellants.
Maria Van Buren, Counsel for Child Labor and Special FLSA Projects (Nicholas C. Geale, Acting Solicitor of Labor; Jennifer S. Brand, Associate Solicitor, and Paul L. Frieden, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, with her on the brief), United States Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before LUCERO, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
But we reverse the district court’s appointment of a special master.
The Southern Utah Pecan Ranch owned over 100 acres of pecan trees in Utah. Through 2007, the Ranch had an informal arrangement with the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. After the Ranch harvested pecans from the trees, the Church could send community members to gather the pecans that had fallen to the ground. The gatherers consisted largely of children, who gave half of the fallen pecans to the Church and half to the Ranch.
In 2008, the Ranch began a series of year-long contracts with Paragon. Under these contracts, Paragon obtained responsibility for operating the pecan grove and harvesting the pecans. Paragon received 70% of the proceeds from the sale of the pecans, and the Ranch received 30%.
Though Paragon was to manage the pecan grove, the Church continued to send children to gather the fallen pecans. Paragon hired Mr. Dale Barlow to fulfill the contract with the Ranch. The Church identified Mr. Barlow as the contact person for the gathering operation, and he participated in organizing and managing the Church’s efforts to gather the fallen pecans.
In 2012, the Department of Labor investigated Paragon and Mr. Jessop, concluding that they had violated the child-labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 212. This conclusion led the Department of Labor to allege a violation of the 2007 injunction. This allegation ultimately led to the finding of contempt.
Paragon and Mr. Jessop deny violating the 2007 injunction. On this issue, we review the district court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ford , 514 F.3d 1047, 1051 (10th Cir. 2008). The court abuses its discretion by relying on an error of law or reaching a clearly erroneous finding of fact. Id.
To prevail, the Department of Labor needed to prove by clear and convincing evidence "[1] that a valid court order existed, [2] that the defendant[s] had knowledge of the order, and [3] that the defendant[s] disobeyed the order." F.T.C. v. Kuykendall , 371 F.3d 745, 756-57 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Constr. Co. , 159 F.3d 1311, 1315 (10th Cir. 1998) ) (alterations in original). Paragon and Mr. Jessop do not dispute the first two elements, focusing instead on the third element.
The 2007 injunction prohibited Paragon and Mr. Jessop from employing minors "under conditions constituting oppressive child labor." Appellant’s App’x at 17. Paragon and Mr. Jessop do not question the oppressiveness of the labor. Instead, they make two arguments:
We reject both contentions.
The first question is whether the children were volunteers rather than employees. We review de novo the district court’s determination that the children were "employees," which presents an issue of statutory interpretation. Johns v. Stewart , 57 F.3d 1544, 1557 (10th Cir. 1995).
The statutory definition of "employee" is "any individual employed by an employer."
29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). And "employ" is defined as "to suffer or permit to work." Id. § 203(g). These definitions are "exceedingly broad." Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor , 471 U.S. 290, 295, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
Paragon and Mr. Jessop contend that the children are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act based on (1) the Supreme Court’s opinion in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor , 471 U.S. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985), and (2) the statutory food-bank exception, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(5). We reject both contentions.
In Alamo Foundation , the Supreme Court discussed the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s coverage of employees. The Court noted that the scope of "employee" is "exceedingly broad" but does contain limits. 471 U.S. at 295, 105 S.Ct. 1953. For example, the definition of an "employee" does not include "[a]n individual who, ‘without promise or expectation of compensation, but solely for his personal purpose or pleasure, worked in activities carried on by other persons[.]’ " Id. (quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. , 330 U.S. 148, 152, 67 S.Ct. 639, 91 L.Ed. 809 (1947) ).
Id. According to Paragon and Mr. Jessop, the children freely chose to gather pecans in order to help the Church and the community. Paragon and Mr. Jessop point to testimony from some of the children that they viewed themselves as volunteers and chose whether to participate in the harvest.
In addition, one child stated that if she had not worked, she would have lost her family and been kicked out of the community. Likewise, parents testified that they had sent their children to the harvest because of pressure from the Church, and one father expressed fear that his family would be separated if he had disobeyed. In light of the testimony, the district court’s finding of coercion was not clearly erroneous. Given this finding, we conclude that the children did not choose to work for their own "personal purpose or pleasure"; they worked because of coercion.
Paragon and Mr. Jessop respond that even if the children had been coerced, the coercion had come from the Church rather than Paragon. But the Alamo Foundation standard does not address the source of the coercion.2 Alamo Foundation states only that individuals working for their own "personal purpose or pleasure" are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. (quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. , 330 U.S. 148, 152, 67 S.Ct. 639, 91 L.Ed. 809 (1947) ). Under this standard, the children were not gathering pecans solely for their own personal purpose or pleasure. Therefore, Alamo Foundation does not support reversal.3
Paragon and Mr. Jessop also invoke 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(5), known as the "food-bank exception," which precludes consideration as "employees" when workers "volunteer their services solely for humanitarian purposes to private non-profit food banks and ... receive from the food banks groceries." Based on this statute, Paragon and Mr. Jessop argue that the children gathered pecans for the benefit of the Bishop’s Storehouse of the Church. For this argument, we may assume (without deciding) that the Bishop’s Storehouse constitutes a non-profit food bank. See Susan Harthill, Shining the Spotlight on Unpaid Law-Student Workers , 38 Vt. L. Rev. 555, 582 (2014) (). Even with this assumption, the argument would fail because the children did not "volunteer" their services.
The Fair Labor Standards Act does not define the term "volunteer." We therefore consider the term’s ordinary meaning. See Conrad v. Phone Directories Co. , 585 F.3d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 2009). Dictionaries provide a helpful basis for determining this meaning. Jones v. C.I.R. , 560 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009). The term "volunteer" is commonly defined as an offer to work without solicitation, compulsion, constraint, or influence of another. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2564 (1993); see also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1941-42 (5th ed. 2011) (defining "volunteer" as "[t]o give...
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