Acosta v. Special Police Force Corp., CIVIL NO. 15–1506 (GAG)

Decision Date20 February 2018
Docket NumberCIVIL NO. 15–1506 (GAG)
Citation295 F.Supp.3d 47
Parties R. Alexander ACOSTA, Secretary of Labor, United States Dept. of Labor, Plaintiff, v. SPECIAL POLICE FORCE CORP., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Susan B. Jacobs, Andrew M. Katz, United States Department of Labor Office of the Solicitor, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Ismael Rodriguez–Izquierdo, Ismael Rodriguez Izquierdo Law Office, Benjamin Guzman–Guzman, San Juan, PR, Jesus Santiago–Malavet, Santurce, PR, for Defendants.

Freddy De Jesus, Carolina, PR, pro se.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPI, United States District Judge

Secretary of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor, R. Alexander Acosta1 ("Plaintiff") sued Defendants Hector Rivera Ortiz ("Rivera"), and Special Police Force Corp. ("SPF") (collectively "Defendants"), under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. ("FLSA" or "Act"), alleging minimum wage, overtime, and record keeping violations under the FLSA. (Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 33–37).2 Plaintiff moved for summary judgment against Rivera and SPF, (Docket No. 55), both of whom opposed the motion. (Docket Nos. 71; 85). Plaintiffs replied. (Docket Nos. 75; 101). SPF moved to amend its opposition, which the Court allowed for a narrow purpose. (Docket Nos. 94; 109). SPF filed an amended opposition and memorandum in support. (Docket Nos. 114; 115).

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment arguing that Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay minimum wage and overtime compensation to their employees, as well as failing to make, keep, and preserve certain wage and hour records for employees. (Docket No. 55 at 1). Plaintiff also seeks liquidated damages and a prospective injunction. Id. In the event liquidated damages are not awarded, Plaintiff requests an injunction to restrain Defendants from continuing to withhold unpaid minimum wage and overtime compensation. Id. at 1–2.

After disposing of preliminary matters involving SPF's amended opposition and Local Rule 56, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment at Docket No. 55.

I. SPF's Amended Opposition

As an initial matter, the Court addresses an issue with Defendant SPF's amended opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment on April 6, 2017. SPF requested and received multiple extensions of time to respond, even though it failed to meet the initial response deadline. (Docket Nos. 55; 64; 66; 80; 83). When SPF moved to amend its opposition, it asked to do so specifically to withdraw its argument that it did not generate more than $500,000 in annual gross income ("AGI"). (Docket No. 94 at 2). The Court granted SPF's motion to amend and allowed SPF to file the amended motion in opposition to summary only with respect to SPF's withdrawal of their argument that they did not generate more than $500,000 in AGI. (Docket No. 109). SPF, however, chose to take the opportunity to add facts, arguments, and citations not included in their original opposition and not related to the issue of AGI. In addition, SPF added seven exhibits not originally included with their memorandum of support. (Docket Nos. 86; 115).

The Court granted SPF's request solely to withdraw its argument as to AGI; this was not an opportunity for SPF to surreptitiously include facts, arguments, and citations it did not manage to include on its first try. Because the Court was unequivocal in its order as to the content to be amended—particularly in light of the many extensions SPF received—the Court disregards all alterations made by SPF in its amended opposition, with the exception of the withdrawal of SPF's argument that it did not generate more than $500,000 in AGI. Further, the Court will not consider any of the additional material presented in Docket Nos. 115–3–115–9.

II. Plaintiff's Objections to Defendants' Statements of Uncontested Facts

Plaintiff argues that Rivera and SPF failed to properly deny or controvert Plaintiff's statement of material facts and further, that they failed to properly support their own statements of material facts. (Docket Nos. 75 at 1–3; 101 at 1–4). The Court agrees.

At the summary judgment stage, parties must follow Local Rule 56. Section (c) states that "[a] party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts." L. CV. R. 56(c). This statement "shall admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts ." Id. (emphasis added). Each denial and qualification must be supported by a record citation. Id.

In addition to allowing an opposing party to admit, deny, or qualify the moving party's facts, the opposing party may submit additional facts "in a separate section." Id. Section (e) provides that the Court may "disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material" and notes that the Court has "no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statement of facts." L. CV. R. 56(e).

If a party improperly controverts the facts, Local Rule 56 allows the Court to treat the opposing party's facts as uncontroverted; the First Circuit has consistently held that litigants disregard Local Rule 56 at their own risk. See Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007).

A. Defendant Rivera's Opposition

Rivera, in his opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, fails to "admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts." L. CV. R. 56(c). Rivera's admissions, denials, and qualifications use a separate numbering system, with almost no reference to the numbered paragraphs in Plaintiff's statement of material facts. (Docket Nos. 55–3; 71–1).3 Litigants ignore Local Rule 56 "at their peril." Caban Hernandez, 486 F.3d at 7. This rule serves the enormously important purpose of "focusing a district court's attention on what is—and what is not—genuinely controverted." Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 2006). The Court, in its discretion, finds that Rivera's failure to conform to this vital rule warrants deeming Plaintiff's statement of fact unopposed by Rivera, and accepting the stated facts as true.

The other additional facts submitted by Rivera in Docket No. 71–1—with the exception of paragraphs 49 and 50—are unsupported by record citations. Local Rule 56(e) allows the Court to "disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material," and that is precisely what the Court will do here. L. Cv. R. 56(e). All paragraphs except 49 and 50 of Rivera's additional statement of facts are hereby disregarded.

B. Defendant SPF's Opposition

SPF, in its amended opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, also fails to "admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts." L. CV. R. 56(c). SPF's admissions, denials, and qualifications use a separate numbering system. (Docket Nos. 55–3; 115–1). The only paragraph that correctly references Plaintiff's statement of material facts is paragraph four—a paragraph which SPF does not dispute. (Docket Nos. 55–2 ¶ 4; 115–1 ¶ 4). The Court, in its discretion, finds that SPF's failure to conform to this vital rule warrants deeming of the rest of Plaintiff's statement of fact unopposed by SPF, and accepting its stated facts as true.

The additional facts submitted by SPF in Docket No. 115–1 require further discussion. As noted above, the Court will not entertain amendments—including the addition of citations—other than those related to SPF's withdrawal of its argument that it did not generate more than $500,000 in gross annual income. This being the case, the only un-amended paragraphs with proper record citations are paragraphs 53 and 54. (Docket Nos. 86–2 ¶¶ 54–55; 115–1 ¶¶ 53–54). Because Local Rule 56(e) allows the Court to "disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material," all paragraphs other than paragraphs 53 and 54 of SPF's additional statement of facts are hereby disregarded. L. CV. R. 56(e).

These rules are critically important; they "ease the district court's operose task and ... prevent parties from unfairly shifting the burdens of litigation to the court." Caban Hernandez, 486 F.3d at 8. Counsel for Rivera and SPF are admonished to adhere to them in future or risk consequences similar to those imposed here.

III. Relevant Factual Background

Plaintiff, Rivera, and SPF's statements of material uncontested facts,4 credited only to the extent either admitted or properly supported by record citations in accordance with Local Rule 56 and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovants, reveal the following undisputed material facts:

SPF is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with its principal office and place of business in Puerto Rico, where it engaged in the business of providing security services. (PSUMF ¶ 1). Rivera resided in Puerto Rico during the period covered by the complaint. (PSUMF ¶ 2). A substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in Puerto Rico. (PSUMF ¶ 3).

SPF regulated the employment of all persons employed by the corporation, and acted directly and indirectly in the corporation's interest in relation to the employees during the period covered by the Complaint. (PSUMF ¶ 4; SSUMF ¶ 4). SPF employed security guards who handled, sold, or otherwise worked on goods or materials that had been moved in or produced for commerce, such as firearms and vehicles. (PSUMF ¶ 5). SPF's annual gross volume of sales made or...

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