Acting Director, Dept. of Forests & Parks v. Walker
| Decision Date | 10 May 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 369,369 |
| Citation | 385 A.2d 806,39 Md.App. 298 |
| Parties | ACTING DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF FORESTS AND PARKS, etc. v. Thomas J. WALKER, Jr., et al., Trustees. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Carl H. Lehmann, Sp. Atty., Baltimore, with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen. and Nolan H. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief, for appellant.
Michael P. Crocker, Baltimore, with whom were Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, on brief, for appellees.
On 20 April 1972, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the appellant, the Department of Forests and Parks (the State) 1 filed a petition for condemnation of certain land held in trust by Thomas J. Walker, Jr. and George B. Woelfel, Jr., the appellees (owners). On 9 November 1973, the State sought and obtained an ex parte order permitting it to enter the land "for the purpose of construction of an armory." Thereafter, according to the owners, the State survey crews staked out an armory on the land. On 28 November 1973, a jury returned an inquisition 2 in the amount of $1,224,000. On that date, judgment nisi was entered. 3 Thereafter the State began construction. Judgment absolute was entered on 20 December 1973. 4 On 31 May 1974, the Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by the State, 5 holding that the State had waived its right to appeal when it entered upon and took possession of the owners' land.
In a series of letters, the owners requested the State to pay a "fair rate" of interest on the condemnation award, from 9 November 1973 to the date of payment, and the State refused to pay any interest. On 24 July 1974, the State deposited the amount of the award with the court. 6 No funds were deposited for the payment of interest. On 6 September 1974, the owners withdrew the deposited funds pursuant to a court order which authorized the withdrawal "without prejudice to any and all claims of the (owners) for unpaid interest due for the State's possession of the property herein condemned and/or upon the judgment rendered herein."
On 22 December 1975, as a further proceeding in the condemnation case, the owners filed a "motion for summary judgment for delay damages." This motion, as later amended, sought damages of $82,017.52, (Md.Ann.Code, art. 95, § 22 )." It additionally sought damages of $12,802.29, "the amount of investment return that the State itself has received, during the period between July 24, 1974 (when said $82,017.52 amount of delay damages or detention money was due to have been paid along with the $1,224,000) and (31 January 1977) . . . by investing, rather than paying the defendants, the said $82,017.52." On 15 April 1977, Judge John N. Maguire entered an order awarding the owners $94,819.81 in damages and costs. This appeal is from that order. We shall reverse. 7
Article III, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution provides:
"The General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to be taken for public use, without just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation." (Emphasis added.)
Maryland Real Property Code Ann. § 12-104(a) 8 provides:
"The damages to be awarded for the taking of land is its fair market value."
The owners do not contend that the jury awarded them less than the fair market value of their land. Rather, they maintain that, because the State took possession of their land on 9 November 1973, they were entitled to be paid its fair market value on or before that date. They claim that, because the State's delay in payment deprived them of the use of that money from 9 November 1973 to 24 July 1974, they are additionally entitled, as part of just compensation, to damages above the fair market value. They assert that, because the State's refusal to pay those damages when due deprived them of the use of that money from 24 July 1974 to 31 January 1977, they are entitled to additional damages. They conclude that the damages should have been determined by applying the State's rate of return on its investments during those periods to the amounts withheld.
-9 November 1973 to 28 November 1973-
The trial court erred in awarding additional damages from 9 November 1973 to 28 November 1973. The question of damages for that period should not have been considered because it previously had been settled.
A ruling of an appellate court upon a question becomes the "law of the case" and is binding on the courts and litigants in further proceedings in the same case. Neither questions which were decided nor questions that could have been raised and decided on appeal can be relitigated. 9
A decision of a trial court which finally determines the rights of the parties becomes the "law of the case" when no appeal is taken. Such a decision also is binding on the courts and litigants in further proceedings in the same case. Neither questions which were decided nor questions which could have been raised and decided in the trial court or on appeal can be relitigated in the same case. 10
Maryland Rule U19 provides in pertinent part:
These rules establish that in condemnation proceedings all questions relating to the amount of just compensation must be decided by the jury. Thus, any claim that the owners were entitled to additional damages because the State's delay in payment deprived them of the use of money due them on 9 November 1973 could have been raised and decided in the trial court.
Here the question of just compensation was determined by the jury. The record does not show that the owners asked the jury to award damages for the loss of the use of money from 9 November 1973. The record does show that the owners did not appeal from the 20 December 1973 judgment entered on the jury's verdict. Under these circumstances, the trial court's award finally determined the owners' right to damages sustained before judgment and became the "law of the case." The owners' claim for damages for loss of the use of money from 9 November 1973 to 28 November 1973, having previously been settled, could not be relitigated in the same case.
-28 November 1973 to 24 July 1974-
The trial court also erred in determining the amount of additional damages for the loss of the use of money from 28 November 1973 to 24 July 1974. Damages should not have been determined by applying the State's rate of return on its investments during that period to the amount of the payment withheld, but rather by applying the legal rate of interest.
In Lore v. Board of Public Works, 13 the Court of Appeals considered the question of whether, in conventional condemnation proceedings, an owner is entitled to interest from the date of the entry of judgment nisi until the time of payment. The Court recognized that, generally, the term "just compensation" is equated with fair market value. 14 The Court concluded that, in condemnation cases, the General Assembly may grant owners more than the constitutional minimum of just compensation. 15 It determined that "one of the extra elements of damage" authorized by the General Assembly was "interest on the award, computed from the date of the entry of the judgment nisi to the time the judgment is satisfied." 16 It held that the owners were entitled to interest on the compensatory award.
Lore establishes that, in conventional condemnation proceedings, an owner receives just compensation if awarded the fair market value of the property taken. An owner is not entitled to any other damages as part of just compensation. An owner who has suffered additional damage is entitled to be compensated only if and to the extent authorized by the Legislature.
Applying these principles to the instant case produces a clear result. Because the owners were awarded the fair market value of their land, they received just compensation. While they were not entitled to any other damages as part of just compensation, they were entitled to compensation for additional damages to the extent authorized by the Legislature. Having recognized that an owner suffers additional damage when payment of a condemnation award is delayed, the Legislature has authorized compensation for the loss of the use of money to the extent of the payment of interest from the date of the judgment nisi. 17 Accordingly, we hold that the owners were entitled to interest from 28 November 1973 to 24 July 1974 at the legal rate of six percent per year. 18
-24 July 1974 to 31 January 1977-
The trial court's determination of the amount of damages for the loss of the use of money from 24 July 1974 to 31 January 1977 was based...
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